Abstract
In this article, I make a case for studying the outcome of security cooperation between external and host forces through the lens of their relationship. This is because in order for such military cooperation to have a sustainable effect, the host needs to develop ownership and autonomy over its own security responses. This article sets out from the observation that there is an evident discrepancy between the stated intent and the actual outcome of the cooperation between the G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5S-JF) and external actors. Building on insights from peace-building and security force assistance (SFA) literature, I argue that the relationship between the G5S-JF and external actors is best characterised as one of asymmetric interdependence and that this asymmetric interdependence can explain why the G5S-JF never developed into an autonomous force with ownership over its security responses. The concept of asymmetric interdependence provides a new lens through which to research SFA and can potentially shed light on other relationships between international, regional, national and local actors more generally.
Introduction
In today’s globalised world, most responses to violent conflict require continuous interaction between the international, regional, national and local levels. Within peacebuilding, there has been an attempt to localise efforts, meaning engaging local actors in externally driven peacebuilding efforts in order to obtain sustainable outcomes. Within military cooperation and interventions, external actors have increasingly engaged in the capacity-building of local or national military forces, with the ultimate aim being that these forces themselves can assume ownership of the response to the security situation. These spheres of engagement between the external and the host in volatile settings have sparked scholarly debates on the successes and failures of external support, often with the aim of explaining why such interventions tend to be ineffective.
This article studies the interaction and cooperation between the G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5S-JF) and external military actors in the Sahel region who have provided support to the joint force. 1 Within the military aspect of such external capacity-building and security force assistance (SFA), scholars often point to the characteristics, approach or nature of either the external or the host to explain why there is commonly a discrepancy between the goal and the outcome of SFA (Biddle et al., 2018; Knowles and Matisek, 2019; Marsh and Rolandsen, 2021; Tull, 2020). In this article, I make a case for studying the outcome of security cooperation between external and host forces through the lens of their relationship, more so than their individual characteristics in and of themselves. I argue that the relationship between the G5S-JF and external actors is best characterised as asymmetric interdependence. This is because in order for such military cooperation to have a sustainable effect, the host needs to develop ownership and autonomy over its own security responses. While examining the nature of the provider or the recipient may explain effects of SFA, what determined the eventual autonomy of the host force is the relationship dynamics between the intervener and the host. The concept of asymmetric interdependence provides a new lens through which to research SFA and can potentially shed light on other relationships between international, regional, national, and local actors more generally.
The G5S-JF was established in 2017 as the military branch of the G5 Sahel organisation, by and for the member states of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Mali and Niger. The joint force was tasked with combatting terrorism, illicit trafficking and transnational crime (AU Peace and Security Council, 2017). When the G5S-JF was established, it was presented as a regional initiative, with a regional mandate and ownership. Following its establishment, it gained significant attention from the international community: by February 2018, over $400 million had been pledged to support the G5S-JF (African Center for Strategic Studies, 2018). The French-led counter-terror operation Barkhane in the Sahel has trained and mentored the G5S-JF troops. In 2020, Barkhane and the G5S-JF entered into a shared command, establishing a joint headquarters and a joint intelligence fusion cell, both based in Niamey in Niger. The European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) initially provided advice and assistance to the G5S-JF headquarters and was in 2020 also mandated to train the military troops of the joint force. The rationale behind the support to the G5S-JF, and thus the military cooperation between the G5S-JF (the host) and Barkhane and EUTM (the external), was to strengthen the joint force’s capacity to combat security threats in the region independently. However, what we see today is not an autonomous or independent G5S-JF. When Mali withdrew from the G5S-JF in May 2022, it became clear that the G5S-JF and the support it had received from external actors had not worked as intended. Also up until that point, it was rather clear that the G5S-JF remained highly dependent on external assistance, finance, training and resources.
This article sets out from the observation that there is an evident discrepancy between the stated intent and the actual outcome of the cooperation between the G5S-JF and external actors. The article asks the question: what can the relational power dynamic between the G5S-JF and external actors tell us about the outcomes of this military cooperation? I argue that the G5S-JF and external actors existed in a relationship of asymmetric interdependence and that this dynamic explains why the support external actors provided to the joint force did not result in an autonomous joint force. Through examining the dynamics between external actors and Sahelian actors through the lens of asymmetric interdependence, this article also sheds light on recent changes in the Sahel, in particular the withdrawal of Barkhane from Mali, Mali’s deployment of the Russian private security company Wagner Group and ultimately Mali’s withdrawal from the G5S-JF.
The methodology for this article derives from three years of research on the G5S-JF and relies on official documents, resolutions and statements from the G5 Sahel organisation, G5 Sahel member states, French ministries, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). It also includes material from 49 semi-structured elite interviews conducted in Bamako (Mali), Paris (France), and Abuja (Nigeria) conducted between 2019 and 2021. 2 A few of these interviews have also been conducted remotely.
In the following, I commence by introducing scholarly debates on peacebuilding, capacity-building and SFA and aim to particularly draw out the debates of how external and host actors interact. I then discuss relational power dynamics and provide a conceptualisation of asymmetric interdependence. Next, I analyse the differences between the stated intentions and the actual outcomes of the G5S-JF and its cooperation with external actors, where I focus particularly on regionality and autonomy. I continue by discussing the consequences of the asymmetric interdependence between the G5S-JF and the external actors and how such power dynamics in a relationship are subject to change according to context. Specifically, I demonstrate how the asymmetric interdependence between European actors and Sahelian actors has seen a shift following the tensions between Mali and France in 2021/22. I conclude by calling for further research on the relationship between external and host forces in other contexts through the lens of asymmetric interdependence.
Relational aspects of the external and the host
There is a wide range of literature from peace and conflict studies, political science and International Relations that relates to the concept of external and host actors. 3 Within military cooperation and hard security issues, the topic of SFA has become particularly prominent in academic debates.
SFA is a form of military foreign policy where external forces engage in ‘training and equipping military and civilian security forces to enhance professionalism and operational capacity’ (Marsh et al., 2020: 6). The intent of providing SFA is to strengthen an ally or a partner-state’s military capacities. Such support is often provided due to a particular security threat that the partner state is facing, such as terrorism (Bartels et al., 2019; Shurkin et al., 2017). SFA allows the provider to ‘pursue certain objectives without large-scale commitments’ (Bartels et al., 2019: vii) because it requires only limited resources and use of personnel from the providing side. In this sense, SFA is often viewed as a cheaper and safer engagement for external actors in conflicts than full-scale military interventions. External forces thus work with host nations’ forces through training and advising, with the aim that the host military will one day be able to operate independently and take ownership of the required military efforts (Livingston, 2011). The intention of SFA is thus quite clear: its purpose is to strengthen a military force to the extent where it can assume responsibility and ownership of its respective security situation.
However, the outcomes of SFA and the consequences of such support have received significant attention in academic research over the past years. This is largely because the objective of building a partner’s capacity to the extent where it can assume ownership over military efforts rarely appears to succeed as an end goal, which the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan and the subsequent collapse of the Afghan army in 2021 can attest to.
There are multiple explanations as to why SFA may not always succeed in building the capacity and efficiency of a host force. Matisek and Reno (2019) point to diverging expectations and practices between the provider and the recipient, where the provider often has to navigate ad hoc relationships on the ground due to the often-fragmented government and military actors. At the core of this divergence, as Matisek and Fowler (2020) argue, is that the provider often fails to fully appreciate and recognise the local context of civil–military relations due to the variations in this from state to state. Shurkin et al. (2017) argue that it is critical for a military to be engrained into a nation-building process and hence that a shared sense of national identity needs to be in place – or, at the very least, the seeds of a national ideology need to be sown – in order for a military to cohesively unite and operate together, which is a prerequisite for military effectiveness. However, in many so-called ‘fragile’ contexts and states, a unified national identity or ideology is often contested, and SFA is typically provided in such fragile contexts, which means that the prerequisites for success are arguably weak from the get-go. Marsh and Rolandsen (2021) argue that the fragmentation among the recipients and the lack of coordination among the providers of SFA may exacerbate security issues more than solving them. Biddle et al. (2018) point to diverging interests among providers and recipients as an obstacle to the effectiveness of SFA missions. Ultimately, the SFA literature argues that the outcome of SFA is often unsuccessful.
While the SFA literature predominantly points to shortcomings in either of the sides of SFA, 4 such as the providers’ approach to the recipient and context, or the nature of the recipients’ military culture, this article wants to direct the focus towards the characteristics of the relationship that develops between the external and the host. Analysing the relational power dynamics between these actors reveals the levels of each agent’s ownership and autonomy, concepts explored in the peacebuilding literature.
Since the 1990s, the concept of local ownership has come to the forefront of peacebuilding efforts, and academic literature has raised questions about how it is understood and how it is used. Some argue that the focus on local ownership has been used by external actors to justify their interventions and that the concept of local ownership is therefore more of a buzzword than a peacebuilding approach whose implementation holds any real success (Pietz and Von Carlowitz, 2007). Others argue that the dominant narrative of ‘local ownership’ in peacebuilding initiatives is inherently based on Western assumptions and values and does not in fact represent the ‘local’ of where the peacebuilding is taking place (Ignatieff, 2004; Lee, 2011; Paris, 1997; Richmond, 2006). A third strain problematises the transferring of ownership of peacebuilding programmes to local populations given that not all local cultures necessarily provide a good foundation for building sustainable peace (Ginty, 2011).
Finally, a large literature on the localisation of peacebuilding focuses on how both ‘local’ and ‘ownership’ can be interpreted in various ways, first through questioning who the locals are – population, elite, or others – and further by asking what ownership means – a maximalist understanding which entails full control and autonomy in decisions (Edomwonyi, 2003), or a more moderate understanding where local perspectives and views are more directly reflected in the peacebuilding programmes (Reich, 2006). This boils down to how the relationship between the external and the host develops, to what degree the host has agency in this relationship, and not least when and to what degree the host is able and willing to assume ownership over the efforts, given that the external actors will one day withdraw.
Indeed, within the peacebuilding literature, several scholars have pointed to the relationship that occurs between the external and the host. Donais (2009) for instance points to the considerable power imbalance between externals and internals, both in terms of resources and decision-making. This imbalance is interesting because, as Paffenholz (2015) argues, ‘external’ and ‘internal’ are not binary opposites, despite often being conceptualised as such within the literature. Rather, there is a collaboration taking place, where it is difficult to identify where the external ends and the internal begins (Richmond, 2015). This perspective on the localisation of peacebuilding has brought about a discussion on the hybridity of peacebuilding. Hybridity here attempts to move away from the idea of external and internal as opposites and therefore refers to the consolidation between external and internal frameworks and the engagement and encounters between the local and the international actors (Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). The question then becomes how best to examine, understand and explain the relationship that occurs between external and host actors. Tsing (2005) uses the metaphor of friction to understand how this hybridity reflects a relationship of imbalance and asymmetry between the external and the internal.
Hybridity and friction speak to the context in which there is interaction between external and host, but as concepts in and of themselves, they do not explain what results from the hybridity or friction. This article draws on these relational perspectives from the peacebuilding literature as a means to understand why SFA to, and external cooperation with, the G5S-JF has not succeeded. Building on these perspectives, this article makes a case for understanding this relationship through the concept of asymmetric interdependence.
Conceptualising asymmetric interdependence
In this article, the term ‘externals’ refers to states that chose to intervene in another state or region militarily with the intent of assisting the host with its security challenges. The ‘host’ is considered the actor operating in its own geographical domain that receives military assistance from external actors, due to an inability to successfully combat domestic or transnational security threats on its own. The differentiating concepts of ‘the external’ and ‘the host’ have similar conceptual counterparts in other literature such as those on fragile states and strong states, the North and the South, and international and local, which are built on divisive discourses that reduce complex power dynamics into binary categories.
These binary divisions in the literature would suggest that what I here refer to as the external actor is often considered a more powerful actor, whereas what I refer to as the host is considered in need of power. However, we need to nuance these assumptions, as well as the assumptions of what constitutes power, as one should not neglect the role of mutual influence and the social and relational ways of exercising power. Baldwin (2016) demonstrates how power holds many dimensions, and therefore argues that it is an oversimplification to speak of ‘the strong’ and ‘the weak’ in a relationship, as an actor may be strong in one dimension of power, but weak in another. In this article, I build on this perspective and argue that the division into a powerful and less-powerful side is indeed too simplistic a way of understanding the dynamics between the external and the host when it comes to military cooperation.
I, therefore, approach this analysis through a relational understanding of power. Power is thus something that occurs when it relates to someone or something else: it exists between agents as a social phenomenon (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). In this manner, power is therefore not purely a possession nor is it only the ability to determine an outcome; power is something that occurs and can be studied in interactions and relationships (Baldwin, 2016; Guzzini, 2013). With regard to the literature on relations between external and host actors, this speaks to how the hybridity of the interactions between the external and the host plays out in terms of power dynamics. The analysis in this article examines how each agent expresses agency, ownership, autonomy and dependence in these interactions, which as per Baldwin’s logic can be expressed and played out in various forms. The analysis reveals the power dynamic of this relationship to be one of asymmetric interdependence. I will first introduce the concepts of interdependence and asymmetry separately, before bringing them together.
An interdependent relationship consists of two or more different agents who to some extent rely and depend on each other. In this relationship, there is often a negotiated commitment from each side, which creates dependency in both directions. Interdependence is directly linked to a relational understanding of power, as according to Keohane and Nye (1989: 9): ‘interdependent relationships will always involve costs since interdependence restricts autonomy’. This does not only go in one direction but is true for both (or all) parties of the relationship. Power dependence theory suggests that ‘one actor’s dependence is considered the source of the other actor’s power’ (Rouhana and Fiske, 1995: 52). For military partners, this would suggest that the party who relies more on the other has less agency in the relationship and hence that the military with the most independence and autonomy also holds more power. The nature of this interdependence has implications for each agent’s ownership of the response to the security situation. Although an interdependent relationship reduces the agents’ autonomy and independence, the level of these may vary, making one side more dependent than the other.
An asymmetric relationship essentially consists of two or more agents who are, per definition, unequal in a relationship. The asymmetry of such relationships can play out in various ways, for instance between two states with different military capabilities, between two people with different kinds or degrees of power or between two agents that exert different levels of influence on each other. In the relationship between two agents, Womack (2015) argues that asymmetry occurs when the relationship ‘is founded on reciprocal but different commitments by each side’. This means that even though the asymmetric relationship may be unequal, it does not necessarily represent an order of pure domination (Efremova, 2019). In order for asymmetric relations to be fruitful, there needs to be mutual recognition of the asymmetry and the different kinds and degrees of power, capacity and ability that the agents possess because it ‘facilitates clearer expectations about what constitutes the sphere of “reasonable” solutions based on the existing power balance’ (Deutsch, 1973: 46). Asymmetry thus deals with relational power. In military partnerships between an external and a host, this would for instance mean that the external agrees to provide resources and training and the host agrees to provide intelligence, allegiance to the provider or simply commitment to the external’s programme.
Combining these two concepts – not as asymmetry and interdependence, but to constitute asymmetric interdependence – thereby describes a relationship where two or more agents depend on each other but to a different degree. Their commitments to each other differ, and one agent is more dependent on the other than vice versa: They are interdependent, but the level of dependency is asymmetric. This article thus challenges the theoretical assumptions of the divisive logic of the strong versus the fragile, such as in the North-South discourse, and makes a case for understanding such dynamics through the lens of asymmetric interdependence. This article utilises asymmetric interdependence as both a description of the power dynamics of the relationship between the G5S-JF and external actors and an analytical tool for understanding what this dynamic means for the relationship.
I also recognise that power is contextual and that the power dynamics of a relationship can therefore change depending on context. This context may for instance refer to the security situation in the Sahel, political leadership changes among any of the parties, or new forms of cooperation, which all may impact the relationship between the external and the host actors. Such changes in context may consequentially change the leverage that the various agents hold at different times in their relationship.
Disentangling the intent and outcome of the security cooperation between the G5S-JF and external actors
The regional nature of the G5S-JF and the aim of assisting the joint force to become an independent and autonomous security actor in the Sahel were at the forefront of the official discourse when the G5S-JF was established (Sandnes, 2023). This section will advance by shedding light on the discrepancy between the intention and the outcome of the SFA, through focusing on the relationship between the G5S-JF and external actors. It will pay particular attention to first the aspects of regionality and regional ownership, and second those of autonomy and dependence. Disentangling ‘the regional’ is critical for understanding the break with – or the continuation of – the asymmetric bilateral relations that have existed between European and Sahelian actors for decades. Autonomy is a key element in the conceptual understanding of interdependence and is thus critical to examine in the context of the G5S-JF and external actors.
The regional versus the national and bilateral
When the G5S-JF was established, it gained significant attention due to its regional mandate and regional focus. The African Union (AU) was one of the first to highlight ‘the innovative nature of the regional initiatives such as the one of the G5 Sahel’ (AU Peace and Security Council, 2017). Prior to the joint force, most external efforts in the Sahel remained nationally focused with bilateral arrangements. A number of external actors were particularly keen to highlight the new regional focus in relation to the establishment of the G5S-JF. In 2017, the UN commended the ‘regional security initiatives, notably the coordination with the G5 Sahel’ (UN Security Council, 2017: 11). Also the EU commended the ‘efforts by the G5 Sahel and ECOWAS to reinforce regional cooperation to address the threats of terrorism and organized crime’ (European Council, 2018a). President Macron stated that, since 2013, France has also ‘regionalised our approach’ to the Sahelian security challenges, further claiming that ‘the cooperation dimension, as I was saying, will be strengthened and will be based in particular on the mechanism of existing operational military partnership at the regional level of West Africa’ (Macron, 2021). The international community thus gave particular focus to the regional level of the Sahel.
The G5 Sahel organisation and its member states have also emphasised the regional nature of the G5S-JF, and not least the importance of a regional focus as opposed to only national efforts. The G5 Sahel strategy for development and security emphasises that its purpose is to ‘strengthen intra-regional cooperation in the areas of defence and security’ (G5 Sahel Secretariat, 2016: 22). 5 The previous executive secretary of the G5 Sahel organisation, Maman Sambo Sidikou, claimed that ‘since the fall of the Songhai Empire (1591), our region has never seen such promising joint cooperation’ (G5 Sahel, 2018). 6 The previous president of Burkina Faso, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, also stated in the UN national assembly that terrorism calls for ‘an effective collective response, made up of solidarity and pooling our efforts and resources. This is the raison d’être of the G5 Sahel’ (Kaboré, 2017: 3). In other words, the official expectations of the G5 Sahel and the G5S-JF were of a regional nature and regional ownership, both from the G5 Sahel member states and from external actors in their support. However, there are many aspects of the relationship between the G5S-JF and external actors that have called into question the regional nature of the G5S-JF and the alleged regional support from external actors.
The G5S-JF battalions, which have been divided along national lines, have been based in their own state and have operated predominantly on their own territory. The exception to this is the eighth battalion of the G5S-JF that was deployed by Chad in Niger, near the border areas of Mali and Burkina Faso. In any multilateral coalition, there is tension between the coalition’s chain of command and the troops’ national chain of command. For the G5S-JF, the national lines appear to be particularly strong because most of the G5S-JF troops are also stationed in their own state, 7 with the exception of the eighth Chadian battalion. This is a way for the G5 member states to maintain control, first over their own troops and their actions but also in that it maintains a national structure that allows for the member states to control how external actors engage with the G5S-JF troops.
France’s engagement in the Sahel has historically been focused on bilateral agreements and assistance, where France’s colonial history and domination have established asymmetry in these relations (Charbonneau and Chafer, 2014; Mann, 2021). Indeed, Francophone Africa has been known as France’s ‘pré carré’, which can be loosely interpreted as a specific area of influence. This influence has included political, military, economic and cultural ties where France has expressed and demonstrated its preponderant power. This colonial legacy is an important backdrop when analysing the more recent relations between the G5S-JF and external actors. Although France has attempted to take a more multilateral approach to its previous colonies – presumably largely to avoid neo-colonial criticism – and has instead been cooperating with the UN or the EU, French bilateral policy towards its previous colonies has remained strong. 8 The establishment of the G5S-JF suggested a more regional response and approach, but bilateral relations have still dominated. The legality of Barkhane’s operational presence in the Sahel has first and foremost been based on bilateral agreements, which means that the relationship between Barkhane and the G5S-JF has also been based on bilateral arrangements with the G5 Sahel member states.
The EUTM also pushed its regional approach to the security threat in the Sahel but has continued to operate through national lines. Even though the EUTM’s mandate has been to train and assist the G5S-JF troops, its dominant activity has been to train the Malian national army, and as of 2021 also that of Burkina Faso. Support to national armies can be claimed to support the G5S-JF down the line, but the joint force is nevertheless not the initial target. 9 Indeed, the EUTM system has facilitated the training of national armies, which may or may not have included training of personnel that operates under the G5S-JF flag. The exception to this has been some training courses that the EUTM has held in Bamako, Mali, where it has brought in personnel from the G5S-JF, but this has remained rather limited compared to the national-lined efforts of the EUTM. The G5 Sahel member states have therefore managed external actors’ engagement with the G5S-JF to a large degree. This facilitated a continuation of the bilateral asymmetry between Europe and Sahelian states that has existed over the past decades (Gegout, 2019), which has given the G5 Sahel member states some more leverage than before, but which has also had implications for the alleged regional approach to the G5S-JF and the Sahel. Ultimately, this means that external actors have depended on bilateral relations with the G5 member states in order to support the regional G5S-JF. However, prioritising the national lines over the regional lines has had implications for the G5S-JF’s ability to take responsibility for managing the security situation at the regional level, which has ultimately impacted the autonomy of the joint force.
Furthermore, the majority of financial and resource support to the G5S-JF has been channelled bilaterally through the G5 Sahel member states. It has thus been the member states that have become legal owners of the resources and not the G5 Sahel organisation nor the G5S-JF. Although this support is earmarked for the G5S-JF – and there has been an understanding between donors and the G5 Sahel member states that the member states will distribute the earmarked support to the G5S-JF battalions – the financial support to the regional joint force goes through bilateral channels. 10 The G5 Sahel member states, therefore, have gained leverage towards donors through the bilateral system of donations to the G5S-JF.
The national and bilateral lines have implications for the purportedly regional nature of the G5S-JF. Disentangling the alleged regional focus of the G5S-JF thus reveals that the national lines of cooperation remained significant to the G5S-JF and its relations with external actors. This suggests a continuation of prior efforts in the Sahel region and not an actual shift towards a regional focus as officially suggested, but the bilateral lines to the G5S-JF have been a manner in which the G5 Sahel member states have managed their relations with external actors. In fact, Welz (2022) points to the bilateral nature of the G5S-JF as an intentional structure as it has allowed the G5 Sahel member states to maintain control of and sovereignty over the regional efforts, as opposed to what their level of control would have been if other regional forces, such as the ECOWAS Standby Force, were involved. External actors might also have viewed it as beneficial to work with a smaller regional unit in the Sahel, as a smaller unit might be more prone to external influence than a larger body, such as ECOWAS. Nevertheless, there was no assurance that a strengthening of one G5 Sahel member state’s national capacities would also strengthen the collective regional capacity. An informant claims that ‘the G5 Sahel Joint Force is a tool for external actors to strengthen Sahelian armies’, 11 which suggests that despite the agency G5 member states express towards external actors, the G5S-JF has remained dependent on external support, indicating an asymmetric relationship between them. Indeed, the system of aiding the G5S-JF has not deviated significantly from what has been done for decades: bilateral military support, which has been highly asymmetric particularly due to France’s colonial legacy in the Sahel region. Even in the post-colonial period, France maintained a substantial military presence in the G5 Sahel member states, and the G5 Sahel member states have structured their security sector according to the French model (Charbonneau and Chafer, 2014). 12 The relationship between France and its former colonies has therefore remained clearly asymmetric. Yet, the continuous worsening of the security situation has indeed discredited the effect of such bilateral support, be it due to corruption, lack of management of resources or other issues.
The bilateral nature of the relationship between the G5S-JF and external actors, therefore, deviates from the official intent of regional cooperation. This is important because it is different from the way SFA was framed towards the G5S-JF as an effort to increase regional cooperation. This raises questions of how this further implicated the interactions in the relationship between the G5S-JF and external actors. Indeed, the reason the regional aspect of this analysis is important is because it not only demonstrates a continuation of already-existing asymmetry, but it also sheds light on the question of ownership of the response to the security situation in the Sahel and the G5S-JF’s independence and autonomy in assuming this ownership.
Autonomy and dependence
The G5S-JF was in its initial phase presented as homegrown and regional, with the aim of establishing a sustainable coalition that could ultimately assume the responsibility of providing security in its own region. These aspects were highly emphasised in setting the expectations of the joint force and its relations with external actors, particularly France. French president Emmanuel Macron stated at the UN General Assembly in 2017 that ‘we cannot succeed in our shared mission if the countries most concerned cannot assume their own responsibilities. This is why, since taking office, I have supported the deployment of the G5 Sahel joint force’ (Macron, 2017b). In a speech in Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou that same year, he claimed that ‘this is a burden we share, and tomorrow it is a stronger more responsive organisation that will pick it up’, here referring to the G5S-JF (Macron, 2017a). Indeed, the French Ministry of Defence has claimed that Barkhane has aimed to ‘support the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) partner countries in taking over the fight against armed terrorist groups’ (France Ministère des Armées, 2020: 4). These statements have outwardly suggested that an end point in the relationship between the joint force and France is an autonomous G5S-JF. The EU has fed this official discourse, by claiming that there’s a need for ‘reinforcing the region’s countries’ ownership of the military operations’ (Fardel and Pichon, 2020: 4), and Macron has verified that ‘the future is in the construction of a sustainable cooperation between the five G5 Sahel countries’ (UN News, 2019). The concepts of sustainability and ownership were thus used by external actors expressing their aim of engagement in the Sahel and especially with the G5S-JF.
The G5 Sahel states have also emphasised regional autonomy and ownership as end goals of this cooperation. This is evident in statements from the previous president of the G5 Sahel organisation, Maman Sambo Sidikou, who claimed that ‘as France is not intended to drag on military operations in Africa, the countries of the region must work together to face the challenges that the departure of the troops from Operation Barkhane could pose’ (G5 Sahel, 2018). In 2020, the G5 Sahel heads of state collectively called for more ‘contributions to support the action of the national and regional forces of the G5 Sahel so that they acquire their autonomy and take ownership of the situation on ground’ (Direction de l’information légale et administrative Francais, 2020). Thus, also the G5 Sahel has emphasised the importance of regional cooperation with an end point of externals withdrawing. Nevertheless, studying the details of the relationship between external actors and the G5S-JF, there are several elements that have not corresponded with the stated aim of achieving autonomy for the G5S-JF. I will note a few examples that demonstrate this by pointing at the asymmetric interdependence between the joint force and external actors.
Since the establishment of the G5S-JF, the joint force has received operational assistance, mentoring and training from operation Barkhane. The operational assistance has related particularly to the military operations the G5S-JF carries out on its own, where Barkhane has provided air support and medical evacuation support. 13 Mentoring relates to when the G5S-JF and Barkhane have conducted joint operations, of which there have been many. The training has predominantly related to preparing for battle. In 2020, Barkhane and the G5S-JF formalised their collaboration more substantially through establishing a joint headquarters alongside a joint fusion intelligence cell in Niamey, Niger (Sahel Coalition, 2020). Through the joint headquarters, the operations that Barkhane and the G5S-JF carried out were organised through a shared chain of command. Several interviewees have reflected that this was a way for France to gain more control over the G5S-JF. 14 The shared command has reportedly improved the G5S-JF’s efficiency and capacity in the field, although these improvements seem to have been strongly dependent on the involvement and capacity of Barkhane, rather than an increased capacity of the G5S-JF.
The EUTM has since the inception of the G5S-JF provided advice and assistance at the joint force’s headquarters. This has included advising and training on strategic and operational matters, though in theory rather than practice (European Council, 2018b). It has also included assisting headquarters personnel in various administrative tasks and assisting G5S-JF personnel in sending financial and resource requests to the EU. 15 The EUTM has also trained headquarters personnel in a pre-deployment capacity prior to their deployment at the headquarters. 16 In 2020, the EUTM mandate was further expanded to include the training of G5S-JF troops. The G5S-JF has thus depended on the EUTM for administrative tasks and ultimately also for the efficiency of the joint force’s headquarters. However, Barkhane and the EUTM’s leverage of influence on the G5S-JF has also depended on the willingness of the joint force to accept support from them over potential support offered by other actors.
The strong interest from many external actors in the Sahel region has left the joint force with the option of choosing whose support to accept. The G5S-JF has been very aware of the strategic interest France and the EU have in the Sahel region. This interest has been particularly visible through the European fear of spill-overs from the Sahel to Europe with regard to both security threats and migration. For Europe to have a certain level of influence on the situation and some leverage on the developments in the region has remained critical for European foreign policy. The G5S-JF has thus held clear leverage in the face of France and the EU: The joint force has managed and used French and EU interests in the region to its benefit. France and the EU have depended on the G5S-JF’s willingness to accept the needed support from them and not from other actors instead – particularly those who may have differing interests from France and its allies, such as Russia or China. This leverage has been used actively by Mali since 2021, which will be discussed further in the next section. Hence, although the G5S-JF has clearly depended on external actors for financial support, administrative assistance and capacity during military operations, there has been an interdependence that has gone both ways, which the G5S-JF has seemed to be both aware of and happy to utilise for burden-sharing in the Sahel security situation.
This interdependence stands in contrast to the stated aim of developing an autonomous G5S-JF. However, this interdependence is also asymmetric: the G5S-JF’s dependency on external actors has been rather urgent in nature, as it has related to the joint force’s efficiency and ultimately its operational capacity, whereas external actors’ dependence on the G5S-JF has related more to influence in the region and control over what could potentially spread and threaten European territory in the future. Hence, the asymmetric interdependence that has increasingly manifested in the relationship between the G5S-JF and Barkhane thus suggests that the external public intent of strengthening the joint force to the extent where it can assume responsibility and ownership independently of French influence is flawed at best.
Ultimately, taking a closer look at the relationship between external actors and the G5S-JF reveals that they find themselves in a relationship of asymmetric interdependence. It is clear that the SFA provided to the G5S-JF is not particularly successful as it has not resulted in an increasingly independent joint force, nor a force that can assume ownership over the response to the security situation in the Sahel.
The context and outcomes of asymmetric interdependence
Looking at this SFA through the relationship between the G5S-JF and external actors, which has emerged as one of asymmetric interdependence, reveals that these dynamics have not allowed for the development of an independent G5S-JF. This suggests that such a relationship has also not facilitated a successful endpoint for the cooperation between these actors. Indeed, the underlying dynamic and system that has existed between Europe and Sahelian states for decades only became more formalised over time.
Though not boding well for an autonomous G5S-JF, asymmetric interdependence has also been viewed as beneficial to some of the parties involved. De Oliveira and Verhoeven (2018) point at how many African states in fact seek out external intervention in order to benefit financially and politically through managing the external engagement, which can be seen in the case of the G5S-JF. The political elites in the G5 member states have indeed benefitted from external involvement in the region. This effective endorsement from external actors has helped endow these elites with legitimacy in the international community and the garnering of resources has also fostered support domestically. External involvement thus bolsters the political power and position of these elites. Furthermore, through emphasising the need for external involvement, Sahelian states also frame themselves as indispensable in this situation: Sahelian states and militaries need to combat these transnational threats, but they require external assistance to do so (Sandnes, 2023). Hence, the strong external involvement in the Sahel appears to have been a result of both external actors benefitting from influence in the region and Sahelian elites benefitting from external presence.
However, a critical element to the power that the G5S-JF and other Sahelian actors hold when facing external actors is the power of choosing which external actors they deem it fruitful to cooperate with. Thus far, the asymmetric interdependence between European actors and Sahelian actors has often been viewed as being in the European actors’ favour. However, recent years have brought other external actors to the table who have increasingly carved out their role in the Sahel. In this regard, Russia has been – and remains – an important actor. Indeed, the concept of asymmetric interdependence can also help us further understand current developments in the region.
Power dynamics and relationships change as context changes. Since the inception of the G5S-JF in 2017 and its relations with external actors, the context in the Sahel has changed. Despite the strong presence of external actors in the Sahel since 2012, the security situation has continued to worsen drastically, which has fostered increasing dissatisfaction with external actors and the flourishing of conspiracy theories and disinformation campaigns in the region, particularly scapegoating France (Thurston, 2022). In addition, over the past few years, several G5 member states have experienced military coups or undemocratic changes of power. The deteriorating security situation, along with the loss of legitimacy and support for external actors in the region, has somewhat diminished the importance of European support for the political elite to remain in power, as it had been in years prior to these coups. For instance, following the military coup in Mali in August 2020, and not least the subsequent coup-within-a-coup in May 2021, where vice president Assimi Goita (who had been the coup-leader in August 2020) assumed the role of president after having removed the interim civilian president of Bah N’daw, France announced a reconfiguration of Barkhane in the region (Salaün and Felix, 2021). This reconfiguration referred specifically to a retreat of about half of the Barkhane troops and a shift in areas of operation, though not a full retreat of the force.
Following this, it became clear that Mali had gone into dialogue with the Russian private security company Wagner Group, which resulted in the deployment of Wagner Group mercenaries by the beginning of 2022 (Paquette, 2022). Shortly after Wagner Group’s deployment, the relationship between Mali and France soured to the extent where France decided to withdraw its troops from Mali; Mali then ended its 60-year-old defence agreement with France; and Mali ended up leaving the G5S-JF in May 2022, partly due to France’s strong involvement in the joint force. This means that Mali exerted power and chose to engage with Russia as an external partner. Russia then constituted an opponent and obstacle to Europe for external influence in the Sahel region (Thompson et al., 2022). The shifting power dynamics and the consequences of the asymmetric interdependence between the G5S-JF and external actors became crystal clear when Mali in May 2022 announced its withdrawal from the G5S-JF, in part due to the strong involvement of external actors in the regional coalition (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères du Mali [@MaliMaeci], 2022).
Studying these developments through the concept of asymmetric interdependence reveals two things in particular: first that there was a shift in the asymmetry between France and the Malian state and second that SFA and building an autonomous G5S-JF did not work precisely because of the dominant role external actors had taken in the relationship. Indeed, the leverage that Sahelian states hold of choosing which external partners they want to work with was strongly utilised by Mali as it turned towards Russia, in this way signalling a turn away from Europe. The response from European actors was that of condemnation (BBC News, 2021). This reaction was linked to the fear of misuse of violence by Wagner Group, as had been witnessed in the company’s engagement in the Central African Republic, but the condemnation likely also stemmed from the challenge Russia now poses to European influence in the Sahel (Lebovich, 2021). This donor competition was most likely strongly played by the authorities of Mali, proving the leverage and power Sahelian states hold when facing external actors. This means that as the context changed, so did the asymmetric interdependence between Mali and France, and this ultimately resulted in Mali’s withdrawal from the G5S-JF.
Using the concept of asymmetric interdependence to understand current developments in the Sahel thus proves useful also beyond the study of the relationship between the G5S-JF and external actors. Indeed, it provides an analytical angle that can explain a shift in the asymmetry of the relationship between Mali and France, which shows that the asymmetry values are not constant, but can change as context changes. Ultimately, this article demonstrates that utilising the concept of asymmetric interdependence when studying the relationship between the G5S-JF and external actors allows for a productive analysis that can also be used to explain more current developments between host states in the Sahel and external actors.
Conclusion
This article has focused the spotlight on the relationship between external and host actors to understand the outcome of their cooperation. The intentions of the cooperation between the G5S-JF and external actors are rooted in the idea of the joint force having a regional approach and nature, with the aim of becoming an autonomous and sustainable actor combatting security threats in the region, ultimately also allowing for external actors to take a step back. However, what we see is that the relationship between the G5S-JF and external actors has been manifested in ways that reinforce a relationship of asymmetric interdependence between these actors. First, there is an inconsistency between the alleged regional approach of the G5S-JF and regional support from external actors and the bilateral nature of many of the joint force’s activities and relations with the external actors. This allowed for an initial continuation of the asymmetry that had existed especially between France and Sahelian states for decades.
Second, there is a clear flaw in the intent to develop an autonomous G5S-JF, as it is highly dependent on external actors for its operationalisation through finances, training and resources. However, it is clear from the analysis that external actors also depend on the G5S-JF for influence in the region, where their strategic interests ultimately concern the prevention of future threats or a spill-over of challenges to Europe. The relationship between the G5S-JF and external actors is thus highly characterised by interdependence. The asymmetry of this interdependence is evident in the G5S-JF’s dependency relating to the very existence of the joint force, while external actors’ dependency relates to a desire to influence and impact on the future potential of spreading threats.
This article has made a case for studying the outcome of cooperation between external and host forces through analysing their relationship, more so than their individual characteristics in and of themselves. The concept of asymmetric interdependence provides a new lens through which to research SFA. The asymmetric interdependence of the relationship between external and host suggests that it is difficult to reach an endpoint in this cooperation where the host – here the G5S-JF – gains autonomy to the extent that it may assume ownership of the security situation. Beyond this, power dynamics are not static and change according to shifts in context. This article shows how the concept of asymmetric interdependence is also a useful tool for understanding shifting dynamics in the Sahel. The concept of asymmetric interdependence is useful for understanding current developments between Mali and France, where the asymmetry shifted due to the context of Mali’s increasing alignment with Russia through the Wagner Group and ultimately its withdrawal from the G5S-JF. Indeed, it appears that the initial asymmetry between France and Sahelian states that had continued from prior to the G5S-JF’s establishment was part in causing Mali’s shifting alignment to Russia. Furthermore, Mali challenging the continued asymmetric interdependence with European actors was also made possible due to the bilateral nature of the joint force and its relations with external actors. Future research should study these tendencies and the concept of asymmetric interdependence between external actors and host actors in other contexts, to verify the extent to which asymmetric interdependence can be generalised as a power dynamic between external and host forces on a theoretical scale. It would be particularly interesting to also evaluate the level of asymmetric interdependency in a context where pre-set colonial ties are either different from those between the Sahel and Europe, or non-existent.
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The author received funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Norwegian name is “Forsvarsdepartementet”.
