This study extends previous empirical work on the payoffs associated with an industry's political investments by examining the political strategies and tactics employed by industries involved with the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). In using a comprehensive framework of regulatory decision making to analyze the ITC's decision-making process, the authors also find that industries facing relatively low costs of collective action are able to secure affirmative decisions from ITC commissioners.
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