Abstract
Ronald Rogowski's recent and important work, Commerce and Coalitions, sets forth a farranging and parsimonious theory of trade and political cleavages. This article closely investigates its validity in the case of pre-World War I Germany, where trade has long been seen as a critical factor determining coalition formation and Rogowski's argument appears at first glance to be especially compelling. Close investigation, however, reveals that the key variable in Rogowski's theory, relative factor endowments, fails to account for the political alignment of capital and labor in Germany following 1890. This article puts forward an alternative theory in which business-labor coalition formation is determined not only by the alliance possibilities associated with trade but also by their intersection with the strength of worker organization and capital-labor mobility. This argument both addresses the anomalies that prewar Germany poses for Rogowski's account of trade and cleavages and provides a potential explanation for the absence of business-labor collaboration elsewhere in Western Europe before 1914.
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