AUMANN, R. and M. MASCHLER (1964) “The bargaining set for cooperative games.”Annals of Mathematics Studies52: 443–475.
2.
AXELROD, R. (1970) Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics. Chicago: Markham.
3.
BROWNE, E. C. and M. N. FRANKLIN (1973) “Aspects of coalition payoffs in European parliamentary democracies.”Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.67: 453–469.
4.
DE SWAAN, A. (1973) Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
5.
DE SWAAN, A. (1970) “An empirical model of coalition formation as an n-person game of policy distance minimization, ” in S. Groennings, E. W. Kelly, and M. Leiserson (eds.) The Study of Coalition Behavior: Theoretical Perspectives and Cases from Four Countries.New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
6.
GAMSON, W. A. (1961) “A theory of coalition formation.”Amer. Soc. Rev.26: 373–382.
7.
LEISERSON, M. A. (1968) “Factions and coalitions in one-party Japan: an interpretation based on the theory of games.”Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.62: 770–787.
8.
LEISERSON, M. A. (1966) “Coalitions in politics: a theoretical and empirical study.” Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University.
9.
REMY, D. (1975) “The pivotal party: definition and measurement.”European J. of Pol. Research3: 291–301.
10.
RIKER, W. (1962) The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
11.
SCHELLING, T. C. (1963) The Strategy of Conflict. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
12.
SHAPLEY, L. S. (1953) “A value for n-person games.”Annals of Mathematics Studies28: 343–359.
13.
VON NEUMANN, J. and O. MORGENSTERN (1944) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
