Several characteristics of a political system have been identified as increasing the cost of governing, such as presidentialism, federalism, an open list with proportional representation, a multiparty system, and coalition governments. Although Brazil suffers from all of these “pathologies,” the authors argue that other characteristics of the Brazilian system have the opposite effect and allow high levels of governability at low cost. In particular, the authors examine the role of legislators’ amendments to the budget, which provide the executive a low-cost means of obtaining support. The authors provide evidence that the Brazilian president routinely uses his or her powers to reward and punish legislators for supporting or opposing his or her interests in Congress. Although legislators have a limited role in the budgetary process, that role can have important electoral consequences for their political careers.
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