The use of operational definitions is necessary to educational research of the “normal” kind, but can easily lead to philosophical naiveté and the misleading reporting of results. Robert Ennis's recommendations on the logical form of operational definitions are supported, as a means of avoiding constricting research dogmas, but a case is also made for reminding research trainees of the richness of many educational concepts borrowed from ordinary usage, and of what Polanyi calls the fruitfulness of concepts that are not completely specifiable.
I have discussed Skinner's general position in more detail in Behavior, learning and control: Some philosophical difficulties in the writings of B. F. Skinner, in Educational Theory, 1972, 22, 230–241.
3.
The extreme limit of the rationale that confines teachers within this paradigm is Mager, Robert F. Preparing Instructional Objectives. Belmont, Calif.: Fearon Publishers, 1962. Significantly, the earlier name for the book was Preparing Objectives for Programmed Instruction..
4.
See, for example, five articles in the Journal of Secondary Education, 1970, 45, 339–380, and the philosophical qualms expressed by C. A. Bowers in Accountability from a humanist point of view. The Educational Forum, 1971, 35, 479–486.
5.
BridgmanP. W.The Logic of Modern Physics. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1927, 5, and see the extensive discussion of Bridgman and later exponents in Benjamin, A. Cornelius, Operationism. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1955.
SkinnerB. F.The operational analysis of psychological terms. Psychological Review, 1945, 52, 271. As with so many of Skinner's reductionist claims, no completed examples are provided to back up this assertion. It seems scarcely plausible that we must wait for a listing of all relevant circumstances before we can employ the term ‘length’ in a scientific way.
8.
BrodbeckMayLogic and scientific method in research on teaching. In GageN. L. (Ed.) Handbook of Research on Teaching. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963, 44–51.
9.
HughG.Petrie argues that this was not a point that Bridgman himself insisted on. See A dogma of operationalism in the social sciences. Philosophy of Social Science, 1971, 1, 145.
10.
SkinnerB. F.Science and Human Behavior. N.Y.: Free Press and Collier-McMillan, 1953, 87. I quote Skinner yet again not because he is a philosopher (since he is not), but because he induces so many research workers to shrug off genuine philosophical problems inherent in what they are doing.
11.
BrodbeckMayMeaning and action, excerpted in Krimerman, LeonardI. (Ed.) The Nature and Scope of Social Science: a Critical Anthology. N.Y.: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969, 416–430.
12.
GrossBarry R.Analytic Philosophy: an Historical Introduction. N.Y.: Pegasus, 1970, 107.
13.
StuartF.Chapin recognized the difficulty in 1939 but believed that the process of test standardization took care of it (Definition of definitions of concepts, quoted in KrimermanL. I. (Ed.), op. cit., 377). His suggestion that one asserts the operational definition after the test has been standardized magnificently begs the question.
14.
EnnisRobert H.Operational definitions. American Educational Research Journal, May 1964, 1, 183–201. This reference p. 190.
15.
HempelCarl G., A logical appraisal of operationism, in his Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1965, 126, though he adds that even this move would not enable one to apply the term in circumstances that were slightly different.
16.
In a class seminar attended by the author at the University of Illinois, 1971.
17.
Cf. BenjaminA. C.: “If we prefer certainty and clarity, throwing out all conjecture and all vague ideas, our knowledge will necessarily remain highly restricted in extent, and we shall have available no technique by which it may be extended.” (Op. cit., 112.)
18.
ScrivenMichaelA study of radical behaviorism. In FeiglHerbertScrivenMichael (Eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956, 112 (Scriven's italics).
19.
EnnisR. H., op. cit., 191, footnote 2.
20.
The ‘WQ’ stands for ‘With Qualifications’, representing the usual experimental provisos, such as ‘normed against a sufficiently typical sample’, ‘administered under standard conditions’, and ‘co-operative subject’. In more detail, Campbell, D. T., and Stanley, J. C. list 12 factors jeopardizing validity, in Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963, 5ff.
And it does seem a little surprising that Brodbeck chose it as an example, though this is consistent with her defence of mentalistic terms in Meaning and action.
23.
GarnerWendell R.HakeHarold W.EriksenCharles W.Operationism and the concept of perception. The Psychological Review, 1956, 63, 150.
Quoted byPetrieH. G., op. cit., 147. Cf. also Benjamin, A. C.: “If we are content with what we already know—facts—we can be both very clear and very certain, but if we wish to know something else—hypotheses—we must sacrifice to a degree both clarity and certaint.” (op. cit., 142). The trouble with Benjamin's remark is, how are we to understand the ‘knowing’ of hypotheses?.
26.
BenjaminA. C., op. cit., 124. This is hardly in tune with the spirit of the venture.
27.
BroudyHarry S.Can research escape the dogma of behavioral objectives?School Review, 1970, 79, 44.
28.
ThusPolanyiMichaelPersonal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958, Part I. See also Broudy, Harry S., On ‘knowing with’, in Philosophy of Education, 1970: Proceedings of the 26th Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society. Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University. 1970, 96–100.
29.
PolanyiM., op. cit., 62. See also Knowing and being, in Polanyi, Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi.MarjorieGrene (Ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, 132 f.
30.
KuhnThomas S.The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed., 1970, chaps. 3 and 4. It is of interest that Kuhn is warmly receptive to Polanyi at this point. See, for example, p. 44n and the Postscript to the second edition, p. 191.
31.
BloomBenjamin S. (Ed.). Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: the Classification of Educational Goals: Handbook I: Cognitive Domain, N.Y.: David McKay, 1956, and Handbook II: Affective Domain, by KrathwohlDavid. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1964.
32.
EisnerEliot W.Instructional and expressive educational objectives: their formulation and use in curriculum, in AERA Monograph Series on Curriculum Evaluation, no. 3, Instructional Objectives. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969, 14–16.
