Corporate Coup-Maker Grievances And Types Of Regime Targets

Abstract

In partial response to the renewed explanatory emphasis on the role of corporate grievances in bringing about military coups, this article operationalizes and tests the hypothesis that a significantly higher proportional frequency of apparent corporate motivations arc associated with coups executed against civilian governments as opposed to coups executed against military governments. Using a 1946–1970 data base encompassing 229 military coups, no statistically significant differences between the two types of government targets emerge at the world level. At the regional level, only Asian coups provide any real support for the hypothesis. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the possible reasons for the general lack of support for the hypothesis and its implications for the analysis of military coups.

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