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Abstract

Curfews are commonly used by governments to control restive populations during conflict, but are they effective? Although the primary goal for governments is to increase military advantage, they also cause significant disruptions to civilian life which may provoke a backlash. In this study, we analyze the effect of curfews on public attitudes and rebel attacks in Turkey. Exploiting the closeness of two national elections and the implementation of curfews between these elections, we employ novel data in a difference-in-difference analysis to examine effects on voting and violence. Our results show that curfews provoke a dual backlash effect. First, they decrease support for the ruling party and increase support for Kurdish and Turkish national opposition parties in the areas where they are implemented. Second, they increase the number of rebel attacks in the areas that experience a curfew. This paper provides robust evidence for the backlash effects of indiscriminate non-violent tactics.

Keywords

curfew non-violent tactics civil conflict voting Turkey

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