This article examines the effect of electoral misconduct on party systems in new electoral regimes. The authors distinguish between different forms of electoral misconduct and argue that preelection tools—which aim to deter opposition parties and their supporters and create a biased information environment—exert a “psychological” effect on parties and voters, whereas ballot fraud exerts a direct, “mechanical” effect on vote shares. Using original data on electoral misconduct in legislative elections in Latin America and postcommunist countries, the authors find that preelection misconduct has a strong reductive effect on the effective number of parties; however, ballot fraud does not. Further investigation suggests that intimidation of opposition parties and voters is the most important mechanism through which misconduct reduces party numbers. By identifying electoral misconduct as a key omitted variable, this article renders the conventional model of party systems more applicable to the political contexts in new electoral regimes.
BeaulieuEmily. (2006). Birth pangs or death throes? The consequences of election boycotts for democratization. Unpublished manuscript, University of Kentucky, Lexington.
2.
BeckNathaniel. (2001). Time-series-cross-section data: What have we learned in the past few years?Annual Review of Political Science, 4, 271-293.
3.
BeckNathanielKatzJonathan N. (1995). What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section data. American Political Science Review, 89, 634-647.
4.
BirchSarah. (2007). Electoral systems and electoral misconduct. Comparative Political Studies, 40, 1533-1566.
5.
BjornlundEric C. (2004). Beyond free and fair: Monitoring elections and building democracy. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
CalingaertDaniel. (2006). Election rigging and how to fight it. Journal of Democracy, 17, 138-151.
8.
CarothersThomas. (2002). The end of the transition paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13, 5-21.
9.
CheibubJosé AntonioKalandrakisTasos. (2004). Global database of political institutions and economic performance. New Haven, CT: Yale Center for International and Area Studies.
10.
CingranelliDavid L.RichardsDavid L. (1999). Measuring the level, pattern, and sequence of government respect for physical integrity rights. International Studies Quarterly, 43, 407-417.
11.
ClarkTerry D.WittrockJill N. (2005). Presidentialism and the effect of electoral law in postcommunist systems: Regime type matters. Comparative Political Studies, 38, 171-178.
12.
ClarkWilliam RobertsGolderMatt. (2006). Rehabilitating Duverger’s theory: Testing the mechanical and strategic modifying effects of electoral laws. Comparative Political Studies, 39, 679-708.
13.
ConaghanCatherine M. (2005). Fujimori’s Peru: Deception in the public sphere. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
14.
CoxGary W. (1997). Making votes count: Strategic coordination in the world’s electoral systems. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
15.
CoxGaryKousserMorgan. (1981). Turnout and rural corruption: New York as a test case. American Journal of Political Science, 25, 646-663.
16.
DiamondLarry. (2002). Thinking about hybrid regimes. Journal of Democracy, 13, 21-35.
17.
Diaz-CayerosAlbertoMagaloniBeatriz. (2001). Party dominance and the logic of electoral design in Mexico’s transition to democracy. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 13, 271-293.
18.
EspinalRosario. (1998). Electoral observation and democratization in the Dominican Republic. In MiddlebrookK. J. (Ed.), Electoral observation and democratic transitions in Latin America (pp. 93-113). La Jolla: University of California, San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
19.
FearonJames D. (2003). Ethnic and cultural diversity by country. Journal of Economic Growth, 8, 195-222.
20.
FilippovMikhailOrdeshookPeterShvetsovaOlga. (1999). Party fragmentation and presidential systems in postcommunist democracies. Constitutional Political Economy, 10, 3-26.
21.
Freedom House. (2004). Freedom in the world. Retrieved from www.freedomhouse.org
22.
GrayJulia. (2009). International organization as a seal of approval: European Union accession and investor risk. American Journal of Political Science, 53, 931-949.
23.
GreeneKenneth F. (2007). Why dominant parties lose: Mexico’s democratization in comparative perspective. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
24.
HartlynJonathanMcCoyJennifer. (2006). Observer paradoxes: How to assess electoral manipulation. In SchedlerA. (Ed.), Electoral authoritarianism: The dynamics of unfree competition (pp. 41-56). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
25.
HartlynJonathanMcCoyJenniferMustilloThomas M. (2008). Electoral governance matters: Explaining the quality of elections in contemporary Latin America. Comparative Political Studies, 41, 73-98.
26.
HickenAllen. (2004). Asia and Pacific: General overview. In ColomerJosep M. (Ed.), Handbook of electoral system choice (pp. 452-474). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
27.
HydeSusan D. (2010). The pseudo-democrat’s dilemma: Why election monitoring became an international norm. Unpublished manuscript, Yale University, New Haven, CT.
28.
JonesMark. (2004). Electoral institutions, social cleavages and candidate competition in presidential elections. Electoral Studies, 23, 73-106.
29.
KaufmannDanielKraayAartMastruzziMassimo. (2009). Governance matters VIII: Aggregate and individual governance indicators 1996–2008 (Policy Research Working Paper 4978). Washington, DC: World Bank.
30.
KelleyJudith. (2009). D-minus elections: The politics and norms of international election observation. International Organization, 63, 765-787.
31.
LaaksoMarkkuTaageperaRein. (1979). Effective number of parties: A measure with application to West Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 12, 3-27.
32.
LehoucqFabrice. (2003). Electoral fraud: Causes, types and consequences. Annual Review of Political Science, 6, 233-256.
33.
LehoucqFabriceMolinaIvan. (2002). Stuffing the ballot box: Fraud, electoral reform, and democratization in Costa Rica. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
34.
LevitskyStevenWayLucan A. (2002). The rise of competitive authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 13, 51-65.
35.
LijphartArend. (1994). Electoral systems and party systems: A study of twenty-seven democracies 1945–1990. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
36.
LindbergStaffan. (2004). The democratic qualities of competitive elections: Participation, competition and legitimacy in Africa. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 42, 61-105.
37.
LindbergStaffan I. (2006). Democracy and elections in Africa. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
38.
MagaloniBeatiz. (2006). Voting for autocracy: Hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
39.
MainwaringScottBrinksDanielPerez-LinanAnibal. (2001). Classifying political regimes in Latin America, 1945–1999. Studies in Comparative International Development, 36, 37-65.
40.
MarshallMonty G.JaggersKeith. (2004). Polity IV Project. College Park: University of Maryland, Center for International Development and Conflict Management.
41.
McCoyJennifer. (1998). Monitoring and mediating elections during Latin American democratization. In MiddlebrookK. J. (Ed.), Electoral observation and democratic transitions in Latin America (pp. 53-90). La Jolla: University of California, San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
42.
McMillanJohnZoidoPablo. (2004). How to subvert democracy: Montesinos in Peru. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, 69-92.
43.
MolinarJuan. (1991). Counting the number of parties: An alternative index. American Political Science Review, 85, 1384-1391.
44.
NetoAmorimCoxGary. (1997). Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties. American Journal of Political Science, 41, 149-174.
45.
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. (1996). Observation of the parliamentary elections held in the republic of Armenia: May 26 and June 2, 1996. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr
46.
OrdeshookPeterShvetsovaOlga. (1994). Ethnic heterogeneity, district magnitude, and the effective number of parties. American Journal of Political Science, 38, 100-123.
47.
PRS Group. (2007). International country risk guide. East Syracuse, NY: Author.
48.
PrzeworskiAdamAlvarezMichael E.CheibubJose AntonioLimongiFernando. (2000). Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950–1990. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
49.
RobertsKennethWibbelsEric. (1999). Party systems and electoral volatility in Latin America: A test of economic, institutional and structural explanations. American Political Science Review, 93, 575-590.
50.
SchedlerAndreas. (2002). The menu of manipulation. Journal of Democracy, 13, 36-50.
51.
SchedlerAndreas. (2006). The logic of electoral authoritarianism. In SchedlerA. (Ed.), Electoral authoritarianism: The dynamics of unfree competition (pp. 1-26). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
52.
ShugartMatthew SobergCareyJohn M. (1992). Presidents and assemblies: Constitutional design and electoral dynamics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
53.
SimpserAlberto. (2006, March). Outside influences on the conduct of elections. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA.
54.
SimpserAlberto. (2008). Cheating big: On the logic of electoral corruption in developing countries (Working paper). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
55.
StokesSusan C. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. American Political Science Review, 99, 315-325.
56.
TaageperaReinGrofmanBernard. (1985). Rethinking Duverger’s law: Predicting the effective number of parties in plurality and PR systems: Parties minus issues equals one. European Journal of Political Research, 13, 341-352.
57.
TaageperaReinShugartMatthew Soberg. (1989). Seats and votes: The effects and determinants of electoral law. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
58.
TavitsMargit. (2005). The development of stable party support: Electoral dynamics in post-communist Europe. American Journal of Political Science, 49, 283-298.
