How does state structure affect responses to globalization? This article examines why some parts of the Chinese state enacted more liberalizing policies than others in response to World Trade Organization (WTO) entry. It shows that, despite single-party rule, China’s WTO-era policy trajectories were neither top-down nor monolithic. Instead, central and subnational governments diverged in their policy responses. The study identifies three competing economic strategies from which these responses are drawn: market-replacing (directive), market-shaping (developmental), and market-enhancing (regulatory). The analysis uses an original dataset of Chinese industry regulations from 1978 to 2014 and employs machine learning methods in text analysis to identify words associated with each strategy. Combining tariff, industry, and textual data, the article demonstrates that the divergent strategies adopted by central and subnational governments are driven by each unit’s differential accountability to the WTO and by the diversity of that unit’s industrial base.
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