This study explores the impact of publicly traded founding family firms (FFFs) on their propensity for corporate political activity (CPA) and their choice of political approaches. Based on the behavior and characteristics of publicly traded FFFs, the author expected a positive association between FFFs and corporate political activity and a preference for relational, or long-term, over transactional, or short-term, corporate political activity. It was found that publicly traded FFFs are more likely to engage in CPA only when the firm's founder is in an executive position. Furthermore, publicly traded FFFs show a preference for relational versus transactional corporate political activity. These findings are examined in light of FFF and corporate political strategy literatures.
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