Coercion and Teaching: Further Reflections

Abstract

In this rejoinder it is argued that the main objections advanced by Beran can be met if two important senses of the concepts of coercion and teaching are distinguished; these are called the “loose” and “tight” senses. With these distinctions in mind, the question of when coercion can be a method of teaching is further examined and it is found that the main contention of the initial paper still appears valid. Coercion and teaching only overlap either when they are both interpreted in a loose sense or when the teaching is concerned just with the acquisition of basic habits as argued previously. It is further maintained that even where we can talk in a loose sense of coerced belief, it is a more difficult task to coerce false than true belief, and finally that the concepts of education and coercion are incompatible.

References

These distinctions can only be drawn very briefly in this rejoinder but I believe they can be made sufficiently clear for the purposes of the present argument. They are not intended to provide full definitions of “coercion” or “teaching” but merely to illustrate two different senses in which the words are commonly used. A loose sense can be understood as one that lacks one or more of the essential features of what may be called a “standard case” of the concept (exemplified by the tight sense) but has sufficient similarities for it to be regarded, at least in ordinary usage, as an instance of the concept. A more detailed discussion of the essential features of the two concepts is given in my original paper, Coercion and Teaching.

It is outside the scope of this rejoinder to consider the relative merits of these two types of teaching but it is interesting to note that this question is in some ways analagous to the issue of discovery learning versus expository teaching as alternative methods of bringing about learning.

For some relevant discussions of the concept of education (and its relation to rationality) see: Bowen

Hobson

P. E.

Theories of Education: Studies of Significant Innovation in Western Educational Thought. Sydney: John Wiley & Sons, 1974. (Introduction and Chapter 8). Langford, G. Philosophy and Education: An Introduction. London: Macmillan, 1968, (Chapters 4, 5.) Peters, R. S. Ethics and Education. London: Allen & Unwin, 1966. (Chapters 1, 2.) Woods, R. G., and Barrow, R. St C. Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. London: Methuen, 1975. (Chapter 1.)

This point was argued in my original paper and as far as I can see has not been disputed by Dr. Beran.

This is not to deny that coercion may on occasion be an effective method of teaching as in the senses and situations discussed above.

This incidentally is not an instance of Coercion I as the silence of the class does not bring about whatever learning takes place, it merely makes it possible.

These points regarding the incompatibility of coercion and education can only be stated very briefly here. It is, however, I think, safe to say that there is a good deal of consensus on this topic both from the ethical point of view (with regard to the inappropriateness and moral unjustifiability of using coercion as a means of getting children to learn) and from the psychological point of view (with regard to the harmful effects on future attitudes towards learning caused by excessive use of coercion).

In this regard, I should add that Dr. Beran's claim that my statement “that the aim of the coercer is fundamentally different to that of the teacher” is obviously false, is only so if I were maintaining that the two aims could never overlap. What I was claiming (and still do) is that the aim of the coercer qua coercer is fundamentally different to the aim of the teacher qua teacher.