Why do some governments engage in genocide or politicide against their civilian population during civil war? Scholarship on this important question views such brutality as a strategic tool the government can use to maintain power through military victory. Returning to the logic of conflict bargaining, I re-conceptualize genocide and politicide as a means to extract information about one’s opponent. I argue that a government is more likely to employ these atrocities during conflict when it is more uncertain about its probability of victory to reveal better information more quickly from the battlefield. I test this argument on all civil wars since 1945 and find support for this claim. These dynamics are more pronounced when the rebels rely on the civilian population to mobilize fighters. My argument helps bridge significant works in the genocide and conflict-bargaining literatures.
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