In Coercion and Teaching (this journal, June 1973). Hobson argues for the view that one cannot be coerced to learn that X. The present paper tries to show that Hobson's argument for this view depends on a misunderstanding of the concept of coercion and that the conclusion of his argument is false.
References
1.
Hobson alternates between posing the basic question of his article in terms of coercive teaching and coerced learning. For example, he asks “… can coercion ever be a form of ‘teaching that’? (i.e. can one get people to learn prepositional knowledge by coercing them?)” (p. 172). He also writes “This question is raised especially when certain schools are criticized as ‘using coercive methods of teaching’ or of ‘forcing children to learn’ certain facts” (p. 168). Lack of space makes impossible a discussion of the difference between “form” and “method” of teaching and of the question whether coercion can be a method of teaching. (It obviously cannot in this sense: coercion is not an alternative to giving a lecture, as a method of teaching, in the way in which holding a discussion session or showing a video-tape are.) Hence, this paper deals only with the question whether it is possible to coerce a person to learn something.
2.
In criticism of Scheffler's definition of ‘education’, Hobson asserts that “Teaching can take place without the giving of reasons of any sort …” (p. 170). Hobson has pointed out to me that this claim is consistent with premise (3), since the student's reason for thinking X true can be that it has been asserted by his teacher. Testimony can be a reason for believing a proposition (cf. Price, H. H. Belief. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969, Lecture 5).
3.
Like Hobson, I am excluding beliefs “related to the act of coercion itself” (p. 173), e.g. the belief that someone is trying to coerce me.
4.
Hobson does not make it clear whether he thinks (the acquisition of) belief without reason is logically or merely empirically impossible. It is sufficient for his purpose in the article under discussion if it is empirically impossible. Hence I will only discuss this latter claim.
5.
Op. cit., p. 303. Cf. D. M. Armstrong who, in his book Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge: University Press, 1973) flatly asserts “It is perfectly possible to hold a belief without the holder having any reason for it” (p. 77).
6.
I am grateful to Prof. D. M. Armstrong for helpfully discussing this argument with me.
7.
FlewAntony, God and Philosophy, London: Hutchison, 1966, p. 161. Cf. Alexander Sesonske who writes “A more interesting sort of belief, perhaps, is one with these characteristics: we consciously assent to it; … but we do not know how the belief could be verified, what would constitute evidence for or against it, or even if anything could be evidence for or against it. Religious beliefs are perhaps the most obvious example of this class”. Journal of Philosophy, 1959, LVI, p. 492.
8.
Lack of space prevents me from discussing some controversial aspects of this definition' They do not make any difference to the present issue. For recent discussions of the concept of coercion seePennockJ. R.ChapmanJ. W. (Eds.) Coercion. Chicago/New York: Atherton, 1972; and Robert Nozick's article Coercion in Morgenbesser, S., Suppes, P. and White, M. (Eds.) Philosophy, Science, and Method. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969, 440–472.
9.
This account of a necessary condition in the circumstances, though not the phrase “necessary condition in the circumstances” itself, is borrowed fromTaylorRichardAction and Purpose. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966, 26–31.
10.
For a critical discussion of the view that coming to believe something is an act seeGinsbergMitchellMind and Belief. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972, 16–17.
11.
Perhaps I should also note that what I have called cases of indirect coercion are clearly different from Hobson's examples where learning is indeed not coerced at all but where the students have been coerced to, say, be silent, so that learning may be possible and where coercion is, therefore, a pre-condition for learning without learning itself being coerced (pp. 174–5).
