Although scholars agree that ethnically divided societies are generally more prone to political violence, critics of consociationalism suggest that proportional representation and parliamentarism provide poor solutions for ethnically heterogeneous settings. I argue that extant findings about the impacts of powersharing institutions on conflict likelihood assume that institutions have a linear relationship with ethnic diversity, whereas in reality, the relationship is more complex. I demonstrate that proportional representation and parliamentarism are associated with an increased likelihood of civil conflict at mid-range levels of diversity but are associated with a decreased risk of conflict in more extremely divided settings, while federalism is independently associated with greater conflict risk at higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity. The results underscore that the peace-promoting effects of institutions may depend on how polarized societies are, encouraging scholars to think more seriously about the effectiveness of consociationalism for mitigating violence where there is greater ethnic diversity.
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