The European Commission's Settlement Procedure in Cartel Cases

Abstract

Since its adoption in July 2008, the European Commission's Settlement Package for cartel cases has been the subject of questions, speculation, and skepticism. The need for clarification of the settlement procedure and its practical implications has become more pressing with the first settlement decisions. First, settlement is an optional route that applies only upon the parties' explicit request, and the standard procedure remains the default one if no settlement is requested or reached. Second, settlement provides for significant procedural economies, in particular, a shorter, streamlined statement of objections and decisions, which in turn limit the parties' reputational damage through adverse publicity. Third, several rounds of confidential bilateral meetings between the Commission and the parties ensure an in-depth hearing of the case, both from the Commission's and the parties' perspectives. Finally, only once a common view of the case is reached are the parties asked to introduce formal settlement submissions to be reflected in the ensuing statement of objections and the decision.