Much political science scholarship, including important work in this journal, has explored the implications of natural resource endowments— particularly oil and other highly valuable export commodities—on political and economic outcomes. Although the first wave of literature emphasized the negative effects of these resources, more recent work emphasizes how domestic institutions can condition the relationship, sometimes leading to positive effects. In this special issue, the authors expand this literature in two important ways. First, they renew attention on the international dimensions of this relationship, exploring how trade, migration, foreign investment, and other global forces influence the effects these resources have on countries. Second, they link the study of the globalization—natural resources nexus to broader debates in international and comparative political economy, such as how domestic institutions shape the impact of globalization and how economic factors affect the political survival of regimes and individual leaders. The five studies in this collection use a variety of research methodologies (formal models, country case studies, and large-N empirical analyses) to examine several different international economic factors linking resources with politics. The findings provide new insights into the politics of natural resources, expand the traditional focus of the resource curse literature to include other natural resources (e.g., water), and shed light on whether globalization has the ability to improve natural resource governance around the world.
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