The United States' Discriminatory Protectionism against China

Abstract

The article examines the characteristics of the United States’ (US) discriminatory protection measures, especially the antidumping (AD) duties, against China. China has been the most significant target of US trade protectionism in terms of the absolute number as well as the intensity of measures. There exists a positive relationship between the US bilateral trade deficit and the increase in the number of its discriminatory trade protection measures against China. US AD decisions against China have been led by the chemical industry, followed by the iron and steel industry. It is expected that the number of US discriminatory trade protection measures against the Chinese textile products will increase in the coming years, since the ten-year phase-out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) was completed at the end of 2004. Since discriminatory trade restrictions are costly in terms of the welfare of the concerned countries, it would be necessary for them to apply stricter regulations regarding the discriminatory protection measures.

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Blonigen, B.A. , ‘Evolving Discretionary Practices of US Antidumping Activities’, NBER Working Paper, No. 9625, 2003.

Blonigen, B.A. and C. Bown , ‘ Antidumping and Retaliation Threats ’, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2003, pp. 249–73 .

Bown, C.P. , B. Hoekman and C. Ozden , ‘ The Pattern of US Antidumping: The Path from Filing to WTO Dispute Settlement ’, World Trade Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2003, pp. 319–74 .

Hansen, W. L. and T. J. Prusa , ‘ Cumulation and ITC Decision-making: the Sum of the Parts is Greater than the Whole ’, Economic Inquiry, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1996, pp. 746–69 .

Irwin, D.A. , ‘ The Rise of US Anti-dumping Activity in Historical Perspective ’, The World Economy, Vol. 28, No. 5, 2005, pp. 651–68 .

Mah, J. , ‘ The United States' Antidumping Decision against Northeast Dynamic Economies ’, The World Economy, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2000a, pp. 1701–9 .

Mah, J. , ‘ Antidumping Decisions and Macroeconomic Variables in the USA ’, Applied Economics, Vol. 32, No. 13, 2000b, pp. 1701–9 .

Mah, J. and Y. Kim , ‘ The Macroeconomic Determinants of Antidumping Duties: The Case of Korea ’, Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2006, pp. 157–62 .

Messerlin, P. , ‘ China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguard ’, World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2004, pp. 105–30 .

10.

Miranda, J. , R.A. Torres and M. Ruiz , ‘ The International Use of Antidumping: 1987–1997 ’, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 32, No. 5, 1998, pp. 5–71 .

11.

McGee, R.W. and Y. Yoon , ‘Antidumping and the People's Republic of China: Five Case Studies,’ Working Paper 98.2, The Dumont Institute for Public Policy Research, 1998.

12.

Prusa, T.J. , ‘ On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping ’, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2001, pp. 591–611 .

13.

Prusa, T.J. and Skeath S. , ‘Modern Commercial Policy: Managed Trade and Retaliation?’, in E.K. Choi and J. Harrigam (Eds.), Handbook of International Trade, Volume 2 ( London: Blackwell , 2004).

14.

Prusa, T.J. , ‘ Anti-dumping: A Growing Problem in International Trade ’, The World Economy, Vol. 28, No. 5, 2005, pp. 683–700 .

15.

US Department of Commerce, ‘TradState Express™’ (http://tse.export.gov), 2005, Accessed 11 November 2005.

16.

US International Trade Commission, Import Injury Investigations Case Statistics (FY 1980–2003) ( Washington, DC: ITC , 2004).

17.

US International Trade Commission, Annual Report 2005 ( Washington, DC: ITC , 2004).

18.

United States Trade Representative, ‘America's Trade with China’, (http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2004/America's_Trade_with_China.html), 2005, Accessed 11 November 2005.

19.

World Trade Organization, Semi-Annual Reports of the Committee on Anti-dumping Practices under Article 16.4 of the Agreement ( Geneva: WTO , 1995–2005).

20.

Zanardi, M. , ‘ Anti-Dumping: What are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha? ’, The World Economy, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2004, pp. 403–33 .