This study examines the determinants of public expenditures in advanced market economies by simultaneously assessing the impact of domestic political institutions and globalization. A distinction is made between collective veto points and competitive veto points, demonstrating that not all veto points have restrictive effects. It is shown that public expenditures are significantly and positively affected by collective veto points, whereas the oppositeis true for competitive veto points thereby indicating that not all veto points are created equal. In addition to veto points, the effects of globalization are also assessed revealing that globalization is exerting little reform pressures on the welfare state with strong evidence indicating that more globalization buoys public expenditures. Current disbursements and social transfers are both positively influenced by globalization. These findings suggest that domestic political institutions continue to shape policy trajectories in this purported global age.
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