Recent studies of authoritarian legislatures underscore the importance of institutions for cooptation and information collection, but many still consider authoritarian legislatures rubber stamps in policy making. We argue that authoritarian legislatures could be important arenas of the contestation reflected in delegates’ bills and proposals instead of their voting outcomes. Specifically, government agencies use authoritarian legislatures to build policy coalitions to advance their policy agendas. Delegates serve as proxy fighters for key party and government elites with different policy preferences. We provide evidence based on an original dataset containing education-related bills and policy proposals submitted to both Chinese national assemblies between 1983 and 2007. We identify the existence of the policy coalitions, and find coalition building is more intensified prior to the promulgation of education-related laws. We then employ network analysis to illustrate the channels behind policy coalition network.
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