Abstract
Why has Brazil failed to develop strong democratic institutions, despite widespread opposition to authoritarianism and support for civilian rule in the 1980s? This article argues that the political pacts bargained by elites that made the regime transition possible limited the extension of democracy. By restoring to old regime elites many sources of their political power as the price for their support for democratization, political pacts left the military with a substantial degree of formal and informal power over civilians, preserved clientelism, and undermined the ability of political parties to transform themselves into genuine transmission belts for nonelite interests. The undemocratic character of the Brazilian state, as embodied by military autonomy, technocratic modes of policymaking, and executive dominance over the legislature, moreover, was reinforced by the defeat of parliamentarism by the constituent assembly in 1988.
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