From Benefits and Beneficiaries: The Historical Origins of Old-Age Pensions From a Political Regime Perspective

Abstract

Global studies on the historical origins of old-age pensions from a political regime perspective are quite rare. Based on the novel PENLEG dataset this article shows that democratic and nondemocratic regimes had different policy priorities when designing old-age pensions for the first time. Whereas democracies had significantly higher legal pension coverage rates than nondemocratic regimes, the reverse pattern can be found for pension replacement rates. The study also shows that temporal effects and colonial legacy mattered. Longstanding democracies introduced much higher legal pension coverage rates than countries that had recently democratized. Additionally, the French colonial legacy spurred high legal pension coverage rates in African autocracies. These findings underline the importance of taking the multidimensionality of welfare programs into account when analyzing political regime differences. Moreover, due attention must be paid to the historical context when theorizing about welfare policies from a political regime perspective.