Abstract
One of the democratic peace puzzles is the question of whether and to what extent the democracy → peace relationship underestimates the possibility that peace precedes democracy: the reversed causal arrow hypothesis. From a war making–state making perspective, democratization needs to be viewed as a partial function of external threat and domestic power concentration. All three variables are found to be interrelated as predicted and related in turn to the external conflict behavior of major powers from 1816 to 1992. These monadic findings, however, do not appear to negate the dyadic relationship between democratization and selectively reduced conflict behavior. In sum, there is substantial support for the reversed causal arrow hypothesis, but it does not render the regime type → conflict behavior relationships spurious. Rather, it enriches the understanding of the context in which democratization has emerged to have some effect on international politics.
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