The Resurgence of Chinese Exceptionalism Under Xi’s Leadership

Abstract

This article examines a historical process of Chinese exceptionalism throughout history. Shedding light on different forms of exceptionalism from imperial China till now, I argue that a new form of exceptionalism appeared under Xi’s administration. Recent studies about this concept seem to dismiss the identity factor and its relations with Chinese exceptionalism. Additionally, the literature on the resurgence of exceptionalism under Xi’s era has been less discussed. In order to address this gap, I identify the common features of Chinese exceptionalism and underline the continuities and changes it has during Chinese history to better explain its traces under Xi’s leadership. The article concludes that Chinese exceptionalism is a narrative that helps Chinese leaders, including Xi Jinping, to give credentials to their domestic and international politics. Furthermore, through my evaluation of the pertinent literature, I suggest that Xi’s exceptionalism is the combination of previous forms of exceptionalism in the past with a subtle difference that paves the way for China to be an active rising power.

Introduction

There is a consensus among Chinese scholars that China and its foreign policies have been distinctive, and since the last decade or so, they have been investigated within the framework of Chinese exceptionalism (中国例外论) (Ho 2015; Zhang 2011). Due to a variety of reasons this concept has captured the attention of scholars recently. First, China has turned into a rising great power and its specific exceptionalist characteristics in various spheres—akin to American exceptionalism—have been included in foreign policy literature (Zhang 2011). Second, the international structure has undergone massive changes during the last decades which has created a strong desire in the minds of Chinese leaders to ‘present China as a peaceful power to create a China opportunity’ in order to pave the way for China’s rise and ensure its national interests (Ibid., 317). Finally, China’s increasing economic footprint, its growing military presence and political influence and recent success in containing COVID-19 have convinced many observers that China is no more an ordinary country. These arguments have been significantly advanced by a large and diverse set of authors addressing Chinese exceptionalism so as to reflect on social, political and historical aspects of this concept (Buzan 2010; Johnston 2018; Kim 1994; Wang 2015). For instance, Benjamin Ho, who has conducted comprehensive research on exceptionalism, believes that China’s exceptional perception of itself has affected its mentalities of global politics which could help us to better understand the Chinese worldview and its interpretation of ‘International Relations compared to mainstream IR theories’ (Ho 2021, 15).

With a closer look at the literature, we realised that many scholars take the idea of exceptionalism as the point of departure in order to investigate the relations of Chinese exceptionalism with domestic and international politics. They believe that an exceptionalist mindset would offer us ‘a more holistic explanation’, which could enable us to understand Chinese politics, interests and its associations with the world as well, since Chinese self-perception and its views towards the world are intricately interwoven with each other (Ho 2021, 17). This could be also applicable to China’s domestic politics in which Chinese exceptionalism would not only give credentials to Chinese Communist Party (CCP’s) ‘governance within China’ but also enhance the image of China at the global level (Ibid., 23). Similarly, Chris Alden and Daniel Large consider Chinese exceptionalism ‘as a normative modality of engagement that seeks to structure relations’, which focuses on ensuring win-win cooperation and common interests at bilateral and multilateral levels (Alden and Large 2011, 21).

However, these studies on Chinese exceptionalism merely cover its ups and downs till Hu Jintao’s period. It is not clear whether this concept is still valid under Xi’s leadership or not. There are some scholars who shed light on Xi’s leadership against the backdrop of Chinese exceptionalism. For example, Björn Alexander Düben considers Xi’s era as the end of Chinese exceptionalism (Düben 2020). However, the framework he devised to explain Xi’s style of leadership does not match the precepts of Chinese exceptionalism, which will be discussed later. Rather than examining the issues under study within the context of Chinese exceptionalism, he merely focuses on Xi Jinping’s attempts at eliminating the political norms adopted by his predecessors (Ibid). In fact, for him, the unique and dynamic form of authoritarian governance in China is the backbone of Chinese exceptionalism which was destroyed by Xi (Ibid). Despite the nuance of this debate, few academic works seek to discuss the manifestation of exceptionalism during Xi’s era which has its roots in Chinese history and culture. To find out whether this is happening in the contemporary era, I examine the literature on Chinese exceptionalism focusing on different types of exceptionalism throughout the history of China up until now to illuminate its traces under Xi’s administration and its role in shaping Contemporary China’s governance.

In the next section, I first introduce the concept of Chinese exceptionalism and its key characteristics. Then it is followed by a review of earlier literature on Chinese exceptionalism from the imperial to contemporary eras. The current literature on this concept mostly analyses China, its behaviour and foreign policy within the context of imperial China and its traditional Central Kingdom. This literature, however, seeks to shed light on different aspects of Chinese exceptionalism which has existed within the body of CCP and has manifested itself in different forms. I find that Chinese exceptionalism is a narrative which has been associated with Chinese identity. However, this issue has been overlooked in the literature on exceptionalism and Xi’s current strategies and policy agendas. Therefore, the new type of exceptionalism that appeared under Xi Jinping has been built upon the legacy of previous Chinese leaders regarding exceptionalism.

Chinese Exceptionalism Defined

Every nation could claim that it is exceptional due to the existence of some unique qualities ranging from ‘the particular set of political and social values to the special historical trajectory and foreign relations experience’ (Zhang 2011, 306). As a result, China could also have its own type of exceptionalism. In fact, Chinese superiority, greatness, goodness and uniqueness have been the recurring themes in the literature on Chinese exceptionalism (Ho 2015; Zhang 2011), which makes us focus on the history of China in order to understand the rise and significance of this concept.

Nonetheless, the range of academic inquiry and conflicting viewpoints regarding Chinese exceptionalism is a testament to the complexity of understanding this concept and its evolution throughout the history of China. What the pertinent literature has missed is the role of identity in shaping Chinese exceptionalism and the way it has affected Chinese leaders’ governance. In fact, investigating Chinese national identity or Chineseeness is a starting point to understand Chinese exceptionalism. There have been lots of debates among scholars about being Chinese in the 21st century (Brown 2007; Callahan 2010; Wang 2000). This issue becomes more prominent when looking at the relations between Chinese national identity, Chineseness and Chinese exceptionalism narratives which are used by Chinese authorities to not only build a ‘collective identity’ among Chinese people to connect diverse communities of Chinese citizens but also give credential to CCP (Ho 2021,73).

However, with a closer look at the literature, it appears that the above-mentioned narratives are not merely limited to domestic purposes, rather, could offer Chinese authorities an opportunity to better illustrate what it means to be Chinese and the global achievements of China to non-Chinese, as we witnessed in 2008 Olympic Games (Ibid). Additionally, Chinese leaders resort to such narratives in order to put great emphasis on China’s goodness and its superior morality and portray the West as the source of China’s problems and ills (Callahan 2010). Seen this way, China’s international and domestic politics were shaped by Chinese exceptionalism which influenced Chinese perceptions of its power and influence in the world. Accordingly, the concept underlines the superiority of Chinese politics in comparison with the West and the unique contribution of China to the world of politics which questions the current normative rules of governance and presents Chinese models as ‘morally better’ (Ho 2021, 21).

Exceptionalism in Imperial China

Initially, exceptionalism was expressed in imperial China, especially in Chinese leaders’ claims about China’s ‘centrality and superiority’ and ‘the benevolent and magnanimous nature of its foreign policy’, the nature of which could be reflected in the concepts, including 中国 and 天下, which, respectively, means ‘the central state’ and ‘all under heaven’ which also connote superiority and centrality of China in cultural, political, and moral spheres (Zhang 2011, 308). Such debate regarding greatness and superiority had been closely connected with the belief that Chinese rulers were chosen by Heaven and subsequently influenced Chinese understanding of their national identity due to being located at the centre of the world (Ho 2015). Chiang Kai-shek also believed that the name 中国 had not only geographical and cultural but also political connotations, and whoever dominated 中国 would be the legitimate ruler of 天下 (Chiang 1947). Besides 中国, Chinese also refer to their country as 神州 means ‘the sacred land/the divine land’ or 天朝 ‘Celestial Empire/ heavenly dynasty’ (Wang 2012, 42–43).

Regarding imperial China’s foreign relations, the general consensus is that certain dynasties specifically the Ming (1368–1644) sought to offer benevolence and peace in their relations, thereby establishing peace and stability in their periphery (Zhang 2011). The underlying motivation behind these dynasties to adopt such an approach, according to some scholars, was to ‘share the fortune of peace’ with other nations and states through a peaceful foreign policy (He 2007, 206–308). This expression, thus, suggests an important element of exceptionalism, namely, China’s tendency to ‘include all other polities in its foreign policy domain and promote their development and prosperity under the influence and constraints of the Chinese civilisation’ (Zhang 2011, 308). Therefore, imperial China’s exceptionalism was characterised by ‘sinocentrism and Tianxiaism in world order conception, benevolent pacifism in policy conduct, and magnanimous inclusionism in foreign relations’ (Ibid).

A dominant feature of Chinese exceptionalism in the related context is that the authors often veer into some excess where they highlight the positive sides of this concept and refrain from portraying the opposite sides. Such an unbalanced tone creates suspicion among the observers when it comes to talking about Chinese leadership not only during the imperial but also in contemporary China.

Moreover, one may argue that imperial exceptionalism is merely limited to the imperial era, but such an argument misses the mark. In fact, if not all but some main components of this type of exceptionalism, namely, pacifism, inclusionism and Sino-centric tendencies in foreign relations could be found in almost all Chinese leaders since 1949. Mao’s insistence on treating China as a great power and centrality of China in its ties with other countries, Deng’s peaceful policies of reaching out to the world, Hu and Jinag’s peaceful development policy which stressed establishing peace and harmony among countries, and finally Xi Jinping’s multifaceted policies which combines all the elements of this type of exceptionalism. Furthermore, in order to shed light on more aspects of Xi’s exceptionalism, his exceptional leadership and the changes he has made in the decision-making structure of the CCP will be examined.

Exceptionalism Under Mao

After Chinese unfavourable historical experiences during the 19^th and early 20^th centuries, known to the Chinese as the ‘century of humiliation’, China’s ‘distinctiveness was maintained in the form of a widely shared feeling’ that China must be treated as a great power (Nymalm and Plagemann 2018, 23). With the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China was no longer the centre of the known world, but under Mao, a new form of exceptionalism appeared that considered China as a unique state in a way that ‘China’s historical entitlement to great power status and moral authority’ was based on some closely related assumptions that have their roots in Chinese understanding of their culture and history (Zhang 2011, 309). This mentality was tellingly manifested in Mao’s political approaches which emphasised the centrality and autonomy of China in foreign relations (Kirby 1994). Such beliefs are not merely limited to Chinese leaders, actually, most Chinese people believe in the greatness of their nation and expect that China should be treated as a great power since it has a pivotal role in world affairs (Levine 1994). Therefore, ‘its foreign policy is based not on expediency but on immutable principles that express universal values such as justice and equity’ (Ibid., 44). As a result, Mao sought to underline the ‘moral superiority’ of China by propagating this issue that as ‘a peaceful great power that had fallen victim to Western imperialism’, China sympathised with the weak and oppressed countries and ‘would strive for the alleviation of their poverty and oppression’, (Zhang 2011, 309) which demonstrates that China’s attacks on ‘power politics’ and ‘hegemony’ under Mao’s era were not merely ‘diplomatic ritual’, rather ‘an integral part of projecting its national/cultural identity as a moral regime in the global theatre’(Kim, 408).

Therefore, Chinese exceptionalism under Mao which was termed by Zhang as ‘revolutionary sinocentrism or Tianxiaism’ sought to depict China’s unique way of realising world communism which distinguished it from the West (Zhang 2011, 310). Chen Jian also argued that the imperial Central Kingdom mentality had deeply influenced Mao, which could be understood from his ambition that ‘the revolution would finally turn China into a land of universal justice and equality’ while simultaneously reestablishing China’s central position in the world and thereby making it ‘a model for other oppressed nations’ (Chen 2001, 51). Understood as such, the evolution of imperial Chinese exceptionalism with its distinctive abovementioned characteristics was replaced by Mao’s version of exceptionalism which emphasised ‘revolutionary exceptionalism’, ‘great power entitlement’ and ‘moral superiority’ (Zhang 2011, 310).

Ethical Exceptionalism

Being cognizant of the issue that communism would no more justify their policies and ensure the maintenance of the party, Chinese leaders decided to adopt a new ideology which emphasised China’s ethical system as a panacea for the new international challenges (Alden and Large 2011). Therefore, since the 1980s, we have witnessed a new form of Chinese exceptionalism, which has sought to depict China’s distinctive ethical system- and the key phrase ‘with Chinese Characteristics’ used by Chinese leaders in order to highlight the uniqueness of China’s policies that distinguish them from the West. These statements seem to carry the implication that the ‘Chinese paradigm to global politics’ is a unique and obvious alternative that could be followed by others (Ho 2015, 165). Being proud of their rising power and moral superiority, Chinese leaders adopted some norms and principles which were heavily influenced by ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, ‘Mao’s anit-imperialist views’ and ‘Deng Xiaoping’s anti-hegemonist theories’ (Ibid., 168).

Additionally, the linkage between Chinese exceptionalism and Chinese unique ethics and morality could be inferred from a study of Chinese national discourse during the 1980s and 1990s, in which Chinese leaders tended to talk more about ‘ethics, principles, and Chinese philosophy’ rather than national interest issues, which suggested that to what extent morality and ethical rationalisations were of great importance for Chinese leaders (Wang 2012, 132). Therefore, this new form of Chinese exceptionalism draws a comparison between Chinese and Western models and depicts China as a distinctive great power (Wang 2015). Not surprisingly then, lots of criticisms came from China against the West in general and the US in particular which were centred on moral economic, political and human rights issues (Ho 2015). Such a kind of exceptionalism even remains today under Xi’s administration. Even today a majority of Chinese elites and ordinary people attach great importance to morality and ethical codes, which have also been a key notion in legitimising CCP throughout the history of China (Yan 2021).

Harmonious Exceptionalism

As a rising great power, China needs to dispel this notion that it would not repeat the mistakes of Western rising powers throughout history by pursuing zero-sum policies, but seeks to provide a peaceful and harmonious world for all countries (Zhang 2011). In essence, such claims seek to corroborate the Chinese narrative that historically China has been defensive, non-expansionist, and status quo-oriented (Wang 2015). These peaceful-oriented discourses can be found in Chinese official documents and statements. Some typical examples were Zheng Bijian’s ‘peaceful rise’ thesis (Zheng 2005), the government’s 2005 and 2011 White Papers on ‘China’s peaceful development’ (PRC State Council 2005; PRC State Council 2011), and State Councilor Dai Bingguo’s essay entitled ‘Stick to the path of peaceful development’ (Dai 2010). In addition to these claims, the term ‘harmony with a difference’ (和而不同) also entered Chinese exceptionalist literature to better explain the Chinese worldview and its exceptional problem-solving approaches by emphasising Chinese eagerness to embrace ‘harmonious coexistence of differences’ and ‘tolerant of other cultures in a process of harmonising differences’, the roots of which lie in Confucian philosophy (Zhang 2011, 312–314). Hence, we have witnessed frequent usage of the term harmony by Chinese leaders in their major domestic and international speeches. For instance, on 1 November 1997, Jiang Zemin delivered a speech titled ‘Enhance Mutual Understanding and Build Stronger Ties of Friendship and Cooperation’ at Harvard University and mentioned:

The Chinese nation is a big family composed of 56 nationalities. Since time immemorial, people of all nationalities have established closely-knitted political, economic and cultural links and joined hands in developing the vast land of our country. China became a vast unified country more than 2,000 years ago. The deep-rooted Chinese culture become a strong bond for ethnic harmony and national unity. Solidarity and unity have been inscribed in the hearts of the Chinese people as part of their national identity. Despite occasional division in Chinese history, ethnic harmony and national unity have remained the mainstream in the history of the Chinese nation, and an important guarantee for China’s development and progress (Jiang 1997).

Similarly, Hu (2005) in his September 2005 speech to the United Nations summit highlighted this theme: ‘We should maintain the diversification of civilisations in the spirit of equality and openness, reinforce dialogue and exchanges among different civilisations and join hands to build a harmonious world where various civilisations coexist’. As understood, a harmonious world suggests the essence of Chinese exceptionalism which in Callahan’s words ‘sees China as an inherently peaceful civilisation – as opposed to what is seen as Western civilisation’s inherent violence’ (Callahan 2013, 48). Moreover, Chinese exceptionalism under Jiang and Hu embraced the combination of the key term of harmony with the term inclusiveness to further underline the promotion of international collaboration, and multilateralism, acknowledging the inclusion of all countries with different political and cultural backgrounds within the international system. With that said, Chinese leaders have supported the inclusion of all countries in order to achieve ‘common security, development, and prosperity based on open multilateralism and mutually beneficial cooperation’ for all countries (Zhang 2011, 312). Interestingly, this concept has also resurfaced under Xi’s administration. For instance, in his report to the 19th CPC National Congress on October 18, 2017, Xi Jinping (Xi 2020, 27) highlighted peaceful development, harmony and inclusiveness:

We must keep in mind both the internal and international situation, stay on the path of peaceful development and continue to pursue a mutually beneficial strategy of opening up. We will uphold justice while pursuing shared interests and will foster new thinking on common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. We will pursue open, innovative, and inclusive development that benefits everyone; boost cross-cultural exchanges characterised by harmony within diversity, inclusiveness, and mutual learning; and cultivate ecosystems based on respect for nature and green development. China will continue its efforts to safeguard world peace, contribute to global development, and uphold international order.

Zhang called such a harmonious inclusion approach ‘neo-Tianxiaism’ since it renewed the old concept of Tianxia in order to adapt it to contemporary realities and structures (Zhang 2011, 13). Acknowledging the diversity of the world which is a recurring theme in the speeches of Chinese leaders, we should consider the roots of such assumptions which lie in the Tianxia principles. In this regard, the distinguished Chinese philosopher, Tingyang Zhao noted that ‘a maximisation of cooperation and a minimisation of conflict’ create a harmony between different states (Zhao 2016, 61). At the same time, however, the concept of Tianxia which has been one of the significant aspects of Chinese exceptionalism, would not merely seek to develop a sense of harmony among the different nations but rather enable Chinese leaders to project Chinese worldviews at a global level. A prime example of the pervasiveness of Tianxia mentality in Chinese foreign affairs would be its tendency to align with both developing and developed countries, considering itself both as a developed and developing state and simultaneously claiming a great power status (Ho 2021). Therefore, such a mentality would not only offer the Chinese ‘a theoretical framework’ whereby to propagate Chinese claims about exceptionalism at a global level but also allow them to ‘de-legitimising the Western-led international system’ and highlight its ‘ideological superiority’ by using the US as a scapegoat for all the ills of the world (Ibid., 58).

Exceptionalism Under XI

Xi’s version of Chinese exceptionalism, though distinctive, is not a fundamental departure from his predecessors mentioned before. In fact, Xi’s Chinese exceptionalism is the encapsulation of the main tenets of Chinese exceptionalism, namely, harmonious coexistence, the peaceful rise of China and depicting the uniqueness of China which distinguishes it from the West. But there are some components that Xi added to Contemporary Chinese exceptionalism-shaping existing order in order to pave the way for the rise of China and reviving authoritarianism in order to increase his authority and centralise decision-making power across all policy areas both in domestic and international arenas. Hence, following President Xi’s assumption of power, most observers believe that he has adopted an assertive approach which is a fundamental departure from his predecessors’ strategy of a low profile (韬光养晦) strategy (Ho 2021). In order to better understand Xi’s type of exceptionalism, it is necessary to investigate his China Dream of Great Rejuvenation (伟大复兴) —which links Chinese exceptionalism with his grand strategy and the emergence of China as a great power—and the changes he has made in decision-making and policy formulation of China.

When Xi assumed power in 2012, China was a rising power and strong enough, which attract the attention of various countries. Consequently, there was no need to go back to Deng’s strategy of a low profile (韬光养晦) or solely adhere to the peaceful rise development of Jiang and Hu (Goldstein 2020). But that does not mean Xi has completely ignored them all, rather he aims to adopt a proactive strategy-rejuvenation strategy—to adjust Chinese strategy to the time at which establishing cooperative ties with rival and neighbour countries is of great importance since they have been seriously contemplating establishing an anti-China coalition to contain the rise of China in the region and beyond (Xinhua 2014). This approach would not merely enable China to adapt but ‘more actively shaping, the world in which it is rising’ (Goldstein 2020, 178). Indeed, Xi’s strategy of rejuvenation has focused on the three efforts of ‘reassure, reform and resist’ (Ibid., 177), which will be discussed below.

First, by focusing on the reassuring approach, Xi sought to reassure other countries that China’s growth in military and economic spheres would not pose any threat to them, but rather would offer them mutual benefit and win-win collaboration (Goldstein 2020). In fact, this effort is the continuation of the peaceful development rise of China which has been taken by his predecessors. Therefore, Xi sought to de-escalate tensions with great and regional powers (Ibid). In this regard, at the summit meeting in June 2013, Xi suggested to Obama that the US and China should forge a ‘new type of great power relationship’ in order to manage their tensions and avoid the ‘Thucydides trap’ (Zhao 2013) Similarly, at a conference in Indonesia in October 2013, he had a speech on ‘peripheral diplomacy’ and asked for establishing relations with regional countries and mitigating concerns about the rise of China (Thayer 2013).

Second, the idea of reform manifests itself in Xi’s era more than before. As China became wealthy and powerful, Xi realised that there was a need to make some reforms in the international system since China believes that the current order which was established by the US before, needs to adapt to the realities of the time (Goldstein 2020). But making some changes in the global order does not mean that Beijing seeks to overthrow the existing order, rather it aims to have a more constructive role in the international system besides participating within it (Ibid). Moreover, China realised that the world needs ‘a new international order’ which is ‘more just and reasonable’, and Xi asks for collective efforts to realise such an international community (Xi 2017). Considering this, Xi sends this message that ‘China is neither a passive status quo power’ nor ‘a disruptive revisionist power’ which seeks to join the current international system or overthrow it, it is rather ‘a reformist power seeking changes to improve a global order’ which would be not only to the benefit of China but all the states (Goldstein 2020, 183). A prime example of promoting international order was China’s Belt and Road Initiative which, though a Chinese initiative, has sought to improve the current existing order rather than challenging it and embrace further collaboration with other countries and current related institutions including BRICS, AIIB, World Bank etc. (Goldstein 2020). And finally, the last component of Xi’s rejuvenation seeks to put great emphasis on maintaining and protecting China’s core national interests. Although China had focused on this issue under Jiang and Hu, especially regarding the Taiwan issue, under Xi, there has been an unprecedented push on core national interests (Ibid). For instance, he has devoted more resources and attention to China’s capabilities, specifically in the military sphere to defend its core interests in the Taiwan Strait and East Asian region (Ibid).

Finally, the rise of authoritarianism under Xi’s era has been the last aspect of Xi’s exceptionalism. Chinese leaders in the Post-Mao era, up until Hu Jintao’s tenure sought to prevent the concentration of power in one top leader due to the irreparable damage China had suffered during the Mao era (Shambaugh 2021). Therefore, they decided to consider a ‘collective leadership’ model which could prevent overconcentration of power and make the top leaders consult with other groups of leaders in the Politburo Standing Committee when they want to make a decision (Guo 2019, 282; Li 2019, 13). Alongside this model, there are some informal norms and procedures including ‘mandatory retirement age and term limits for CCP Politburo members, cadre evaluation systems, and regional representation in the CCP Central Committee’ (US Annual Report to Congress 2022), which in some observers’ words lead to the emergence of a more ‘institutionalised’ political system in China (Fewsmith 2021, 265–266; Miller 2018b). Similarly, Cheng Li, a distinguished expert on China’s politics, believes that the existence of at least two factions in China’s political system which have created an ‘intraparty mechanism approximating a system of checks and balances in the CCP leadership’, enables the leaders of these factions to occupy top leadership positions (Li 2019, 251–256). He categorised these factions as an ‘elitist coalition’ consisting of leaders from the families of revolutionaries- such as Jiang Zemin, and Xi Jinping, and a ‘populist’ faction of leaders who had an affiliation with the Communist Youth League and their policy orientations revolved around equality in the economic sphere and wide regional development including Hu Jintao, and Li Keqiang (Ibid). It should be noted that these factional groups are not exhaustive, since as Bo Zhiyue, director of the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre (NZCCRC) and Professor of Political Science at Victoria University of Wellington, mentions there are various factional groups in the literature of Chinese politics such as the Youth League group, the princelings, the Tsinghua clique, and the Shanghai gang. However, none of these is necessarily ‘functional factions in real politics’. What is important is the relations of politicians with the core leader, Xi Jinping, who has sought to eliminate various factions and ‘lump them into one loosely connected anti-Xi faction’ since he assumed power (Zhiyue 2022). There is no doubt that since assuming power in 2012, Xi has created his own faction and appointed his people to various positions of power in the Party. This issue has become more prominent when we look at leadership changes in the members of Politburo—who have played a significant role in the political system of China since Xi took power. According to Nikkei (2019), in the 19^th Congress, 14 of the 25 members of the Politburo were from Xi’s faction. Regarding the 20^th Congress, more than half of the members of the Politburo are from Xi’s faction (Maan 2022). Similarly, Guoguang Wu, from the University of Victoria in Canada and Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Centre for China Analysis, believes that Xi’s unprecedented dominance of the CCP leadership, evidenced by Xi’s men occupying almost most of the seats in the top leadership bodies of the CCP, put an end to the old factional politics among Chinese elites (Wu 2022), which means that under Xi’s era, we witness a new era of factional politics in which ‘Xi’s status and authority as top leader are unlikely to meet any challenges from within high-ranking CCP cadres’, rather factional competition begins to occur ‘among the various groups of Xi’s followers who currently sit on the Politburo and its Standing Committee’(Ibid).

As for the norms and institutions in China’s political system, as mentioned before, they are informal, flexible and not necessarily binding which means that they could be manipulated by Chinese leaders in order to advance their own interests (Fewsmith 2021). We witnessed such manipulation during Jian Zemin’s tenure when he abused these norms to maintain his position and eliminate his rivals and opponents (US Annual Report to Congress 2022). Similarly, Xi Jinping has fully taken advantage of these informal norms to consolidate his power and upset the previous trend towards factional power balancing. Alvin Y. So, a distinguished professor at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, takes a step further and argues that Xi has systematically dismantled and rolled back the legacies of Deng Xiaoping which has provided China with political stability during the past four decades including ‘fixed term limit and enforced retirement rules for leaders and cadres; relative tolerance of intellectual and limited dissent; and no personality cult around the leader’ (So 2019, 51). In justifying Xi’s changes to the political system of China, So draws a comparison between Deng and Xi’s political trajectories and argues that, unlike Deng who was an experienced and respected figure that had been in high places which enabled him to carry out far-reaching reforms, Xi has not such authority and background which makes him to revitalise the party-state and changing the decision-making structures. Hence, Xi is more prone to authoritarianism (So 2019). Furthermore, when Xi assumed power in 2012, he realised that the CCP lost its efficient governance capacity under his recent predecessors (Ibid). Xi himself highlighted this issue in his ‘historical resolution’ ¹ and claimed that ‘previously lax and weak governance’ ‘weakened the Party’s creativity, cohesiveness, and ability, and posed a serious test to its exercise of national governance’ (Embassy of the PRC in the US 2021).

Over the past decades, Xi has gradually increased his power and personal authority in China’s political system which has been unprecedented since Mao Zedong (Wu 2020). Unlike Jiang Zeming and Hu Jintao, he immediately took control of the party, military, and state, in a way that became CCP general secretary and chairman of the CMC in 2012 and state chairman in 2013 (US Annual Report to Congress 2022). In 2016, the 18th CCP Central Committee formally declared him the ‘core’ of the CCP (Buckley 2016; People’s Daily 2016). The word ‘core’ is used for influential top leaders in China’s politics and was used before only for Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping (Buckley 2016; Guo 2019). At the end of Xi’s first term, his political theory, ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ was included in the Party Charter and the Preamble of the PRC Constitution which elevated him above the previous leaders after Mao whose contributions to the doctrine of the Party carry less political significance (Miller 2018a; Reuters 2018).

Understood as such, the evolution of Chinese exceptionalism under Xi based on the previous leaders’ policy agendas and priorities, and given what has been discussed, ‘great power reformism, benevolent pacifism and harmonious inclusionism’ have been the dominant features of contemporary Chinese exceptionalism which overlap with previous exceptionalist components of imperial, ethical and revolutionary exceptionalism and suggest that a country’s exceptionalist thinking is bound up with its culture and history (Zhang 2011, 310). In fact, Xi’s form of exceptionalism portrayed China as an alternative to the West with unique economic, political, and cultural aspects. Another aspect of Xi’s exceptionalism is his revival of authoritarianism and centralisation of power in China’s political system which is unprecedented in the history of CCP after Mao.

Conclusion

One of the goals of this article has been to review the academic literature on Chinese exceptionalism and address the gaps which have been dismissed by the authors. First, the article maintains that Chinese exceptionalism is a narrative which seeks to depict China as a different great power, which is morally superior to the West, especially American model. President Xi’s proposal of a new type of great power relations between the US and China, and Chinese leaders’ constant criticism of US hegemony and unilateralism corroborate this issue. Additionally, maintaining the stability and power of the CCP, and promoting a positive image of China in the world as a peaceful, non-hegemonic and moral state have been the ultimate goals of Chinese exceptionalism even today under Xi’s era.

Second, it discusses the links between Chinese identity, Chineseness and Chinese exceptionalism all of which have their roots in Chinese history and culture. Finally, it reveals the continuities and subtle changes of Xi’s exceptionalism.

Third, Xi’s exceptional style of leadership, his attempts at restructuring China’s policy-making apparatus, putting an end to the old factionalism in the Party and paving the way for the emergence of new factional politics which will be among his followers are major issues that are discussed in this article.

After discussing these issues, I embed them into the literature on this field to provide the readers with a more nuanced understanding of Chinese exceptionalism which has resurfaced throughout the history of China in different forms. The article contributes to the literature by making linkages between different forms of Chinese exceptionalism and further explaining how they generate a multifaceted one under Xi’s administration which helped him to reshape his rejuvenation strategy and the future of China’s political system.

Despite what has mentioned in this essay, the existing literature on Chinese exceptionalism has substantial limitations. With that said, there are some questions which are of interest to the scholars of this field: How Chinese exceptionalism could challenge China’s relations with its rival and neighbour countries? What role Chinese exceptionalism would play in shaping Xi’s current and future foreign policy? To what extent nationalism and identity would influence the inception of Chinese exceptionalism throughout the history of China? Finally, regarding Sino–US relations, which have been one of the important issues in global politics, do Chinese exceptionalism and American exceptionalism prevent both sides from managing their tensions or not? Answering all of these questions would offer critical thinking about Chinese exceptionalism and contribute to the scholarship on Contemporary Chinese Studies.