Deliberate non-enforcement of the law has been analyzed as a policy tool to redistribute income. I show that it also responds to political incentives for the provision of insurance, resembling two well-known dimensions of social policy design. I analyze data from a large informal program of social insurance in the world: informal access to electricity service. Transmission and distribution losses (TDL) in the electricity sector are counter-cyclical because non-compliance and theft increase during economic crises. By exploiting variation in political institutions, I capture political motivations for the provision of informal insurance. Using a panel of 110 developing countries (1970–2014) and instrumental variables for business cycles and regime type, I show that unlike highly entrenched autocrats, democracies tolerate increases in electricity losses during negative income shocks. This paper expands the literature on “forbearance” showing how the provision of informal insurance varies across the developing world.
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