Recognising recognition through thick and thin: Insights from Sino-Japanese relations

Abstract

Research on recognition in International Relations has demonstrated that states are not exclusively concerned about their physical security, but also anxious to be recognised by other states. What counts as recognition and non-/mis-recognition, however, is not always clear. Scholars of recognition seem to agree that recognition theory has not yet developed a persuasive way of recognising recognition. Providing a satisfactory answer to the question of how we recognise recognition and its denial is a necessary first step towards being able to convincingly theorise about recognition. This is especially important since recognition is often treated as a dependent variable—how states are recognised by other states is seen as influencing their behaviour, sometimes with military conflict as the outcome. This article further develops the concepts of ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ recognition as it addresses the problem of how to recognise recognition. Based on an analysis of empirical material on what, in Japan, has been interpreted as Chinese non- and mis-recognition of Japan, the article shows how concrete expressions of thin and thick recognition between established states can be recognised.

Keywords

China identity Japan recognition thick recognition thin recognition

Introduction

The literature on recognition in International Relations (IR) has expanded considerably in recent years. This research has provided novel interpretations of state behaviour. Most importantly, perhaps, recognition theorists have demonstrated that states are not exclusively concerned with survival, but also care about how they are recognised by other states. At times, states will even go to war to be properly recognised (Lebow, 2010; Lindemann, 2010; Murray, 2010, 2012; Ringmar, 1996, 2002), which makes recognition literally a matter of life and death.

Numerous scholars of recognition have noted that identifying recognition and non-/mis-recognition is no simple matter. For example, Erik Ringmar has suggested that it is hard to ‘know whether recognition is granted or not’ (1996: 81). Hans Agné states that it is difficult to determine ‘whether feelings of recognition originate, as assumed, in social interaction with adversaries, rather than somewhere else, for example in exclusively psychological processes within the subjects’ (Agné, 2013: 102). Furthermore, Axel Honneth has argued that, because of their amorphous nature, it is particularly difficult to identify recognition between states (Honneth, 2012). There seems to be a consensus among scholars of recognition that recognition theory has not yet successfully developed a method for recognising recognition. We are, thus, presented with an important research problem: How do we recognise recognition and its denial when we see them? In order to theorise convincingly about recognition, it is absolutely crucial to be able to recognise it. This is especially important since recognition is often treated as a dependent variable—how states are recognised by other states is seen as an important factor that influences their behaviour, leading in some cases to military conflict.

This article seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate about how to recognise recognition in IR by further theorising about the concepts of thin and thick recognition in a way that clarifies how such recognition between established states can be recognised empirically. Thin recognition is fundamentally about identity with other actors, that is, about being recognised as a full member of a community. Thick recognition, by contrast, acknowledges difference or uniqueness, or a particular identity. Existing research has defined the concepts, but has not gone very far in exploring concretely what thin or thick recognition might constitute. In other words, the issue of how to recognise thin and thick recognition empirically has not yet been sufficiently addressed. The article is informed in particular by empirical material dealing with what, in Japan, has been interpreted as Chinese non- and mis-recognition of Japan. While such acts and statements became increasingly common in the 21st century, attempts were also made to improve bilateral relations through recognition.

The next section critically discusses recent research that has sought to develop a method for recognising recognition and begins to distinguish the approach taken in this article to ontological and other key standpoints. The third section introduces and develops the concepts of thin and thick recognition and discusses how acts and statements of thin and thick recognition can be recognised. In order to illustrate in greater detail how recognition can be recognised, the fourth and fifth sections provide analyses of thin and thick recognition, respectively, based on empirical study of Sino-Japanese relations. The concluding section summarises the results of the study and discusses implications for further research on recognition in IR.

Previous research on how to recognise recognition

Thomas Lindemann has addressed the question of how to recognise recognition in a number of important publications (2012, 2014a, 2014b). In an article dealing specifically with the question of how to recognise recognition, he suggests that it is possible to recognise situations of ‘nonrecognition where elementary agency or status is denied (denial of dignity) or where actors are obtaining or claiming total independence and superiority over others (hubristic identities)’ (2014b: 1). While Lindemann’s conceptualisation is useful for understanding certain types of demand for recognition that might be especially likely to result in violent conflict, it has certain limitations that make it less suitable as a general framework for recognising recognition. For Lindemann, there are two types of struggle or demand for recognition that are of particular significance. He views the first, the demand for dignity, as morally justified, and the second, struggles to have a hubristic and superior identity recognised by others, as unjustified. In response to criticism by Yana Zuo that his categories are not distinct (2014: 1), Lindemann conceded that these are not watertight categories but instead exist on a continuum (Lindemann, 2014b: 4).

Approached from the theoretical viewpoint adopted in this article, the struggle for dignity described by Lindemann is arguably a struggle for thin recognition. It is primarily related to fundamental respect for a group as an equal autonomous actor, rather than to specific traits, such as the struggle to be recognised as a great power, or hubristic identities that are more akin to struggles for thick recognition. As such, demands for dignity and those for recognition of hubristic identities belong in two distinct categories. Seen in this light, Lindemann’s argument that the two are opposites on a continuum, that is, that they differ in degree rather than in kind, appears problematic. Nevertheless, this might seem to support Lindemann’s original assertion that the struggle for dignity is justified, whereas struggles to have a hubristic and superior identity recognised by others is not. Within these categories, however, can be found diverse struggles—and not all struggles for a particular identity (thick recognition) are necessarily hubristic. One could, for example, imagine that some minority groups seeking independence (and thin recognition) foster what might be seen as inflated self-identities that increase in-group pride and cohesiveness and, thus, strengthen the group in its struggle. This possibility seems to be implied in Zuo’s critique of Lindemann (Zuo, 2014). In such cases, thin recognition is primary and the group engaged in struggle is not necessarily demanding that others recognise its inflated self-identity. This could change if the collective were successful in its struggle for thin recognition. It might then demand that others also recognise its inflated self-identity.

In another commentary on Lindemann’s solution to the problem of how to recognise recognition, Brent Steele suggests that Lindemann’s way of theorising recognition implies that some form of ‘correct’ recognition is possible. He raises doubts concerning this possibility and instead asks: ‘Maybe, instead, there’s simply always recognition?’ (Steele, 2014: 2). Steele’s critique echoes Patchen Markell’s (2003) criticism of Charles Taylor. The latter argues that ‘misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted and reduced mode of being’ (Taylor, 1994: 25). Because self-identities are always constructed in a particular way and could have been constructed differently, Markell argues that recognition is always a form of mis-recognition.¹ On this ontological issue, I agree with Steele and Markell. At the same time, however, even if there is simply always recognition and such recognition is always a form of mis-recognition, actors still present and perform certain identities as if they were their true identities, and they wish to have these identities recognised or at least accepted by others. Despite the fact that feelings of non-recognition and mis-recognition in this sense are largely subjective, it is still possible empirically to establish what kinds of acts are likely to be, and typically are, interpreted as denials of thin and thick recognition. We can seek to distinguish significant differences among acts interpreted as recognition, non-recognition and mis-recognition.

This section has discussed Lindemann’s approach to the problem of how to recognise recognition. Although potentially useful for analysing certain struggles for recognition, I find it less convincing as a more general approach to the problem of how to recognise recognition for the reasons discussed above. The next section develops a different and more generally applicable approach that focuses on thin and thick recognition.

Recognising thin and thick recognition

As is noted above, recognition is often divided into thin and thick recognition. Thin recognition has been taken to mean ‘being acknowledged as an independent subject within a community of law’ (Wendt, 2003: 511). This involves legal status as a sovereign subject rather than as subordinate to someone else. Such status is universal in the sense that the sovereign subject shares it with equals (Taylor, 1994; Wendt, 2003: 511; cf. Allan and Keller, 2012: 76–77; Larson et al., 2014: 7). The struggle for thin recognition is thus about being recognised as a member of a community. In this sense, thin recognition is about common identity with other actors. It is about being respected as fundamentally equal. However, thin recognition does not mean total equality but only equality in the sense of belonging to the same fundamental category, of being the same kind of subject. What such subjectivity entails depends on what kind of subject we are concerned with. State subjectivity, for example, differs from individual subjectivity. In the case of the international community, it merely means that an entity is recognised as a sovereign state. Hierarchy, enmity and rivalry are still possible within such a community. In this context, Agné’s call for IR to utilise insights from International Law (IL) is highly relevant for recognising thin recognition and its denial (2013). In IR, being treated by other states with the respect that states ought to show each other according to IL fits into this category. While not as formally defined as laws, norms nonetheless also belong in this category.

The struggle by non-European political entities to be recognised as members of the international community belongs in this category too (Bartelsson, 2013; Suzuki, 2009). Whereas much research on the struggle for recognition has tended to highlight how entities seek formal recognition as states, it is also possible to focus on already recognised or established states. Political entities that are officially recognised as states are likely to interpret acts that violate norms or conventions on interstate behaviour as insults or slights, such as those stipulated in the Vienna Convention (Lindemann, 2012: 215–216). It is useful to label the denial of thin recognition as non-recognition, because those who are not granted such recognition are not recognised as members of the international community of states.

Thick recognition, in contrast, acknowledges difference or uniqueness, for example in the form of specific qualities. Charles Taylor describes this notion:

There is a certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else’s life. But this notion gives new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point of my life; I miss what being human is for me. (Taylor, 1994: 30)

To this, Axel Honneth adds: ‘The political representatives of other communities are to “recognise” that upon which a community founds its self-image—the challenges it has overcome in the past, its power to resist authoritarian tendencies, its cultural achievements, and so on’ (Honneth, 2012: 29). The denial of thick recognition thus entails not recognising a state’s particular identity. The state in question is recognised in a way that differs from its self-identity. In this sense, it is mis-recognised. From the ontological standpoint of this article, as outlined above, mis-recognition does not mean that a state is recognised in a way that differs from some form of ‘correct’ or ‘true’ identity, but in a way that diverges from how it constructs its own identity. Mutual recognition thus involves two parties recognising each other not just as equals (thin recognition), but as possessing different traits or qualities (thick recognition), thereby creating solidarity (Wendt, 2003: 511–512; cf. Allan and Keller, 2012: 77–78; Strömbom, 2014: 171).

Identity is closely linked to emotions (Hagström and Gustafsson, 2015; Lindemann, 2012: 211). Denial of recognition is often understood as humiliating and disrespectful (Gustafsson, 2015; Wolf, 2011). What is interpreted as an insult in the context of thick recognition, however, depends on one’s self-identity (Lindemann, 2012: 214). For a state that sees itself as a great power, it might be taken as an insult to be called or treated as a middle power, whereas a state that really regards itself as a middle power would not consider the same treatment offensive. Acts that recognise or confirm an identity, by contrast, are typically seen as respectful and thus induce pride and make actors feel ontologically secure (Gustafsson, 2015). Reinhard Wolf has suggested that ‘by provoking anger and resistance an act of disrespect is usually much more conspicuous than respectful behaviour’ (2011: 113).

Why is it useful to differentiate between thin and thick recognition? Even though there are contextual differences related to thin recognition, they are less pronounced than those pertaining to thick recognition. Within the Westphalian state system, what counts as thin recognition is likely to differ only to a relatively small extent between states and over time. Domestic reactions to non-recognition are likely to be more unified than is the case for the denial of thick recognition, because the particular identities with which thick recognition is concerned can be the objects of domestic contestation and, thus, change over time. What was largely interpreted as ‘correct’ recognition at one point in time could therefore be seen as mis-recognition at another, when one dominant identity construction has replaced another. Knowing this makes it possible to explain why states react in different ways at different times to similar acts and representations.

Erik Ringmar has suggested that:

A crime against an identity is a crime of omission rather than commission. If we want to deny a person recognition, all we have to do is to look the other way—no big gestures are needed and few traces are left at the sight of the crime. (1996: 82)

Whereas it might be true that ignoring someone is one way of denying thin recognition, denying thick recognition is not necessarily a matter of omission. This article makes clear that mis-recognition can also occur in the form of commission and therefore divides thick recognition into four different types: (a) explicit recognition; (b) explicit denials of recognition; (c) implicit acts, behaviour or statements that are interpreted as recognition; and (d) implicit acts, behaviour or statements that are interpreted as denials of recognition. Explicit recognition refers to statements to the effect that: ‘you are X’, when the target’s self-identity is constructed as X. Explicit mis-recognition, by contrast, refers to statements to the effect that: ‘you are not X’. Implicit recognition and mis-recognition refer to any non-explicit acts, behaviour, statements or representations that are interpreted as such.

Recognising thin recognition: international norms for states

The analysis focuses on two episodes: the seizure of five North Korean asylum seekers at the Japanese consulate in Shenyang in 2002, and the large-scale protests against Japan that took place in China in 2005.

In May 2002, Chinese armed police entered the Japanese consulate in Shenyang in north-east China and took away five North Korean asylum seekers. According to the official Japanese version of events, the police officers entered the consulate without the consent of consular officials, thereby violating the Vienna Convention. Wan Ming, in an analysis of the incident, describes the Japanese response as an ‘emotional outburst’, which was exceptional since Japan ‘acted out of character’. According to Wan, the emotional reaction was not based on concerns about what would happen to the North Korean refugees, but related to ‘worsening views of China, cumulative resentment toward Chinese actions in recent years, and increasingly critical media coverage of China’ (Wan, 2003: 840).

While these factors might have contributed to the strong Japanese response, they do not fully explain what it was about this particular incident that triggered such an ‘emotional’ response from Japanese politicians, the press and the general public. Recognition theory is arguably well equipped to explain it. Because the incident was interpreted as a violation of the Vienna Convention and of Japanese sovereignty, both key norms governing interstate behaviour that define states as fundamentally equal, it could be understood as a denial of thin recognition. The emotional reaction seems to have entailed feelings of insult and indignation.

Japan’s Prime Minister, Koizumi Junichirō, stated explicitly that he had protested about China’s actions because he believed they constituted a violation of the Vienna Convention. He demanded ‘sincerity’ (seii) from the Chinese side (Wan, 2003). Another parliamentarian from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) stated: ‘It is the same as a violation of territory. Had it been another country [than Japan] there would have been war’. He described the incident as a result of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s weak foreign policy since 1945 (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2002a). The LDP’s Kamei Shizuka called for Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko’s resignation, even though the two belonged to the same party. Kawaguchi, in turn, demanded an apology from China and a guarantee that the Chinese authorities would prevent a recurrence of any similar incident.

In the end, the North Koreans were allowed to travel to South Korea through the Philippines, but debate over the incident continued in Japan (Wan, 2003). The LDP’s Usui Hideo told the Japanese Diet that it was necessary to restore Japan’s honour (Diet session 154, Budget committee, meeting 28, 22 May 2002).² Similarly, the LDP’s Morioka Masahiro argued that Japan’s ‘dignity had been wounded’ (Diet session 154, Special committee on how to deal with armed attacks, meeting 10, 23 May 2002). An editorial in Yomiuri Shimbun commented that although the human rights of the North Koreans had been protected, Japan’s sovereignty had not: ‘The reality of China’s violation of Japan’s sovereignty will not fade’ just because the human rights of the North Koreans had been protected. That Japan should demand an apology was described as ‘self-evident’ (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2002b).

In April 2005, large-scale, in part violent, protests took place around China. Demonstrators attacked Japanese restaurants and foreign exchange students, and threw stones and other objects at the Japanese embassy and consulates. Over 100 windows belonging to the Japanese embassy in Beijing were reportedly shattered while the Chinese police looked on without intervening (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2005a). Japan’s Foreign Minister, Machimura Nobutaka, demanded an apology, reparations for the damage and measures to prevent a recurrence (Diet session 162, Foreign policy and defence affairs committee, meeting 6, 12 April 2005).

Two days later, Machimura complained that a representative of the Chinese foreign ministry had blamed Japan for the violent demonstrations, because of its mistaken views on its wartime past. In the Diet, Machimura criticised this statement, pointing out that demonstrators will always claim to have a reason, but destructive behaviour can never be tolerated. He stated that the Chinese demonstrators had screamed ‘patriotic innocence’ (aikoku muzai in Japanese; aiguo wuzui in Chinese), a phrase that, according to Machimura, means that ‘anything is acceptable if one demonstrates love for the nation’. He argued that the Chinese official’s statement was also characterised by this logic, and that the Chinese foreign ministry consequently approved of the destructive behaviour (Diet session 162, Foreign policy and defence affairs committee, meeting 7, 14 April 2005).

The next day, Vice Foreign Minister Aizawa Ichirō declared that according to the Vienna Convention, the receiving country is obliged to take action to guarantee the safety of diplomatic missions. Representatives of the Chinese government claimed to have taken such measures. According to footage of the attack on the embassy, the police failed to intervene when demonstrators threw rocks at the building, and allowed the destructive behaviour to continue. Aizawa described the Chinese government’s failure to take measures to guarantee the safety of the Japanese missions as a violation of the Vienna Convention (Diet session 162, Security affairs committee, meeting 7, 15 April 2005). Similar arguments appeared repeatedly in the Diet and in newspaper editorials. Yamane Ryūji of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), for example, said the demonstrations reminded him of the Cultural Revolution (Diet session 162, International affairs investigating committee, meeting 8, 18 April 2005). According to another speaker, China had not obeyed even ‘the most basic international rules’ (Diet session 162, Finance committee, meeting 10, 19 April 2005). Even Asahi Shimbun, a left-leaning newspaper known for criticising the Japanese government and often branded ‘anti-Japanese’ and ‘pro-China’ by the right, strongly criticised the Chinese government’s handling of the incident. Its editorial argued that it should be made a prerequisite for bilateral talks on any future issue that the Chinese side ‘clearly recognise its responsibility for the stone throwing incident’. The Chinese government’s claim that ‘no responsibility lies with the Chinese side’, even though the demonstrators were allowed to attack the embassy from the evening late into the night, made ‘the Japanese people indignant’. The article referenced China’s obligations under IL to protect diplomatic missions (Asahi Shimbun, 2005a).

Muroi Kunihiko of the DPJ also stated that the Japanese people were indignant, and that Japan’s ‘dignity as a nation was being completely trampled on’ because China refused to apologise and pay damages, but instead blamed Japan (Diet session 162, Plenary session, meeting 20, 19 April 2005). Satō Michio (DPJ) argued that upholding the safety of diplomatic missions is the ‘minimum moral in diplomacy’ and that the destruction of diplomatic missions, including bricks being thrown at them, cannot be allowed (Diet session 162, Foreign and security policy committee, meeting 12, 10 May 2005). According to Matsubara Jin (DPJ), because it was a ‘state to state battle over honour’, the status quo could not be restored without a Chinese apology for China’s ‘obvious violation of the Vienna Convention’ (Diet session 162, Foreign affairs committee, meeting 7, 13 May 2005). Nakano Jō (DPJ) described the incident as ‘unthinkable’ (arienai), given the existence of the Vienna Convention, and stated that it was obvious that Japan should demand a Chinese apology. Since it was a matter of Japan’s ‘face’ (mentsu), he demanded a ‘proper’ response from the Chinese side (Diet session 162, Security committee, meeting 7, 15 April 2005). An editorial in the Yomiuri Shimbun described China as ‘a country that does not admit its clear violations of international law and does not apologise either’ (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2005a).

On 7 June 2006, Matsubara Jin (DPJ) asked Foreign Minister Asō Tarō (LDP) whether China had yet apologised for the incidents in which it had ‘clearly … violated the Vienna Convention’ in its relations with Japan, including the 2002 Shenyang incident and the violent demonstrations of the spring of 2005. The foreign minister responded that China had not yet apologised, and added that the ‘Chinese side’s responses are extremely important for the production of Sino-Japanese mutual trust’ (Diet session 164, Foreign affairs committee, meeting 20, 7 June 2006). The claim that the Chinese government’s failure to stop demonstrators attacking Japanese diplomatic missions constituted a violation of the Vienna Convention is significant in terms of thin recognition, as the treaty specifies the rights and obligations of states that enjoy official diplomatic relations.

China’s alleged lack of respect for international norms and rules in its dealings with Japan has been a recurring theme in the Japanese discussion of these incidents. Newspaper editorials and politicians have repeatedly stated that the Chinese authorities have ignored international rules on interstate conduct as defined by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Direct quotes of and references to the Convention appear in both parliamentary statements and newspaper articles, with numerous references to article 22, which states: ‘The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity’ (United Nations, 1961: article 22, para. 2). The explicit reference to ‘dignity’ in this document, which regulates diplomatic interactions between entities that recognise each other as equal in the basic sense of being sovereign states, suggests a link to the focus on dignity in recognition theory. Japanese statements that the Chinese handling of the incident had left Japan ‘indignant’ and even injured Japan’s dignity further highlight that the Chinese government’s posture was understood as a denial of thin recognition.

Both incidents caused emotional reactions in Japan, and calls for Chinese apologies. Importantly, Japanese politicians and journalists have continued to dwell on these incidents long after they occurred. For example, parliamentarians continue to ask ministers in Diet sessions whether China has apologised. Demands for apologies are likely to indicate feelings of not being recognised. If we invert this finding, it is possible to conclude that such apologies could function as acts of recognition and ways of restoring a relationship when a party feels it has been insulted. Other expressions of indignation and of feelings of being insulted can similarly be treated as indicators of feelings of non-recognition.

This section has shown that thin recognition and non-recognition can be recognised by focusing on IL and norms regulating the behaviour between established states that formally recognise each other as equal in the sense of being sovereign states. Acts and statements seen as violating norms and laws such as those defined by the Vienna Convention, for example, behaviour interpreted as violating the sanctity of diplomatic missions, are typically interpreted as denials of thin recognition and therefore tend to result in expressions of feelings of having been insulted as well as demands for apologies.

Recognising thick recognition

The first step in the study of thick recognition is for the analyst to identify a specific self-identity that might be either recognised or mis-recognised by other states (cf. Saurette, 2006). States have multiple identities, some of which are more significant than others in certain situations (Hagström and Gustafsson, 2015). The relative importance of particular identities also changes over time. In Japanese self-identity narratives, especially those constructed by the Japanese government in the international arena, the memory of the post-war era has come to occupy an important place. Numerous official documents and speeches delivered by Japanese prime ministers, as well as apologies for Japan’s aggressive war in the 1930s and 1940s, contain identity constructions that stress Japan’s development as a peaceful, contrite and generous state in the period since 1945. These representations are central to thick recognition, as they contain claims about Japan’s particular identity.

As an example, the ‘Murayama statement’, issued by Japanese Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi on 15 August 1995 not only contained a ‘heartfelt apology’ for Japan’s ‘colonial rule and aggression’, but also emphasised Japan’s peaceful development in the post-war period:

The peace and prosperity of today were built as Japan overcame great difficulty to arise from a devastated land after defeat in war. That achievement is something of which we are proud, and let me herein express my heartfelt admiration for the wisdom and untiring effort of each and every one of our citizens. (Murayama, 1995)

The statement, in other words, emphasised Japan’s peaceful post-war identity, and other achievements of which Japan can be proud. Prime ministers since Murayama have similarly stressed this identity in apologies that have paraphrased the statement (Gustafsson, 2015).

The pamphlet 60 Years: The Path of a Nation Striving for Global Peace, published by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in July 2005, is an even more elaborate example of this identity construction. The first page quotes Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō’s General Policy Speech, delivered to the Diet in January 2005:

In the post-war period, Japan has become the world’s second largest economic power. Never turning into a military power and always observing pacifism, Japan has played an active role in achieving world peace and prosperity by contributing financially, such as through Official Development Assistance and contributions to the UN, and by personnel contributions, such as participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

The pamphlet also describes how Japan, following the end of the war, started over as a ‘nation striving for global peace’ (MOFA, 2005). Its section on Official Development Assistance (ODA) describes Japan as the ‘world’s leading donor country’. A diagram shows that 12.6 per cent of Japan’s total bilateral ODA has gone to China, and that Japan supplied 20 per cent of the world’s total ODA between 1993 and 2004 (MOFA, 2005). Clearly, this construction of Japanese identity emphasises its uniqueness. In addition, these Japanese apologies and other representations construct post-war Japan as radically different from its wartime past ‘other’. Now that this self-identity has been identified, the next step is for the analyst to recognise recognition and/or mis-recognition of it.

What is referred to in China as ‘patriotic education’ is frequently described in Japan as the root cause of sometimes violent ‘anti-Japanese’ demonstrations. For example, when discussing the 2005 protests against Japan in China, the DPJ’s Matsubara Jin directly connected the events to Chinese patriotic education. He cited a Chinese teacher’s manual to show how teachers were told to ‘stimulate the pupils’ minds and encourage them to harbour a strong resentment towards the assaults by Japanese imperialist aggression against China’ (Diet session 162, Foreign affairs committee, meeting 6, 22 April 2005). A Yomiuri Shimbun editorial discussing the demonstrations blamed the former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin for launching ‘life-long learning’ of ‘anti-Japanese education’ in the mid-1990s, and stated that Jiang’s plan for patriotic education had laid the foundation for the establishment of more than 200 patriotic education bases. In addition, it claimed that Chinese textbooks feature numerous descriptions that ‘deliberately plant anti-Japanese sentiments’ in the minds of Chinese pupils (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2005b).

Patriotic education is described as problematic in Diet statements and newspaper editorials, partly because it contains numerous detailed depictions of the Japanese military’s atrocious behaviour during the Second World War. However, the problem with Chinese education is seen as related to not only what it contains but also what it excludes. That China, while emphasising the importance of remembering Japan’s war in China, refuses to acknowledge Japan’s development in the post-war period is a recurring theme in this discourse. A number of speakers representing various political parties have expressed such views in the Japanese Diet. For example, in 2006, Takano Hiroshi of the Kōmeitō described Chinese education as ‘anti-Japanese’ because it devoted extensive time to detailed descriptions of Japanese wartime aggression but none at all to Japan’s post-war development as a peaceful nation that has expressed regret about the past and provided China with large-scale ODA (Diet session 164, Foreign policy and defence committee, meeting 22, 13 June 2006).

Around the time of the large-scale protests against Japan in the spring of 2005, Daimon Mikishi of the Japan Communist Party made similar calls for the Chinese government to teach young people not only about Japanese aggression, but also about Japanese post-war aid to China (Diet session 162, Investigative committee for international affairs, meeting 8, 18 April 2005). In response to the 2005 protests, the left-wing Asahi Shimbun expressed concern about what it described as Chinese misrepresentations and biased portrayals of Japan:

Through patriotic education, many Chinese repeatedly see the photographs and images of the Japanese military’s aggression. The other side—the post-war history of a Japan that has a constitution, which forbids the use of force to resolve conflicts, does not possess nuclear weapons and has not been engaged in war is practically unknown. (Asahi Shimbun, 2005b)

Japanese parliamentarian Takebe Tsutomu (LDP) stated during a visit to China that ‘[because,] based on regret, post-war Japan has continued to walk the path of a peace state, it deserves some recognition’ (Sankei Shimbun, 2005).

A related point, which is made repeatedly, is that Japanese expressions of contrition and apologies for its past aggression have not been properly recognised. After the Japanese diplomatic missions were attacked, voices were raised demanding that the Chinese government cover the costs of repairing the building and issue an apology, as the Chinese authorities had failed to stop the destruction. Chinese President Hu Jintao refused to apologise and instead insisted that Japan express regret for its past war of aggression. Yomiuri Shimbun criticised Hu’s statement, arguing that the accusation that Japan had not shown regret was an ‘obvious distortion of history’ and that Japan had expressed deep regret back in 1972, in the joint declaration issued when bilateral relations were established. The editorial stated that official expressions of regret or apology had been made more than 20 times since. It pointed out that Koizumi delivered an apology during the 2005 Asia-Africa Summit, just before his meeting with Hu. Hu had stated that he wanted ‘regret to be turned into real actions’. The editorial countered that, if so, China should also put a stop to its own ‘behaviour’ concerning its ‘patriotic and anti-Japanese education’ (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2005a).

When the Chinese foreign ministry agreed to initiate a joint bilateral history research project in the wake of the 2005 demonstrations, this prompted a certain degree of optimism in Japan. For example, Higashi Junji (Kōmeitō) saw it as a sign that the Chinese government would agree to teach Chinese children about Japan’s post-war development as a peaceful state. Prime minister Abe Shinzō (LDP) lamented that China had not previously recognised Japan’s post-war development, but believed that it was significant that it was doing so now (Diet session 165, lower house budget committee, meeting 4, 10 October 2006). The next day, Takano Hiroshi (Kōmeitō) urged Abe to demand that China teach ‘correct recognition of our country as a peaceful country’ in the post-war era (Diet session 165, upper house budget committee, meeting 1, 11 October 2006).

These expectations of Chinese recognition were realised in 2007–2008, when Sino-Japanese relations improved. First, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and then President Hu Jintao visited Japan. Significantly, during their visits, they both explicitly recognised Japan’s identity as a peaceful state in the post-war period, and one that had provided China with ODA. On 13 April 2007, Prime Minister Wen declared in a speech to the Japanese Diet: ‘The Japanese government, and its leaders, have on several occasions expressed its attitude towards the history issue, officially recognised its aggression, and expressed deep regret and apologies to the victimised countries’ (Wen, 2007). Asahi Shimbun called China’s explicit recognition of Japan’s apologies ‘epoch-making’ (Asahi Shimbun, 2007). Wen also stated that ‘China has received support and assistance from the Japanese Government and people in its reform, opening-up and modernisation drive’ (Wen, 2007). Asahi Shimbun argued that, ‘this must be the first time many people in China have heard the truth’ about Japan’s aid to China (Asahi Shimbun, 2007). Yomiuri Shimbun also expressed appreciation and remarked that few Chinese knew about the role that Japanese ODA had played in China’s development, for example, in developing important infrastructure in coastal regions (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2007). Explicit Chinese recognition of Japan’s self-identity was even inscribed in the Joint Statement issued by the governments of Japan and China in connection with Hu Jintao’s meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo on 7 May 2008 (MOFA, 2008). The extremely positive Japanese reactions to the statements demonstrate that recognition of the achievements central to Japan’s self-identity can contribute greatly to an improvement in interstate relations.

However, this improvement in bilateral relations was later reversed. In a Diet debate in 2010, after protests against Japan had once again taken place in China, Hirasawa Katsuei (LDP) complained that Chinese war museums, such as the one located in Jiandao in Jilin province in north-east China, depicted Japanese soldiers torturing Chinese, while there were no panels mentioning the friendly bilateral relations and the substantial aid provided by Japan to China in the post-war period (Diet Session 176, lower house judicial affairs committee, meeting 2, 22 October 2010).

By the autumn of 2012, when large-scale demonstrations against Japan took place in more than 100 Chinese cities, the optimism brought about by China’s recognition of Japan’s self-identity had vanished. China was once again seen as mis-recognising Japan’s post-war identity. This was cited as a fundamental bilateral problem. An editorial in Yomiuri Shimbun mentioned that Japan had provided Yen-loans on generous terms, which had contributed to China’s development, but that Japan’s spirit of cooperation was hardly recognised at all in China. On the contrary, ‘anti-Japanese patriotic education’ had been strengthened during the 1990s (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2012). Asahi Shimbun urged the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to stop dealing with its many social problems through the use of ‘anti-Japanism’ (han’nichi). Moreover, it argued that Japan must work hard to guarantee that the Chinese people learn about Japan’s ‘actual circumstances’, as few people in China knew about Japan’s contribution to China’s development in the form of more than 3 trillion Yen in loans (Asahi Shimbun, 2012).

The examples discussed above show how China is seen as denying Japan’s peaceful post-war identity, mainly in the field of education. Another incident, which took place following the Japanese nationalisation of three of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, involved a more direct and explicit denial of this self-identity. In September 2012, Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang stated during a meeting with Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Peter O’Neill that: ‘Both China and Papua New Guinea were victims of the Japanese fascist invasion back in the Second World War’. He continued:

Japan’s position today on the issue of the Diaoyu Islands is an outright denial of the outcomes of victory in the war against fascism and constitutes a grave challenge to the post-war international order. No nation or people who are peace-loving and justice-upholding will tolerate Japan’s stance. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (MOFAPRC), 2012)

Arguing that Japan’s behaviour denied the post-war order, and that such actions would not be tolerated by ‘peace-loving’ nations, in effect denies Japan’s identity as peaceful. Since Li’s statement was an attempt to appeal to the international community, what was seen in Japan as mis-recognition of Japan’s identity could spread beyond the bilateral context. Japan’s Foreign Minister, Gemba Koichirō, responded in an International Herald Tribune op-ed that Japan’s stance on the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue was ‘absolutely not’ an attempt to deny the post-war international order. More importantly, he also directly addressed the mis-recognition of Japan’s self-identity: ‘Japan is a peace-loving nation and has greatly and consistently contributed to peace and prosperity throughout Asia in the post-war period. This policy, strongly supported by our citizens, is a hallmark of Japan and will never change’. He also pointed out that China had recognised Japan’s self-identity in the 2008 joint statement (Gemba, 2012).

In an abundance of newspaper articles and statements, many important Japanese voices have expressed the belief that China refuses to recognise Japan’s post-war identity as a peaceful, contrite and generous state. They view as part of the problem that the Chinese education system mis-recognises Japan’s self-identity. Apart from the implicit mis-recognition of Japan’s self-identity in Chinese education, Chinese leaders have more explicitly mis-recognised Japan’s identity in public statements. Finally, and more promisingly for bilateral relations, there are clear examples of how Chinese leaders have explicitly recognised Japan’s self-identity.

This section has demonstrated how analysts can recognise thick recognition and mis-recognition. Since thick recognition is concerned with particular identities, it is necessary to pay attention to the construction of such identities and to statements asserting that such identities have been denied.

Conclusion

This article has sought to contribute to the literature on recognition in IR by addressing the problem of how to recognise recognition. Developing the concepts of thin and thick recognition in a way that clarifies what they might refer to in a more concrete way is not only important for research on recognition, but also has implications for policy. In particular, explicit recognition, as we have seen, can be at least a first step towards improving interstate relations in times of bilateral crisis. Through its examination of the case of Sino-Japanese relations, the article has identified numerous empirical examples of what concretely might constitute thin and thick recognition between established states. It suggests that the IL and norms that regulate the behaviour between established states that formally recognise each other as equal in the sense of being sovereign states, such as norms of sovereignty and those defined by the Vienna Convention, are central to thin recognition. Acts and statements seen as violating such norms and laws, such as acts interpreted as violating the sanctity of diplomatic missions, are typically interpreted as denials of thin recognition and therefore tend to trigger expressions of feelings of being insulted and demands for apologies. If such demands are not met, this adds insult to injury and results in further expressions of feelings of insult.

While the article has made several general points about thin recognition, analysts also need to take context into account. For example, for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the status of Taiwan is arguably the most sensitive issue related to thin recognition. Acts by other states that seem to challenge the One China policy by treating Taiwan as an independent state are easily interpreted in China as non-recognition. When it comes to thick recognition, context is even more important, since it is first necessary to identify the particular identities constructed by a particular state in order to be able to recognise thick recognition and its denial. This article should be seen as a first attempt to develop a framework for recognising recognition and non-/mis-recognition. As such, it should be complemented by research that further explores thin and thick recognition in various contexts in order to determine the extent to which the insights from the case study are more generally applicable.

It has been pointed out that the differences between thin and thick recognition are important because

…a collective demanding international legal recognition as a sovereign state (thin recognition) will be making a very different claim, and demand a very different response, than a rising power looking to achieve ‘its place in the sun’ among the system’s world powers (thick recognition). (Murray, 2014: 2)

This article has demonstrated that thin and thick recognition are not only important for collectives struggling for recognition as sovereign states or for those seeking their ‘place in the sun’. Japan’s demand that China recognise its identity as a peaceful state in the post-war period belongs in neither of these categories. In addition, a state might believe that it is being denied both thin and thick recognition at the same time. This is exemplified by the Japanese reactions to ‘anti-Japanese’ demonstrations in China. By allowing attacks on Japanese diplomatic missions, the Chinese government was viewed as denying Japan thin recognition. At the same time, its patriotic education, which is viewed as denying Japan’s identity as a peaceful state in the post-war period, was understood as the root cause of the demonstrations.

This article has also suggested that it might be fruitful to distinguish between explicit and implicit mis-recognition, the former referring to statements to the effect that ‘you are not X’, whereas the latter signifies non-explicit acts or statements interpreted as mis-recognition. These distinctions open up the possibility of asking questions about the effects of different types of recognition. Further research could explore whether the explicit denial of self-identities negatively influences relations between states to a greater extent than implicit denial. It could also investigate the contexts in which explicit or implicit denial is more likely to occur, and whether the denial of thin or thick recognition causes different reactions.

Footnotes

Funding

The research received financial support from the Swedish Research Council (grant 2012–1150).

Notes

Author biography

Karl Gustafsson is a research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. His doctoral dissertation received the Stockholm University Association’s award for best dissertation in the Social Sciences in 2011. His article ‘Memory Politics and Ontological Security in Sino-Japanese Relations’ won the Wang Gungwu Prize for best article published in Asian Studies Review in 2014. He recently published articles in Global Affairs, The Pacific Review and Asian Perspective.

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