This article explains legislators’ support for electoral reforms reducing electoral irregularities and protecting voters’ autonomy at the ballot box in Britain and Germany in the late 19th century. We argue that the main political cleavage over the adoption of new legislation to limit illicit electoral practices pitted politicians able to take advantage of opportunities for vote buying and intimidation against those who could not do so because of unfavorable political and economic conditions in their district. We examine the political, partisan, and economic factors accounting for candidates’ ability to engage in electoral irregularities and show that, in both countries, resource-constrained candidates were more likely to support the introduction of electoral reforms. Because the primary illicit electoral practice differs across these two cases—vote buying in Britain and economic intimidation in Germany—some of the political and economic factors accounting for legislators’ support for reform differ across these cases.
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