Ethnic Quotas as Term-Limits: Caste and Distributive Politics in South India

Abstract

While ethnic quotas are primarily used to increase minority political representation, they also act like term-limits for majority-group incumbents, who cannot seek reelection after quota implementation. As such, quotas may have the perverse effect of making incumbents less accountable during their last term, particularly to minorities. Although majority-group incumbents may still have social reasons to distribute benefits to their coethnics, they have less reason to do so for minorities, from whom they derive little social reward. Using the systematic rotation of caste quotas in south India, this article shows that village presidents who expect to be ousted by quota spend significantly less on minorities than those who can run again; however, they do not reduce spending on goods that benefit their own communities. These findings suggest that quota policies must be evaluated not just by whom they bring into office but also by whom they force out.