Recent decades have seen a considerable increase in delegation to independent regulatory agencies, which has been justified by reference to the superior performance of these bodies relative to government departments. Yet, the hypothesis that more independent regulators do better work has hardly been tested. We examine the link using a comprehensive measure of the quality of work carried out by competition authorities in 30 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries, and new data on the design of these organizations. We find that formal independence has a positive and significant effect on quality. Contrary to expectations, though, formal political accountability does not boost regulatory quality, and there is no evidence that it increases the effect of independence by reducing the risk of slacking. The quality of work is also enhanced by increased staffing, more extensive regulatory powers, and spillover effects of a more capable bureaucratic system.
BawnK. (1995). Political control versus expertise: Congressional choices about administrative procedures. American Political Science Review, 89, 62-73.
2.
BernsteinM. H. (1955). Regulating business by independent commission. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
3.
BevanG.HoodC. (2006). What’s measured is what matters: Targets and gaming in the English public health care system. Public Administration, 84, 517-538.
4.
BortolottiB.CambiniC.RondiL.SpiegelY. (2011). Capital structure and regulation: Do ownership and regulatory independence matter?Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 20, 517-564.
5.
BovensM. (2007). Analysing and assessing accountability: A conceptual framework. European Law Journal, 13, 447-468.
6.
BovensM.SchillemansT. (2014). Meaningful accountability. In BovensM.GoodinR. E.SchillemansT. (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of public accountability (pp. 673-682). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
7.
BusuiocM. (2009). Accountability, control and independence: The case of European agencies. European Law Journal, 15, 599-615.
8.
CukiermanA.WebbS. B.NeyaptiB. (1992). Measuring the independence of central banks and its effect on policy outcomes. World Bank Economic Review, 6, 353-398.
9.
DewatripontM.JewittI.TiroleJ. (1999). The economics of career concerns, part II: Application to missions and accountability of government agencies. Review of Economic Studies, 66, 199-217.
10.
DubnickM. J.FredericksonH. (2011). Introduction. In DubnickM. J.FredericksonH. G. (Eds.), Accountable governance: Problems and promises (pp. xi-xxx). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
11.
EdwardsG.WavermanL. (2006). The effects of public ownership and regulatory independence on regulatory outcomes. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 29, 23-67.
12.
ElgieR.McMenaminI. (2005). Credible commitments, political uncertainty or political complexity? Explaining variation in the independence of non-majoritarian institutions in France. British Journal of Political Science, 35, 531-548.
13.
Ennser-JedenastikL. (2015). Credibility versus control: Agency independence and partisan influence in the regulatory state. Comparative Political Studies, 48, 823-853.
14.
GailmardS.PattyJ. W. (2007). Slackers and zealots: Civil service, policy discretion, and bureaucratic expertise. American Journal of Political Science, 51, 873-889.
15.
GilardiF. (2002). Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies: A comparative empirical analysis. Journal of European Public Policy, 9, 873-893.
16.
GilardiF. (2005). The institutional foundations of regulatory capitalism: The diffusion of independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598, 84-101.
17.
Global Competition Review. (2005). Rating enforcement 2005. London, England: Law Business Research.
18.
Global Competition Review. (2006). Rating enforcement 2006. London, England: Law Business Research.
19.
Global Competition Review. (2007). Rating enforcement 2007. London, England: Law Business Research.
20.
Global Competition Review. (2008). Rating enforcement 2008. London, England: Law Business Research.
21.
Global Competition Review. (2011). Rating enforcement 2011. London, England: Law Business Research.
22.
Global Competition Review. (2012). Rating enforcement 2012. London, England: Law Business Research.
23.
Global Competition Review. (2014). Rating enforcement 2014. London, England: Law Business Research.
24.
Global Competition Review. (2015). Rating enforcement 2015. London, England: Law Business Research.
25.
GutiérrezL. H. (2003). The effect of endogenous regulation on telecommunications expansion and efficiency in Latin America. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 23, 257-286.
26.
HanrettyC.KoopC. (2012). Measuring the formal independence of regulatory agencies. Journal of European Public Policy, 19, 198-216.
27.
HanrettyC.KoopC. (2013). Shall the law set them free? The formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies. Regulation & Governance, 7, 195-214.
28.
HuberJ. D.McCartyN. (2004). Bureaucratic capacity, delegation, and political reform. American Political Science Review, 98, 481-494.
29.
JackmanS. (2009). Bayesian analysis for the social sciences. Chichester, UK: John Wiley.
30.
JordanaJ.Levi-FaurD.Fernández i MarínX. (2011). The global diffusion of regulatory agencies: Channels of transfer and stages of diffusion. Comparative Political Studies, 44, 1343-1369.
31.
JordanaJ.RosasG. (2014). When do autonomous banking regulators promote stability?European Journal of Political Research, 53, 672-691.
32.
KaufmannD.KraayA.MastruzziM. (2010). The worldwide governance indicators: Methodology and analytical issues (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 5430). Washington, DC: World Bank.
33.
KoopC. (2011). Explaining the accountability of independent agencies: The importance of political salience. Journal of Public Policy, 31, 209-234.
34.
KoopC. (2014). Theorizing and explaining voluntary accountability. Public Administration, 92, 565-581.
35.
KydlandF. E.PrescottE. C. (1977). Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans. Journal of Political Economy, 85, 473-492.
36.
LernerJ. S.TetlockP. E. (1999). Accounting for the effects of accountability. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 255-275.
37.
LevyB.SpillerP. T. (1996). Regulations, institutions, and commitment: Comparative studies of telecommunications. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
38.
LoewensteinK. (1957). Political power and the governmental process. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
39.
MaggettiM.GilardiF. (2014). Network governance and the domestic adoption of soft rules. Journal of European Public Policy, 21, 1293-1310.
40.
MaggettiM.IngoldK.VaroneF. (2013). Having your cake and eating it, too: Can regulatory agencies be both independent and accountable?Swiss Political Science Review, 19, 1-25.
41.
MajoneG. (1996). Temporal consistency and policy credibility: Why democracies need non-majoritarian institutions (EUI Working Paper, RSC No 96/57). Fiesole, Italy: European University Institute.
42.
MajoneG. (1997). From the positive to the regulatory state: Causes and consequences of changes in the mode of governance. Journal of Public Policy, 17, 139-167.
43.
MajoneG. (1999). The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems. West European Politics, 22, 1-24.
44.
MayP. J. (2007). Regulatory regimes and accountability. Regulation & Governance, 1, 8-26.
45.
McCubbinsM. D.NollR.WeingastB. (1987). Administrative procedures as instruments of political control. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 3, 243-277.
46.
MeroN. P.MotowidloS. J. (1995). Effects of rater accountability on the accuracy and the favorability of performance ratings. Journal of Applied Psychology, 80, 517-524.
47.
MoeT. M. (2012). Delegation, control, and the study of public bureaucracy. In GibbonsR.RobertsJ. (Eds.), The handbook of organizational economics (pp. 1148-1182). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
48.
MottaM. (2004). Competition policy: Theory and practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
49.
PatilS. V.VieiderF.TetlockP. E. (2014). Process versus outcome accountability. In BovensM.GoodinR. E.SchillemansT. (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of public accountability (pp. 69-89). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
50.
PhilpM. (2009). Delimiting democratic accountability. Political Studies, 57, 28-53.
51.
QuintynM.TaylorM. W. (2007). Robust regulators and their political masters: Independence and accountability in theory. In MasciandaroD.QuintynM. (Eds.), Designing financial supervision institutions: Independence, accountability and governance (pp. 3-40). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
52.
RadaelliC. (2004). Getting to grips with quality in the diffusion of regulatory impact assessment in Europe. Public Money and Management, 24, 271-276.
53.
RajuN. S.LaffitteL. J.ByrneB. M. (2002). Measurement equivalence: A comparison of methods based on confirmatory factor analysis and item response theory. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 517-529.
54.
RogoffK. (1985). The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1169-1189.
55.
SamejimaF. (1970). Estimation of latent ability using a response pattern of graded scores. Psychometrika, 35, 139.
ScottC. (2000). Accountability in the regulatory state. Journal of Law and Society, 27, 38-60.
58.
SelinJ. (2015). What makes an agency independent?American Journal of Political Science, 59, 971-987.
59.
TetlockP. E. (1983). Accountability and the perseverance of first impressions. Social Psychology Quarterly, 46, 285-292.
60.
TetlockP. E. (1985). Accountability: A social check on the fundamental attribution error. Social Psychology Quarterly, 48, 227-236.
61.
ThatcherM. (2005). The third force? Independent regulatory agencies and elected politicians in Europe. Governance, 18, 347-373.
62.
ThatcherM.Stone SweetA. (2002). Theory and practice of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions. West European Politics, 25(1), 1-22.
63.
WallstenS. J. (2001). An econometric analysis of telecom competition, privatization, and regulation in Africa and Latin America. Journal of Industrial Economics, 49, 1-19.
64.
WeldonE.GarganoG. M. (1988). Cognitive loafing the effects of accountability and shared responsibility on cognitive effort. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 14, 159-171.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
