Variance theories have dominated corporate political action (CPA) research because the pioneering works in the 1970s and 1980s. Process theories offer an entirely new perspective on CPA research, as they are able to explain processes across a number of levels of analysis and link actions to contexts. We add to the existing CPA literature by offering a process model that can be useful especially in historical and evolutionary analysis. Our model depicts CPA as a complex system in which a firm’s actions are affected by various factors across organizational, industry, and institutional levels of analysis. As political actions also influence these factors, the process is in essence systemic and path dependent. Our model supplements existing research by offering the possibility to explain the long-term consequences of CPA vis-à-vis wider societal changes and by promoting longitudinal research strategies. In addition to the theoretical model, we provide a historical analysis of the evolution of the Finnish paper and pulp industry to illustrate the applicability of the framework.
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