Assembly dissolution is a key dimension of constitutional variation in parliamentary democracies. It conditions the timing of elections, influences electoral accountability, and shapes how politicians bargain about government formation, termination, and policy. Yet, despite the importance of dissolution rules, no measure exists that applies to the different actors involved in dissolutions and records the complexity of the rules sufficiently accurately to capture their substantive implications. This article develops, operationalizes, and tests a detailed index of parliamentary dissolution powers that generalizes to all relevant actors. We demonstrate the substantive utility of the index by examining how election timing powers modify electoral accountability.
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