Abstract
This article will argue that corporate performance crime can be described as structurally coerced action because it represents the most reasonable response to a sanction-containing organisational demand set beyond a legitimately attainable threshold. This account of corporate performance crime recognises the importance of structural strain, rational choice and social learning experiences as key contours on its contextual landscape. However, the concept of coercion as a moral concept requires a further and vital ingredient — encroachment upon some moral right. The claim of right to be asserted is one to have organisational rewards allocated upon the basis of merit-based criteria. It is strain theory which provides a space for the assertion of encroachment upon this moral right, while the theories of rational choice and social learning help explain the reasonableness of action. The designation of corporate performance crime as coerced action contains implications for criminal responsibility, punishment and crime-prevention strategies which the article explores.
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