The electoral success of far-right parties forces mainstream parties to reconsider their strategies towards these challengers. Center-right parties in particular face trade-offs between a principled commitment to non-cooperation and their vote and policy goals. Accommodation may win back conservative voters, yet simultaneously alienate centrist supporters. Existing research has explored accommodation and dismissal primarily in the electoral arena, but less is known about the role of wholesale exclusion – the cordon sanitaire – in the legislative arena. Studying Germany, we examine how voters evaluate the willingness of the center-right (CDU/CSU) to collaborate with the far-right (AfD) in parliament. We show that voters overwhelmingly reject a coalition, while many are willing to tolerate issue-specific cooperation under certain conditions. By uncovering how voters balance principled commitments against instrumental policy goals, this study deepens our understanding of the electoral and democratic consequences of the cordon sanitaire.
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