Several propostions about resource allocation behavior are tested with data for the Japanese national government and 46 prefectural governments. Results are compared with those from parallel tests employing data for the West German national government and 105 municipal governments. Most of the behavior observed in both countries seems compatible with the incremental model's assumptions. However, the West German national government's spending patterns are shown to be just as stable as the Japanese national government's. This finding runs counter to baransu descriptions of budgeting in Japan. Findings for subnational governments in both countries also contadict the literature. In particular, the expenditure pattern variability of Japanese prefectures and West German municipalities decreases with increased interparty competition.
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