This article analyzes European Union (EU) politics through the lens of comparative federalism. The article assesses the contributions that rationalist and constructivist approaches can make to the analysis of EU federalism, focusing on two broad questions. First, what explains shifts in authority from the state (i.e., member states) to the federal (i.e., EU) level? Second, what explains the degree to which the federal government constrains state discretion? This article develops testable hypotheses based on the rationalist and constructivist perspectives and presents a set of initial plausibility probes. The article shows that there is considerable room for dialogue between rationalist and constructivist perspectives and together they can provide a more comprehensive explanation for the dynamics of EU federalism.
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