This study explores the institutional consequences of natural disasters on the distribution of authority between national and subnational governments. Specifically, it examines how disasters influence fiscal and administrative centralization and how this effect varies with their geographic distribution. We argue that natural disasters act as external shocks that increase institutional centralization and the centralizing effect of disasters is more pronounced when they occur farther from the capital or are widely dispersed. Using data from 84 countries (1962–2018), we find support for both the centralizing impact of disasters and the moderating effect of geographic distribution. Results also reveal variations in the effects across different types of disasters, dimensions of centralization, and time lags reflecting cumulative impacts. Overall, the findings suggest that, contrary to the global trend of decentralization, natural disasters drive national and subnational units toward greater centralization, highlighting the adaptive capacity of modern states in response to environmental shocks.
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