Coalition Payoffs and Electoral Performance in European Democracies

BROWNE, E. and M. FRANKLIN (1973) “Aspects of coalition payoffs in parliamentary democracies.” Amer. Political Science Rev. (June): 453–469.

BUENO de MESQUITA, B. (1975) Strategy, Risk, and Personality in Coalition Politics: The Case of India. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.

DOWNS, A. (1957) An Economic Thoery of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.

KERNELL, S. (1977) “Presidential popularity and negative voting.” Amer. Political Science Rev. (March): 44–66.

KEY, V. O. (1966) The Responsible Electorate. New York: Vintage.

LEISERSON, M. (1968) “Factions and coalitions in one-party Japan: an interpretation based on the theory of games.” Amer. Political Science Rev. (September): 770–787.

LEMIEUX, P. (1977) The Liberal Party and British Political Change: 1955–1974. Doctoral dissertation, MIT. (unpublished)

RIKER, W. H. (1962) The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.

RIKER, W. H. and P. ORDESHOOK (1973) Introduction to Positive Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

SCHOFIELD, N. (1976) “The kernel and payoffs in European government coalitions.” Public Choice (Summer): 29–50.