Conflict of Interest Theory and Specific Systems

Abstract

After examining conflict of interest theory and Axelrod's application of it to the postdiction of postwar Italian parliamentary coalitions, a replication of Axelrod's work is undertaken with Weimar Germany as the setting. Axelrod's theory is compared in terms of its predictability with other theories (the Von-Neumann-Morgenstern theory, Leiserson's bargaining theory, the basic and modified theories of William Riker, and De Swaan's policy distance theory). Axelrod's minimum-connected winning approach is shown to have a relatively higher predictive ability in postdicting Weimar coalition behavior. Some suggestions as to the modification of conflict-of-interest theory for application to “abnormal parliamentary periods” are offered in conclusion.

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