A growing literature documents that public policy in modern democracies fails to represent the preferences of traditionally marginalized subconstituencies. By dissecting party agendas, I show that inequality already permeates the very politicization of issues before democratic decision-making even begins. Election platforms worldwide predominantly reflect the concerns of male, educated and affluent citizens. That parties disregard large voter groups at this early stage seems surprising given that campaign agendas are inherently public. My analysis reveals that looming electoral backlash is anticipated by a strategy of “discreet” inequality. In particular, agendas are designed to appear inconspicuous and agreeable by exempting issues from unequal responsiveness that voters perceive as divisive or threatening. Discreet inequality thus appeases marginalized groups while ignoring their views on the large majority of more ordinary issues. The article demonstrates these patterns for gender, education, and income using comparative survey and manifesto data covering 42 countries.
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