Still leaders but less exceptional: The Nordic states and development assistance

Abstract

The Nordic countries have been described as generous front-runners in their development assistance, making observers suggest the existence of a ‘Nordic Model’. They have been claimed to play a leadership role in a European and global context. Recently, however, this characterisation has been challenged due to changes in Nordic policies and in the external environment. We investigate the development policies of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden – and their changing roles and priorities from the start of Nordic aid programmes, with a focus on developments and trends in the last 15 years and ask if we have come to the end of the Nordic Model. We identify three key changes in their policies: (1) an increased emphasis on security and migration, (2) the traditional focus on poverty reductions is increasingly competing both with other value-related objectives and with self-interested goals and (3) an increased emphasis on the role of the private sector and trade as instruments for development. We argue that perceptions of a Nordic leadership role still exist, despite these challenges, although in a diluted and more complex shape. The Nordic Model is not abandoned but has been eroded by external and internal forces.

Introduction

The Nordic countries have, at least since the 1970s, been described as generous and advanced in their development assistance, making observers discuss the existence of a ‘Nordic Model’ and of ‘Nordic Exceptionalism’ (De Bengy Puyvallée and Björkdahl, 2021; Kjaer et al., 2022; Selbervik and Nygaard, 2006; Stokke, 2019). The Nordics have, admittedly to different degrees, been claimed to play a leadership role in global and European aid cooperation. A key element of this Nordic model, besides its generosity, is an emphasis on values and norms, such as democracy, sustainability, human rights and gender equality (Elgström and Delputte, 2015; Stokke, 2019). However, over the last decade, several contextual changes have taken place, which have affected the Nordic states and their development aid. Key among these are the migration crisis of 2015 and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. We have also witnessed changes in the characteristics of Nordic development aid, leading some observers to question their alleged normative leadership role. Furthermore, the homogeneity of the Nordics has been increasingly put into question, with scholars emphasising divergence in goals, priorities and policy instruments (Kjaer et al., 2022).

This article investigates four Nordic states ¹ – Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden – and their changing roles and priorities in development assistance. We describe developments and trends from the start of Nordic aid programmes but concentrate our analysis on changes that have occurred during the last 15 years. We pose two over-arching research questions:

• RQ1. Have we seen the end of the Nordic Model?

• RQ2. Have we seen a change in the roles played by the Nordics in the field of development assistance?

The analysis in this article is, because of space limitations, admittedly held on a general level. There is no room for detailed descriptions and in-depth scrutiny of the development policies of the individual Nordic countries.

Based on our empirical material, we identify three key changes in the policies of the Nordics: (1) an increased emphasis on security, due to the war in Ukraine, and migration, due to the migration crisis in 2015, (2) the traditional focus on poverty reduction is increasingly competing both with other value-related objectives (e.g. democracy, human rights and climate change) and with self-interested goals (reducing the costs of irregular migration) and (3) a renewed but increased attention and emphasis on the role of the private sector (in both donor and recipient countries) and trade as instruments for development. We situate these changes in an evolving European political landscape where populist and far-right forces gain ground across the continent.

Theoretically, we apply concepts and propositions from role theory and leadership theory. Our empirical material consists of external reviews of the Nordic countries’ development policies carried out by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), an analysis of key Nordic government documents from 2010 to 2025 and secondary material. In the last section, we will relate the findings based on this material to interviews conducted with member state representatives in the EU Council Working Party on Development Cooperation (CODEV) during several rounds between 2015 and 2024. Methodologically, we employ a perceptual approach where we use the material to delineate perceptions, expectations and evaluations of Nordic role conceptions and role performance, especially during the last decade.

The article serves to illuminate the internationally highly reputed ‘soft foreign policy power’ of the Nordics in development assistance while highlighting the challenges to the normative leadership role that have appeared in the last decade. We argue that perceptions of a Nordic leadership role still exist, despite these challenges, although in a diluted and more complex shape. The Nordic Model is not abandoned but has been eroded by external and internal forces.

In the next section, we briefly delineate debates and approaches on development assistance that have been covered in Cooperation and Conflict during its 60 years of existence. The following two sections deal with theory and methodology. We explicate the main concepts and ideas of role theory and leadership theory and present our methodological choices and materials. The analytical part starts with an overview of over-arching trends, tendencies and continuities in Nordic development assistance in the time period between 1960 and 2010, structured according to a number of main themes: volume, bilateral versus multilateral aid, goals and motives. After introducing external and internal challenges that have shaped Nordic policies since 2010, we then turn to our main area of interest, developments during the last 15 years, identifying major changes in the policies and roles of the four Nordics. In the concluding section, we provide tentative answers to our research questions.

The Nordics and development cooperation in Cooperation and Conflict

Cooperation and Conflict paid attention to the Nordic countries’ important role in as well as their strategies towards development cooperation already in the early years of its existence. In 1970, a special issue was devoted to ‘Nordic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries’ (Vol. 5, No. 2). The SI contained both articles on the individual countries’ development aid and comparative studies. In this issue, Reinton (1970) emphasised the importance of moral issues in the Nordics’ development aid, stating that there was ‘a strong moral incentive to give creative aid to the poor countries, at least in the beginning. Later the entrepreneurial atmosphere may enter and over-come morals’ (p. 118). He also concluded that there were no major differences between the Nordic countries regarding development aid, and that they did, in fact, become more and more similar due to ‘the great amount of cooperation between them’ (Reinton, 1970: 119).

There has been a recurring interest into to what extent the Nordic countries demonstrate differences and similarities in their development aid. Despite some differences among the Nordics, they have often been described as like-minded in their approaches to development cooperation giving rise to the concept of a ‘Nordic Model’. In an article in Cooperation and Conflict in 2017, Elgström (2017) described how the three Nordic EU members ‘have traditionally been praised for their generous and advanced development policies, [. . .] driven by solidarity and moral and humanitarian concerns rather than by material interests’ (p. 228). The ‘good power’ approach of the Nordics has been an important part in their seeking status and recognition in international politics (Røren, 2019).

Cooperation and Conflict has also published articles with a focus on the identity and ‘branding’ aspects of the Nordics in relation to development cooperation as well as foreign policy in general, with a special issue in 2007 about ‘Nordic Internationalism’ as one example (Vol. 42, No. 1). Here, the concept of ‘Nordic Exceptionalism’ is discussed, described by Browning (2007) as an idea that the Nordics are ‘being different from or better than the norm – and of the Nordic experience, norms and values as a model to be copied by others’ (p. 27) but also ‘a firm Nordic belief in internationalist solidarism and Third Worldism’ (p. 28). International solidarity is also emphasised by Bergman in the same SI, in her article about how social democracy has influenced Swedish internationalism. An important aspect of the Nordics’ identity or branding on the international stage has been their emphasis on values such as democracy, human rights and gender equality. Much research has focused on the Nordics’ outstanding record on gender equality at home and promotion of this norm abroad, not least through its development policy. Richey (2001) argued that ‘the Danish state’s identification with gender issues is transferred into Danish development policy’ (p. 178), and the importance of gender equality in Nordic development cooperation – also for the other Nordics – is brought up in the afore-mentioned articles by Bergman (2007) and Elgström (2017).

There have been ongoing discussions over the years about whether ‘Nordic Exceptionalism’ still exists. Browning stated in 2007 that ‘the idea of a distinct Nordic position or model is increasingly less obvious’ (Browning, 2007: 28). He argued that ‘it is no longer clear that the Nordic countries hold to clearly defined or distinctive positions, interests or identities that mark out the Nordic states from others’ (Browning, 2007: 31). Importantly, relating to a role perspective, Browning (2007) furthermore stated that ‘it is also unclear whether other actors (the audience) so clearly identify the Nordics as a separate group with a distinct brand as they did previously’. Membership in the EU – where the three Nordics have become part of a larger like-minded network when it comes to development and gender issues (Elgström, 2017) – could be one reason for a less distinct Nordic position. Internal changes, such as changes in government and parliamentary complexities, were factors that Huldt already in 1979 flagged could lead to more divergence between the Nordic countries’ approaches to development aid (Huldt, 1979).

Roles and (normative) leadership

Roles are ‘patterns of expected, appropriate behaviour’ (Chaban and Elgström, 2021b: 19). Role theory, applied to foreign policy and International Relations (IRs), initially tended to have a structural view, suggesting that national roles were mainly determined by the international system (Breuning, 2024). The roles presented by Holsti (1970) in his seminal article on national role conceptions were also heavily influenced by the Cold War world order at the time. In more recent years, role theory has come to link actor-centred and structural approaches (Chaban and Elgström, 2021b: 19), recognising the mutually constituting nature of the system and the actor, as well as emphasising the interaction between the self and ‘the other’ (Breuning, 2024). Following Chaban and Elgström (2021b), we will use the distinction between role conception, or the self-image of an actor (state) and role prescription, which consists of other actors’ (states’) perceptions and expectations of that actor. As stated by Aggestam (2006), a role conception is formed by ‘a mixture of norms, intentions and descriptions of reality which vary in degree of specificity and manifestation’ (p. 20). Actors tend to have multiple role conceptions, which at times can result in a role conflict. Since states’ role conceptions may differ regarding different policy areas, it is important to study national role conceptions in relation to specific policy areas (cf. Breuning, 2024). Importantly, although role conceptions are relatively persistent, they can be ‘reshaped through confrontations with others’ expectations’ (Aggestam, 2006: 16).

This leads us to role prescriptions, which is made up by other actors’ perceptions and expectations. Wehner (2015) describes the ‘importance of Others’ expectations [as] key for the role conception of a state, as the latter emerge in the interaction of the self-conception side and the role expectation dimensions’ (p. 435). Expectations are also linked to role performance of the state in question, since performance will feed back into others’ expectations of how different roles will be enacted in the future (Aggestam, 2006). If performances are not living up to expectations, this may result in an expectation-performance gap (Chaban and Elgström, 2023), which eventually could lead to changes in expectations and, potentially, in role conceptions.

A role that commonly occurs in studies of IRs is that of a leader. Leadership is here defined as ‘an asymmetrical relationship of influence in which one actor guides or directs the behavior of others towards a certain goal over a certain period of time’ (Underdal in Elgström, 2007: 449). In the study of international negotiations, the actors can be categorised as, for example, ‘leaders, mediators, defenders of one’s own interests, brakers and followers’ (Elgström, 2007: 449). Summarising the IR literature at the time, Holsti (1970: 255) found that ‘bloc leader’ was a commonly occurring role in the literature. The primary role sources were ‘external threats; ideology; structure of system’ (Holsti, 1970), clearly reflecting the Cold War world order. Among other national role conceptions suggested by Holsti (1970) we find that of ‘regional leader’, implying ‘special responsibilities that a government perceives for itself in its relation to states in a particular region with which it identifies, or to cross-cutting subsystems such as international communist movements’ (p. 261).

The role of leader does not have to be based on a great power status, which is evident also in the categories presented by Holsti. He emphasises the importance of identity in his description of a regional leader. Leadership can have different sources, material and immaterial, such as military, economic, social (identity) or ideational/normative. In this article, we focus on normative leadership, which emphasises the role of ideas and norms as sources of leadership. Normative leadership is a form of ‘soft power’, shaping the preferences of others through appeal and attraction (Nye, 2004), through the promotion of norms (cf. Manners, 2002). It implies ‘that the goal that the actor aspires to reach is directed to attain a certain value or norm [. . .] and to spread this value to other actors within a certain community’ (Elgström and Rosén Sundström, 2024).

Methodology

With external reception of the Nordics being built on the recognition and perceptions of their policies, this section will briefly outline a perceptual approach to the study of Nordic foreign assistance, based on the research by one of the authors in cooperation with Professor Natalia Chaban, in their research on EU foreign policy (Chaban and Elgström, 2020, 2021a, 2021b, 2024). According to this approach, both senders and recipients of foreign policy actions are seen as active agents, informed by a range of cognitive, emotive and normative images of, in this case, the Nordic countries. The perceptual approach predicts discrepancies between the perceptions of senders and receivers.

The perceptual approach is particularly well suited for an analysis of roles because role theory emphasises the interplay between an actor’s self-images, in terms of role conceptions, and the images held by external actors, role prescriptions. Roles are chiselled out in the meeting, continuous actions and reactions, between the parties’ perceptions and expectations. The perceptual approach also implies that role performance is indicated by how self and others perceive the level of performance.

In this article, there is a difference between the first period we study (1960–2010) and the second (2010–2025) with regard to the evidence we have on self-images and external perceptions. We base our relatively compact analysis of the first five decades almost solely on secondary material, some dealing with the individual Nordic countries and others having a comparative perspective. Some of these sources share our interest in the fate of the Nordic Model, but none of them make use of role theory. These studies, written by scientists as well as practitioners, often rely on a large variety of sources, official documents but also interviews with aid officials. They offer rich and solid evidence of observers’ and participants’ views on the self-images of the Nordics, and indirectly of their role conceptions, while evidence of outsiders’ perceptions is scant (descriptions of the reputation of Nordic states’ aid policies are sometimes reported, providing us with some clues). This obviously makes it difficult to carry out a full analysis of their development policy roles, as we primarily have to be satisfied with self-perceptions.

The latter part of our empirical analysis is very different. The secondary literature is not as rich, but instead we can base our conclusions also on documents from the four states as well as OECD/DAC. In order to put additional weight on our analysis of roles, we have selected key documents on foreign assistance released by the governments of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden between 2010 and 2025. We have analysed these texts searching for statements relating to perceived identity and their self-images as donors. To learn more about external perceptions, we have scrutinised the OECD/DAC reviews of the Nordic countries published between 2010 and 2025. In the concluding discussion, we will relate our findings to interviews conducted in our previous and ongoing research projects. We have interviewed EU member state representatives in CODEV in several rounds between 2015 and 2024, where some interviews focused on foreign aid in general and the role of the Nordics (Elgström and Delputte, 2015), while others mainly concerned gender equality in development cooperation (Elgström and Rosén Sundström, 2024; Rosén Sundström and Elgström, 2020). Finally, some limitations regarding the sources should be noted. Actors’ motives for their actions are not necessarily reflected by official statements. Furthermore, the reliability of policy documents and elite interviews in capturing actual practice can be put into question.

Nordic development assistance 1960–2010

Nordic experts on development policy agree on the existence in the 1970s–1990s of a ‘Nordic aid model’ (Development Today, 2010; Kjaer et al., 2022; Odén, 2011) and described the Nordics as ‘frontrunners’ (Lancaster, 2007; Stokke, 2019: 6–7) in their foreign aid policies. In the EU context, Denmark, Finland and Sweden ‘stood out as generous donors, driven by solidarity, altruism, moral and humanitarian concerns, rather than material interests’ (Elgström and Delputte, 2015: 30). The model was characterised by its ‘generosity, its focus on poverty reduction, human rights, sustainable development, multilateralism, and alignment with recipient government policy’ (Kjaer et al., 2022: 319).

The Nordic uniqueness in development policy should be seen in the light of a broader discourse on the Nordics as value-driven ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Ingebritsen, 2002; Lawler, 1997, 2007; Olsen, 2013), or ‘humane internationalists’ (Pratt, 1989; Stokke, 1989), trying to spread the norms they cherish to other actors, by persuasion or by acting as role models (Elgström and Delputte, 2015).

The Nordic countries were, however, slow starters regarding aid volume (Stokke, 2019: 6). In the 1950s and early 1960s, driven by the Cold War, the United States was the leading provider of development assistance, prompting its allies to initiate or increase aid programmes. Denmark and Norway were actually among the least generous in these early years (Lancaster, 2007: 192). However, this Nordic tardiness was to change, and they were soon ahead of others in terms of share of Gross National Income (GNI). In Sweden, a government bill (prop. 1962: 100) – labelled the ‘Bible’ of Swedish aid in its first decades – confirmed Sweden’s acceptance of the volume target for the first United Nations development decade and expressed an ambition to reach the 1% of GNI in official development assistance (ODA). Sweden became the first country in the world to reach the 0.75% of GNI target in 1974.

Denmark’s way to the ‘heyday of Denmark as a provider of ODA’ in the 1990s (Stokke, 2019: 79) was slower and bumpier. Its aid volume was not more than 0.38% in 1970, and it was not until 1985 that its parliament decided to reach the 1% of GNI goal in 1992. In the 1990s, Denmark became the ‘most generous source of aid, relative to the size of its economy’ in the world and gained a reputation ‘as a leader in development assistance’ (Lancaster, 2007: 190). Its aid volume hovered around 1% throughout the decade and remained substantial despite a 10% cut in 2002. Norway followed a similar path. Its aid contributions were very small in the 1960s but then increased rapidly. ‘By the late 1970s, Norway’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) had increased from a tiny share of gross national product (GNP) in the 1960s to beyond the target set for the second UN development decade (0.7% of GNP)’ (Stokke, 2019: 122). Norway’s aid reached the 1% target in 1983 and then continued on this level to the mid-1990s when it decreased and did not meet the target again until 2010 (Stokke, 2019: 130).

Finland has, in terms of the volume of its aid contribution, been described as ‘the odd man out’ among the Nordics (Elgström and Delputte, 2015: 30). Although all Finnish governments since 1993 have promised to reach the 0.7% target, they have all failed to meet this goal, with the average of aid disbursements of 0.42%. This stands in sharp contradiction with ‘Finland’s external and internal image of an otherwise progressive donor and like-minded partner on the international scene’ (Karhu and Lanki, 2022: 436).

In its formative period, aid was often channelled through the UN system and the World Bank. All the Nordics have, especially by supporters of this system, been described as ‘good multilateralists’, with substantial portions of its aid channelled through multilateral agencies and with Finland standing out with almost half of its aid as multilateral core support (Kjaer et al., 2022: 327). This multilateral orientation was true not least in the 1960s and 1970s (Stokke, 2019: 74).

From the beginning, Nordic aid was driven by humanitarian motives (Engh, 2021: 126; Odén and Wohlgemuth, 2006; Stokke, 2019: 74). According to the Swedish government, its development assistance was already in 1962 claimed to ‘emerge from a sense of moral duty and international solidarity’ and that Sweden ‘had no self-seeking interest’ (quoted in Stokke, 2019: 190, 224). In Norway, justifications, objectives and guidelines have been basically altruistic (Stokke, 2019: 135). Denmark also referred to humanitarian solidarity as primary reason for its assistance (Stokke, 2019: 74, 92), while Finnish goals and motives have followed Sweden’s (Kjaer et al., 2022: 335). References were also made, particularly in Sweden, to the welfare state ideas of the countries as a political justification of foreign aid (Engh, 2021: 127).

The main goal of the Nordic states’ aid programmes has since their inception been poverty reduction. Basically, this implies that aid should be primarily directed to low-income countries, rather than mid-income countries. The basic focus on poverty alleviation and increased standard of living in recipient countries characterised their aid during the entire time period (On Sweden: Stokke, 2019: 197; On Finland: Karhu and Lanki, 2022: 440; On Denmark: Lancaster, 2007: 195; On Norway: Stokke, 2019: 137). In the 1980s and 1990s, however, other objectives, related to global problems, were added. Environmental protection came to the forefront and occupied a prominent position starting in the 1980s (Lancaster, 2007: 198–199; Stokke, 2019: 82, 211) and democracy, human rights and gender equality became focal points in the 1990s (Karhu and Lanki, 2022: 441, Lancaster, 2007: 198–199, 208; Stokke, 2019: 83, 198–199). ² These new priorities followed international trends (Kjaer et al., 2022: 323). With the Nordic countries aspiring to a leadership role in environmental and climate change issues, it was natural that they tried to act as vanguards in these fields also in development circles (cf. Engh, 2021: 126).

Domestic economic interests have ‘strongly influenced’ Danish development policy ‘from day one’ (Stokke, 2019: 96). Stokke adds that ‘certainly Danish business interests have been looked after, almost consistently’, although they are not considered to be the main driver of aid policy (Stokke, 2019: 98). Promotion of Norwegian commercial interests was an important objective in Norway (Tjønneland, 2022: 376). Also in Finland, its ‘aid paradigm’ stresses ‘the importance of Finland’s own interests’ (Karhu and Lanki, 2022: 447). Stokke (2019: 210, 225) adds that also Sweden, with its official emphasis on ‘no self-seeking interests’, has in the early 2000s experienced a certain commercialisation of its aid, despite strong resistance from its aid community. A significant share of Nordic bilateral aid was used to procure goods from domestic companies until the early 1990s.

In terms of continuities and changes, many of the main traits of the Nordic Model remain throughout the period: the emphasis on humanitarian motives, the focus on poverty reduction as the main goal, the high share of GNI given as aid, relative to other DAC countries (with Finland all the time lagging behind but still performing relatively well). Certain changes are, however, visible. More goals are added alongside poverty alleviation, under the influence of international trends. The multilateralist focus remained but with an increasingly notable change in focus from core funding to earmarked funding. Even more important was a gradual phasing out of bilateral state-to-state aid, a dominant feature of Nordic foreign assistance before the turn of the millennium (Kjaer et al., 2022: 328; Tjønneland, 2022: 381–382). There are also some signs that the Nordics’ aid policies are beginning to grow apart. Danish aid did in the 2000s develop characteristics that did not fit easily with the traditional Nordic Model, making Kjaer et al. (2022) conclude that it has ‘undergone a paradigm shift in the new millennium’ (p. 335). External observers, however, still tended to stick to the concept of a Nordic Model, comparing them to mainstream DAC countries.

When trying to link Nordic aid policies in the time period 1960–2010 with the concepts of role theory, it seems safe to conclude that Sweden, Norway and Denmark, but to a certain extent also Finland, have tried to play a leadership role in development assistance, at least since the 1970s, including the sub-role as ‘a generous provider of assistance’. Engh (2021) contends that the Nordics have played ‘self-assumed roles as international leaders’ (p. 127) in the development field. She adds that Sweden has promoted a ‘picture of a reliable and generous provider of development assistance’ and that this has ‘became an integral part of Swedish identity in international relations’ (Engh, 2021: 128, quoting Ekengren and Götz, 2013: 85). This characterisation is shared by Stokke (2019: 226), stating that the narrative of Sweden as a generous and idealistic donor ‘has developed into Swedish identity . . . its self-image’. The Swedish leadership role is also visible, as demonstrated above, in climate change and environmental assistance. Lancaster (2007: 202) submits that Denmark in the early 2000s ‘still’ intended to remain ‘in the forefront internationally’ as a donor. Norway was strong on environmental issues already in the 1980s and prominent on climate change after 2000 (Tjønneland, 2022: 376). Although these remarks bear witness of Nordic role conception (self-images), there is also some evidence that these images were shared by international observers. Denmark is thus claimed to have ‘gained reputation as a leader’ in development assistance (Lancaster 2007: 190) and Stokke (2019) remarks that ‘Sweden remains a special provider of development assistance . . . into the new century’ (p. 226). In this context, we should also consider the general assessments made – and presented above – about the Nordic Model and its role in development assistance.

Furthermore, it seems reasonable to argue that the Nordics, and most evidently Sweden, have in their national role conceptions promoted images as champions of democratic values, human rights and gender equality. Already at an early stage of Nordic assistance, the role of a proponent of multilateralism was prominent and this role lingered throughout the time period, although changes in the forms of multilateral aid may have diminished its credibility.

Challenges to the Nordic model

The Nordic aid model – ‘pure traditional aid’, in its ultimate form driven by altruistic motives, without consideration of egoistic self-interests – has during the latest two decades been challenged by external events and trends as well as by developments within domestic societies.

External challenges

Major unfolding events on the global arena have in the latest 15 years led to repercussions in the policies of major aid donors worldwide. In the Nordic context, the refugee crisis of 2015 and the Russian annexation of Crimea and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine have affected their development policies. As described by Kjaer et al. (2025: 117), since 2022 ‘donor countries have allocated major portions of their aid budgets to Ukraine and related purposes, including for refugees in donor countries’ (p. 117).

Costs for asylum seekers in donor countries can be counted as ODA for the first 12 months (Kjaer et al., 2022: 332). Sweden is the Nordic country that has by far received the largest number of refugees and has also covered the largest amount of in-donor costs (Kjaer et al., 2022), but all the Nordics have used this opportunity to the full as long as this has been allowed by OECD/DAC rules. ³ The Conservative-Liberal government in Sweden has recently decided to use the aid budget to cover refugee expenses not only for the first but also for a second year – in direct violation of OECD rules. According to Kjaer et al. (2022) ‘the ability to report these costs as ODA is probably the single starkest example of influence of aid policy and practice from another issue area’ (p. 333). Given unaltered or decreased aid budgets, using asylum costs as ODA diminishes the amount of aid given to poor countries.

A perceived ‘danger’ of huge in-flows of migrants (as ‘too many’ immigrants are often associated with poor integration, leading to alienation, high crime rates and the rise of criminal gangs) has resulted in an increased focus on help to fragile states ⁴ (cf. Kjaer et al., 2022: 331), in an attempt to attack the background causes of migration in these countries. For example, Denmark has increased its emphasis on countries in conflict, from which irregular migration is assumed to come (Kjaer et al., 2022: 338).

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 also resulted in a significant flow of refugees into the Nordic states. Again, foreign assistance was used as a way of financing refugee costs. In Sweden, a cut with almost 20% of the aid budget for 2022, caused by a sharp increase in the financing of refugee costs, resulted inter alia in drastic decreases in aid targeted for human rights and sustainable peace (Concord, 2022). In total, 6.6% of the Swedish aid budget will be utilised to finance the reception of refugees in 2025 (Concord, 2024). Ukraine has also become a major recipient of humanitarian aid. Denmark, Norway and Sweden have substantially increased the aid to Ukraine over the last years, with Norway the most generous provider among the Nordics (Kjaer et al., 2025). This has affected aid to other recipient countries – in June 2025 the Swedish government announced further cuts in development aid to African countries (Concord, 2025b; Ekonomistyrningsverket, 2025).

Internal challenges

Domestic factors have often been paid less attention in studies of change in development cooperation policies (Kjaer et al., 2022: 325 ff.) One aspect, which Kjaer et al. focus on, is the role of party politics and coalition government formation in the Nordics. More specifically, they argue that

if far right-wing parties are needed to form a government, development aid is likely to be more politicized in the sense that there will be proposals to e.g. cut aid, use it to reduce migration, or do away with aid altogether. (Kjaer et al., 2022: 326)

Denmark was the first of the four countries where a far-right party acted as support party to a government, with the Danish Peoples’ Party supporting the Conservative-Liberal government in 2001–2011. The start of this period also saw a sharp increase regarding the share of seats in parliament in favour of cutting aid (Kjaer et al., 2022: 336). The share of Danish parliamentarians advocating reduction in aid stayed at a considerably higher level than in the other three countries up until 2017, also during a Social Democratic-led government. The development cooperation strategies, both of a centre-right government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2017) and a Social Democratic-led government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2021) have enjoyed strong agreement in the Danish parliament. The strategy documents after 2015 also share an increased focus on migration.

In Norway, the far-right Progress Party had its national breakthrough already in 1989, but it did not become a government party until 2013, when it formed a coalition government with the Conservative Party. The Progress Party stayed in government until 2021. Tjønneland (2022: 386) argues that there is a broad political consensus on development aid in Norway and that: ‘Parliamentary and coalition politics have played a crucial role in maintaining this broad consensus’ (Tjønneland, 2022: 387). The Progress Party has often called for budget cuts to development cooperation but dropped this claim during its time in government (Tjønneland 2022: 380) and has been committed to the 0.7% target. On the Conservative side, the Christian Democratic party has played an important role for upholding the consensus on development aid. As stated by Kjaer et al. (2022: 337): ‘Aid policy has in fact been important in wooing the Christian Democrats when forming governments’. Development aid noted a record high in 2023, when Norway reached 1.09% of GNI. In 2024, it decreased with 5%, which was mainly due to the end of a 1-year support package due to the war in Ukraine (Government of Norway, 2025; Norad, 2025).

In Finland, the far-right Finns Party entered parliament for the first time in 2003. It became part of a government coalition for the first time in 2015–2019, and then again since 2023. There has been a low level of support for reductions of Finnish aid in the parliament, but then Finnish aid has been at a lower level than in the other three Nordics. The support for aid reductions increased between 2007 and 2011, to stay at a somewhat higher level than before (Kjaer et al., 2022: 336). The Social Democratic-led government (2019–2023) increased development aid, from 0.42% of GNI in 2019 to 0.58% in 2022 (Kjaer et al., 2022: 338, OECD, 2023: 9). Since its comeback in government in 2023, the Finns Party has argued for reducing development aid by half. This has caused strains in the government coalition, in which another party, The Swedish People’s Party, is in favour of an increased aid budget (Swanljung, 2023). However, development aid as a share of GNI has decreased somewhat during the new government, to an estimated 0.42% for 2024 (Finnish Government, 2024a). Finland’s latest development strategies have also brought up the role of development aid as important in affecting the underlying causes of migration (Finnish Government, 2024b; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2021).

Sweden had a populist right party in parliament 1991–1994, but this party was neither part of nor support party to any government. The far-right Sweden Democrats came into parliament in 2010, which is also the year when the share of parliamentarians in favour of cutting aid started to increase. As stated in the previous section, since the migration crisis in 2015, the aid budget has also been used to cover costs for refugees in Sweden during the Red-Green government (2014–2021). However, a major overview of the Swedish development policy took place in 2023 by a Conservative-Liberal government, supported by the Sweden Democrats. With ‘Development Assistance for a New Era’ (Government Offices of Sweden, 2023), Sweden retracted from the 1% goal for the first time since the 1960s. The long dominant Social Democratic Party has criticised the new government’s development policy in parliament, but, at the same time, it has also decreased the share of aid in its own proposed budget. It has, however, declared the intention to get back to the 1% goal (Social Democratic party, 2024). The focus on migration and refugees has been further accentuated in the new government’s reformed development policy: ‘Development assistance policy should also be developed into a better tool to promote returns, voluntary repatriation and sustainable reintegration, and reduce irregular migration’ (Government Offices of Sweden, 2023: 5).

Three of the four Nordics – the exception being Norway – have thus seen a decrease in their development aid and all of them have experienced a turn towards a focus on migration in their policies. The first of these trends seems to relate to far-right parties becoming part of or supporting governments, as suggested by Kjaer et al. (2022). It is, however, important to note that there have also been some shifts among parties historically in favour of a generous foreign aid, such as the Social Democrats, not least with regard to the use of aid in one’s own country.

Nordic development assistance, 2010–2025: an overview

Regarding aid volume, Denmark ‘maintained [its] reputation as generous and predictable partners for development countries’ in the first half of the 2010s (Stokke, 2019: 94), but this picture started to change in the latter years of the decade (Stokke, 2019). Cuts in the aid budget were carried out in 2015 and Danish assistance since then has continued to be equal to or slightly above the DAC 0.7% target (Engberg-Pedersen and Fejerskov, 2021: 133). In its 2021 Report, DAC affirms that Denmark demonstrates a ‘stable and significant official development assistance budget’ (OECD/DAC, 2021: 8), in 2023 at 0.74% (OECD, 2024).

Sweden was in 2019 praised by DAC for its generous aid (OECD/DAC, 2019a: 16), hovering around 1% of its GNI. After the coming to power of the new Conservative-Liberal government in 2022, the country’s aid budget was, however, cut. Based on a prognosis of 2024, development aid will be cut with 6 billion SEK in 2025 and a further 1 billion SEK in 2026 (Government Offices of Sweden, 2024). In the 2023 budget, the budget allocation for ODA for the 2023–2025 period represented 0.88% of projected GNI in 2023, which the DAC mid-term review stated is ‘a departure from Sweden’s long-standing goal of allocating 1% of GNI to ODA and sends a negative signal to partners at a time when the need for and demands on ODA are so acute’ (OECD/DAC, 2024a: 1). Sweden’s reputation for generosity has been challenged by development non-governmental organisations (NGOs). According to Concord (2024), the new frame means ‘that Sweden will not live up to its aid commitment to 0.7 per cent of its GNI in 2028’.

In Norway, however, the 1% target is still alive (Concord, 2025a). Allocations on this level continued throughout the 2010s and the early 2020s (Tjønneland, 2022: 380). In 2023, the country’s ODA was 1.09% of GNI. The large amount of aid, increasing from 11 billion NOK in 2000 to around 55.7 billion in 2024 (Norad, n.d.), is enabled by the continuously rising Norwegian GNI, due to its oil revenues but also by strong Parliamentary support, despite a strong far-right party in Parliament (cf. Kjaer et al., 2022: 338; Tjønneland, 2022: 380).

In Finland’s DAC mid-term review conducted during the former centre-left government in 2021, the country was praised for increasing its ODA (OECD/DAC, 2024b). However, when the latest full DAC review took place, the new centre-left-populist government had announced plans to cut Finland’s ODA with €1 billion 2024–2027 as part of its austerity measures to reduce public spending and government debt (OECD/DAC, 2024d: 15). In April 2024, the government announced further cuts: ‘amounting to a total reduction in ODA of EUR 1.2 billion over four years, a cut of approximately 25%’ (OECD/DAC, 2024d). It is estimated that ODA will correspond to 0.36% of GNI in 2025 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2024). Despite the fact that the 0.7% target has remained an ‘essential feature of the Finnish aid paradigm’, the target has never been reached (Karhu and Lanki, 2022: 449–450).

While poverty reduction has remained as a primary goal in all the Nordic countries, it is now sharing this ranking with other objectives (Kjaer et al., 2022: 333). In the Finnish case, Karhu and Lanki (2022: 460, 442) observe that it is ‘coupled with other development policy goals and even with competing aims, most notably from the other branches of foreign policy. . . blurring the poverty focus’. Sustainable development and poverty elimination are still fundamental goals (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2021: 9), but their relative weight is diminished by the focus given to democracy, human rights, gender equality and environmental protection (ibid., p. 8). The DAC review of 2024 states that: ‘The further reduction of Finland’s ODA budget is undermining its commitment to support those most in need’ (OECD/DAC, 2024d: 8).

Similarly, Kjaer et al. (2022) note that Denmark has ‘abandoned poverty reduction as the only over-arching goal’ (p. 333). According to a policy document from 2017 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2017: 5), it is also a defender of human rights, gender equality, actively combating climate change.

Sweden, however, maintained its emphasis on poverty alleviation (Kjaer et al., 2022: 333), although it also considerably increased the focus on the same type of value-related goals as Denmark and Finland (Kjaer et al., 2022: 334). Its decision to introduce a Feminist Foreign Policy in 2014 considerably raised its gender equality profile, not least in the area of foreign assistance (Rosén Sundström and Elgström, 2020; Rosén Sundström et al., 2021). However, after the advent of the Conservative-Liberal government in 2022, new priorities were established. As development cooperation is seen as ‘one of the most important tools to pursue and protect Swedish interests’ (Government Offices of Sweden, 2023: 2) it had to be re-constructed. While reducing poverty in Less Developed Countries is still a policy goal – Swedish aid aims to ‘create conditions for improved living conditions for people living in poverty’ (Government Offices of Sweden, 2023) – it is strikingly less prevalent than in previous policy documents and only one among many prioritised objectives, including gender equality, combatting climate change and democracy building (Government Offices of Sweden, 2023: 4, 11–19). Preventing irregular migration and furthering voluntary repatriation are introduced as other key objectives (Government Offices of Sweden, 2023), adding a new dimension to Sweden’s policy objectives. Mitigating illegal migration had been declared a goal by Denmark already in 2017 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2017: 19).

The Swedish government motivated its new priorities by stating that: ‘A nation’s most important obligation is towards its own citizens. We still have an extensive aid budget despite the investment needs we have at home’ (Benjamin Dousa, Minister for International Development Cooperation and Foreign Trade, quoted by Aftonbladet, 2024, our translation). Defending national domestic interests, including the welfare state, now seems to be a major motive behind Nordic assistance, besides humanitarian motives. Both Denmark, Sweden and Norway motivate their increased humanitarian aid to fragile states and states in conflict as an instrument to prevent irregular migration (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2017: 5, 19; Swedish Government, 2023: 2; Tjønneland, 2022: 377), another example that demonstrates the new emphasis on domestic concerns. However, this trend has this far mainly been visible in policy documents, not so much in concrete budget allocations. It should also be borne in mind that increased assistance to countries in conflict is sometimes motivated by other concerns, often of a political nature. Higher aid flows to Ukraine and Palestine are cases in point. Finally, supporting private sector interests by emphasising its importance as an instrument of aid is also part of the new aid parcel (Finnish Government 2024b; Government Offices of Sweden, 2023: 5; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2017: 9).

Norway has kept its commitment to poverty reduction, although this focus has been watered down by attention to other policy objectives, such as resisting climate change, improving global health and women’s rights and fighting inequality (Donortracker, 2025; Tjønneland, 2022: 376). Norway has thus, more than its Nordic neighbours, in the last decade or so focused on global public goods (Concord, 2025a; Tjønneland, 2022: 376, 378). Such aid constituted 21% of its aid in 2018, compared to 14% in Sweden, and 11% in Denmark and Finland (Tjønneland, 2022: 382). Education in developing states was prioritised during the governments of Erna Solberg (2013–2021) (Tjønneland, 2022: 377). Since 2021, the current government has added food security as a new priority (OECD/DAC, 2024c).

Nordic foreign assistance policy roles, 2010–2025

In this section, we trace what roles the Nordic countries are perceived to play in their foreign aid policies and practices in the 2010–2025 period. As roles emerge from the interaction between self-images (role conceptions) and external role prescriptions, we analyse both recent domestic policy documents and external descriptions and evaluations in the form of OECD/DAC peer reviews on the Nordic states. ⁵ We scrutinise the role perceptions of the three countries one by one.

The latest DAC report on Sweden, from 2019, describes it as a ‘strong development partner . . . adept, ambitious and influential actor on global sustainable development’ (OECD/DAC, 2019a: 16). In terms of roles, Sweden is pictured as a leader in several areas of development aid. It has ‘shown leadership in the pursuit of peace and conflict prevention, gender equality through its Feminist Foreign Policy and environmental sustainability and climate change’ (OECD/DAC, 2019a: 16, cf. p. 35) and has been a leader on policy coherence for sustainable development (OECD/DAC, 2019a: 28) and ‘in implementing the 2030 Agenda’ (OECD/DAC, 2019a: 26–27). The report states that: ‘Support for global sustainable development is in Sweden’s foreign policy DNA’ (p. 26). Sweden is also characterised as a ‘champion of multilateralism’, ‘a long-term and valued partner to multilateral organizations’ (pp. 17 and 26), thus confirming the continuation of a traditional Swedish role. The criticism directed to Sweden is limited and primarily concerns the large number of aid recipients (p. 21) and the multitude of goals, resulting in unclear priorities (pp. 20 and 35).

If DAC reports hold on to the ‘pure foreign aid model’ (see Note 5), there are reasons to believe that a future report on today’s Swedish foreign assistance would not be as positive as the one referred to above. In a mid-term review conducted in early 2023, before the new government’s reform of development cooperation, DAC stated that:

The reduction of core funding to the multilateral system [. . .] brings a risk that Sweden is perceived as moving away from its valued role as a global actor. We discussed the important role that Sweden plays within the DAC and globally and encouraged Sweden to demonstrate its continued ambition and international leadership. (OECD/DAC, 2024a: 1)

In the new government’s 2023 development strategy there is a very strong focus on Sweden’s near abroad, ‘a key element in our re-orientation of foreign aid’ (Government Offices of Sweden, 2023: 5), is evident. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a ‘paradigm shift’ (Government Offices of Sweden, 2023: 2), influencing Sweden’s security and prosperity and creating fertile ground for ‘criminality, terrorism, violent extremism, irregular migration and organized crime’ (Government Offices of Sweden, 2023). Swedish key values are under threat. Sweden’s assistance is considered an instrument to counter irregular migration and to increase repatriation. Sweden clearly now sees itself as playing the role of defender of Swedish interests – including external and domestic security interest – and values. Promoting Swedish economic and commercial interests is also a prominent feature in the policy document, i.a. by focusing on ‘synergies between trade and aid’ (p. 5). In addition, Swedish core support to international organisations is diminished (pp. 4 and 8), raising doubts about the future of the country’s long-standing role as a multilateralist, a concern flagged already in the mid-term report prior to the new strategy.

In the latest DAC report on Finland (OECD/DAC, 2024d), it is regarded as to be a leader in certain aspects: ‘Continuing to align to core values will ensure Finland remains a reliable partner and leader on key issues’ (OECD/DAC, 2024d: 10). Here, DAC especially mentions Finland’s ‘human rights-based approach and gender equality’ as ‘areas where Finland has had global reach and impact over the review period, by effectively and consistently aligning its engagement with these values’ (OECD/DAC, 2024d). In these areas, Finland continues to ‘build trust and dialogue and to have convening power in the multilateral system beyond its size’ (OECD/DAC, 2024d). The review also notes ‘key shifts in focus’ of Finnish aid, ‘including the reallocation of resources towards Ukraine and the more explicit use of development co-operation resources to support the internationalisation of Finnish companies’ (OECD/DAC, 2024d). The latter can be seen as part of a role as defender of Finnish interests.

In a recent report on development cooperation, the Finnish government similarly emphasises the need for stronger ties between trade and development and that this will ‘promote the business operations of companies both in the partner country and in Finland’ (Finnish Government, 2024b: 21). Finland thus displays a self-image as a defender of Finland’s domestic interests. However, the government also highlights how its own development has been advanced by a ‘stable democracy, gender equality and the participation of women and girls in society’s activities, high-quality education that is open to all, and economic and technological development’ (Finnish Government, 2024b), values which it considers important in its development aid. Finland can therefore also be described as a defender and promoter of national values. The continued importance given UN organisations and multilateral cooperation means that Finland maintains its role conception as a multilateralist.

The DAC Report on Norway from 2019 contends that Norway is ‘a strong development partner’ and a ‘driving force behind a number of multi-stakeholder initiatives’ (OECD/DAC, 2019b: 16). DAC ascribes Norway a leadership role in the field of development policy, as it ‘uses its voice to be a consistent and global leader’ (OECD/DAC, 2019b: 26). Its leadership within the donor community ‘is epitomized by its commitment to provide 1% of Gross National Income as ODA’ (OECD/DAC, 2019b: 46). Norway is also portrayed as a multilateralist, demonstrating ‘a committed approach to multilateral co-operation and upholding and strengthening global governance and norms’ (OECD/DAC, 2019b: 26). However, it is at the same time recommended to ‘detail in its multilateral strategy how its use of core funding /and/ earmarked funding . . . aligns with its objective of strengthening the multilateral system’ (OECD/DAC, 2019b: 18). These two roles are also given prominence in the 2024 DAC Mid-term Review (OECD/DAC, 2024c).

The report concludes that a ‘narrative of shared responsibility underpins Norway’s approach to sustainable development’ (OECD/DAC, 2024c: 16), which includes a ‘long-standing focus on poverty reduction’ although its policy guidelines do not ‘directly outline how Norway addresses poverty reduction’ (OECD/DAC, 2024c: 36, 38). Its ‘global and thematic priorities in advancing global public goods’ are in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (OECD/DAC, 2024c: 27).

DAC observes that Norway’s strategic priority is given to global public goods and challenges that ‘affect Norway’s national interests’. As an example, it mentions Norway’s international efforts to protect and uphold international law around oceans. These initiatives aim, it is claimed, to the country’s ocean security and economic interests (OECD/DAC, 2024c). Norway is thus assigned a role as protector of national interests. The Report also critically notes ‘an incoherence between Norway’s climate policy . . . and its support for the domestic petroleum industry’ (OECD/DAC, 2024c: 17, cf. 28). Nevertheless, Norway portrays itself as a leader in climate change and renewable energy in development cooperation (Government of Norway, 2021).

The expanding list of thematic priorities and cross-cutting objectives that characterises Norwegian foreign assistance mirrors an increasingly important self-image as an active global leader, also visible in Norway’s international engagement as a peace mediator. The growing number of such priorities partly results from a huge increase in the Norwegian state budget, mainly due to revenues from its oil extraction. An aid budget with a fixed 1% target implies an increase of 2 to 3 billion NOK a year (Tjønneland, 2022: 390). ‘Any minister coming in will find fresh funds available to fund new priorities’ (Tjønneland, 2022). While Norway has continued its support to multilateral organisations, there has been a clear shift from core funding to earmarked allocations and new global funds in areas prioritised by Norway (Tjønneland, 2022: 382, 386). Its multilateral approach has thus changed markedly.

In its 2021 Report, DAC affirms that Denmark has ‘pioneered ambitious climate change policies, building on political leadership’ (OECD/DAC, 2021: 8, cf. p. 19), is seen as a ‘global leader in fragile contexts’ (p. 9) and as an ‘early champion to link development partnerships with humanitarian action’ (OECD/DAC, 2021). It has a ‘solid record as a champion of gender equality, defence of democracy and advancing human rights’ (p. 9). It is clearly seen to play a leadership role in development aid, but also a role as promoter and defender of Danish values. Denmark is claimed to pursue ‘broad objectives’, where human rights and gender commitments ‘are clearer than its poverty focus’ (p. 34). Poverty reduction as a goal is ‘less clearly articulated than it was in the past’ (p. 9). At the same time, its strong commitment to multilateralism is confirmed (p. 16).

Danish support for ‘stemming irregular migration is increasingly shaping ODA allocations, with both positive and negative consequences’ (p. 17). The Report observes that ‘a number of Denmark’s partners perceive a risk that a focus on climate change, private sector development and irregular migration might come at the expense of a focus on poverty reduction’ (p. 36). DAC argues that Denmark has to safeguard ‘the integrity of its ODA’ and recommends that it should clarify how its development assistance ‘is expected to contribute to reducing poverty’ (p. 10, cf. p. 18), expressing a worry that recent developments in Danish aid policy are jeopardising traditional aid policy norms.

In its latest policy document, ‘A Changing World’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2025), Denmark has toned down its own leadership role compared to previous policy documents. While it stated that ‘Denmark must lead the way’ and declared that it ‘will lead the fight against climate change in the poorest countries’ in 2021 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2021: 5), it now declares that ‘Denmark cannot achieve this ambition alone. We are simply too small for that. The EU plays a central part of the strategy. It is in Denmark’s interest that the EU becomes a preferred partner for developing countries’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2025: 5). Hence, Denmark is now described as part of the EU rather than a leader in its own right when it comes to development cooperation. It does, however, still portray itself as a leader regarding humanitarian issues: ‘Denmark is widely regarded as a leading and credible humanitarian actor’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2025: 6). Values such as democracy, human rights and sustainability continue to be prominent (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2025). The document describes development assistance as giving ‘Denmark a strategic advantage that only becomes greater when the world is in turmoil’ and portrays this as ‘a geopolitical investment that opens doors and creates results and strategic alliances. It gives us a voice in countries and forums where decisions of great importance to us are made’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2025). This is in line with Denmark’s previous emphasis on domestic interests. This is further underlined by the outline of Danish aid as based on the Partner country and Danish economic as well as political interest (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2025: 10).

Conclusion: is the Nordic model still in existence?

To draw a conclusion about the continued existence, or not, of the Nordic Model we need to examine if the basic characteristics of this model are still in place, are perceived to be so, and if the Nordic countries under study still exhibit similar policy traits, or if their policies have diverged in the last 15 years. Following our perceptual approach, we have investigated whether the Nordics are still seen as leaders and generous providers of aid, as multilateralists and as promoters of democracy and sustainable development, with a focus on poverty reduction, human rights and gender equality.

There are signs of both change and continuity in the roles assigned to the Nordic countries as aid donors between 2010 and 2025. The leadership role is pronounced in DAC evaluations of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, while Finland is perceived as a leader only in selected areas, notably on gender equality. The latter assessment is reinforced by interviews with members of the EU Working Party on Development (CODEV) where Finland is considered the ‘main leader on gender equality today’, after Sweden’s rescinding of its FFP (Elgström and Rosén Sundström, 2024). Denmark and Norway also portray themselves as front-runners and leaders and Sweden does the same – with the notable exception of the 2023 document issued by the Conservative-Liberal government, supported by the far-right Sweden Democrats. Here, the focus is on a re-orientation of Swedish aid, as a consequence of external events, and Swedish leadership is not mentioned.

The role as a champion of democratic values, human rights and gender equality, prevalent in all Nordic countries, is still there, but in recent years increasingly complemented by a role as a defender and pursuer of Nordic values, where the domestic origins of these values are stressed. We also observe the emergence of a novel role, as a defender of national/domestic interests, especially in Swedish narratives, but also in the self-images of the other three countries. This is coming to the fore in the will to prevent illegal migration and financing domestic costs for refugee reception as well as in a renewed and increased emphasis on the role of the private sector in foreign assistance. ⁶ Increased allocations for humanitarian aid, including aid to fragile and war-torn states to prevent an exodus of refugees, have evoked a new role as a humanitarian partner.

The role as a generous provider of foreign assistance is still evident in both DAC and national documents. In reports from DAC and development NGOs it is, however, linked to warnings: recent decreases in Danish and Swedish ODA put the positive images of the Nordics at risk (Finland is an outlier, as it has expressed its ambition to reach the 0.7% goal for decades, but has never been near to reach this objective). The alleged generosity of the Nordics has been challenged by recent cuts in foreign aid budgets, leading three of them to de facto abandon the 1% target. The exception is Norway, which is still living up to this goal. The situation is similar regarding the Nordics’ traditional role as multilateralists. In the 2010s, multilateral aid – including both core funding and earmarked aid – accounted for between 56% (Denmark) and 65% (Finland) of the countries’ total aid (Kjaer et al., 2022: 238). Sweden’s recent cuts in allocations to core support for UN organisations have, however, raised doubts in DAC reports about its intentions for the future.

To summarise, we find that Nordic aid today exhibits signs of securitisation. The European migration crisis in 2015, followed by an exodus of refugees from Ukraine after 2022 and a deteriorating security situation in northern Europe as a result of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine have impacted Nordic development policies in several ways. Substantial parts of the aid budget are devoted to cover domestic costs associated with incoming refugees. The share of humanitarian aid directed to Ukraine but also to fragile LDCs, aimed to diminish the flow of irregular migrants, has increased dramatically. Nordic development aid is more and more focused on their near abroad and to its external and domestic security interests. We also witness a commercialisation of aid, an increased attention and emphasis on the role of the private sector as a development actor especially in Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Private enterprises have always had a place in Nordic policies, but in recent years, this focus has escalated. Official assistance is ‘not enough’ but has to be combined with trade relations and private investments.

The trends described here are common to all the four Nordic countries analysed in this article, albeit to varying degrees. They are thus contributing to increasing similarities between the Nordics – contrary to the trends observed in the early 2010s (Engh, 2021; Kjaer et al., 2022). This is not to play down the existing divergencies between the countries, nota bene the big differences in aid volume and share of GNI, the varying prioritisation of policy areas or the differing emphasis given to support to domestic economic interests.

All in all, the Nordic Model’s key characteristics are under attack. The central role of poverty reduction is challenged by the heightened attention to other policy objectives – climate change, democracy, human rights – resulting in a competition about increasingly scarce resources as aid budgets have been reduced (except in Norway). This trend has been amplified by the budget increases for refugee costs and humanitarian action in war-torn states.

The ‘stickiness’ of the leadership role speaks in favour of a continued image of Nordic Exceptionalism. In several areas of development aid, the Nordics are still pictured as front-runners. They still seem to be considered by outsiders as a ‘separate group with a distinct brand’ (Browning, 2007: 31). At the same time, interviews with EU Development Committee delegates presented in a 2015 article (Elgström and Delputte, 2015), revealed that the Nordic states are today in the EU considered part of a larger Like-Minded group of ‘progressive’ aid donors, including i.a. also the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, Ireland and Belgium. In this sense, the Nordics are not perceived as being exceptional anymore, or perhaps only in certain fields, such as gender equality.

To conclude, the traditional focus of the Nordic Model has been eroded: it is not abandoned but weakened by external forces in combination with domestic policy developments, notably the increased influence of far-right political parties. As such parties are prone to prioritise domestic concerns and audiences at the cost of altruistic external action, and as such ideas have spread also to traditional conservative parties, and even to Social Democratic parties to some extent, ⁷ domestic political developments have contributed to the erosion of the Nordic Model.

It should be noted, however, that the erosion of the Nordic Model is by no means inevitable. Party preferences and election results may change, leading to altered priorities regarding development policy. The Nordic countries are still considered generous and progressive donors in a comparative perspective. Their leadership role seems to remain among external observers. Institutionalised role expectations tend to be ‘sticky’, they do not change suddenly or dramatically (Chaban and Elgström, 2021b: 23; Towns et al., 2024: 1273). In an ongoing research project on Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy, a policy initiated by the Social Democratic government in 2014 but immediately rescinded by the Conservative-Liberal government in 2022, we find that practitioners in CODEV have not changed their perceptions of Swedish behaviour in any major way after the retraction (Elgström and Rosén Sundström, 2024). In the words of one non-like-minded delegate: ‘Sweden’s position on Council conclusions is apart from the label the same. It didn’t change drastically. Sweden is still a very vocal supporter of gender equality, women’s empowerment and work against gender-based violence. In my opinion, removing the label didn’t change anything’. More generally, policy practitioners in the field, brought up with images of the Nordics as progressive forces, may be rather resistant to signals that challenge such perceptions (cf. Towns et al., 2024).