The selection process for firm participation on foreign trade missions during the Clinton administration has received much attention. Although critics said seats were exchanged for political contributions, government officials argued they selected internationally competitive firms capable of leveraging the contacts the mission provided. This article provides empirical evidence consistent with both claims. Firms with high levels off oreign trade competency were almost six times more likely to be chosen for participation than firms with little international experience, whereas firms making large soft money donations were five times more likely to be chosen for participation than firms making no soft money donations.
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