Abstract
Soviet economic policy under Brezhnev presents a puzzling pattern of abortive reforms and contradictory approaches. The authors find that the political arrangements and decision-making procedures Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues set up were major causes of Soviet failures to reform economic policy. The authors' data, derived from a content-analysis study of Politburo members' public statements, suggest that Politburo decisions on economic policy were made through a collective and consensual process, which did not resolve conflict but merely smoothed it over. The process allowed important individuals or minorities to have their views endorsed in official decisions, but in many cases there was very little commitment behind these decisions because they did not represent the views of a majority or the General Secretary. Lack of commitment at the top gave implementing agencies wide lattitude to dilute, delay, or even block fulfillment of those decisions.
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