This article analyzes efforts to harmonize European Union export control policies on dual-use goods from the perspectives of neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist theories of European integration. The outcome of the Council negotiations on dual-use export controls can best be characterized as an intergovernmental bargain. Judicial policy making in this area, on the other hand, fits neofunctionalist expectations rather well, and on implementation issues central state executives may be losing their exclusive control. The article concludes by arguing that rather than investing great theoretical significance in differences among issue areas or policy types, it appears more fruitful to recognize the European Union as a system of multilevel governance. In this system, the relative weight and influence of different actors varies depending on whether we are concerned with policy initiation, legislative decision making, policy implementation, or judicial policy making.
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