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Abstract

This article introduces the concept of visibility in infrastructure politics and public projects. I introduce what “visibility projects” are—distorted public projects aimed at increasing government officials’ visibility in politics and career prospects. These projects are highly costly and often compromise business interests because political visibility does not often translate into business profits. Using China’s urban bus sector as a case, I further show that when a sector is chosen for visibility projects, government officials can seek financial contributions and operational changes from businesses in the sector, creating an uneven playing field between private companies and state-owned enterprises. Private companies, facing hard budget constraints, are more likely to resist visibility projects than state-owned firms, which can ultimately lead to de-privatization of a sector. I show these dynamics with a quantitative analysis based on an original dataset, a process-tracing case study, and in-depth interviews.

Keywords

Infrastructure politics regulatory politics public services urban planning state-business relations bureaucratic incentives de-privatization nationalization

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Visibility Projects and De-Privatization: A Case of China’s Urban Bus Sector

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