Filter Results

Select search scope: search across all journals or within the current journal

Search this journal

Enter search terms…

Advanced search

/

About

About Sage
About Sage Journals
Privacy Policy
Terms of Use
Contact Us
Help

Information for

Authors
Editors
Librarians
Researchers
Reviewers
Frequently asked questions

All content on this site: Copyright © 2026 Sage Publications. All rights reserved. This website is technically supported and operated by China National Publications Import and Export (Group) Co., Ltd. 京ICP备09090397号-11

Merger of Bertrand Competitors Can Decrease Price

The Antitrust Bulletin

Journal indexing and metrics

Journal Homepage Submission guidelines

Restricted access

Research article

First published online June, 2005

Merger of Bertrand Competitors Can Decrease Price

, , and

Volume 50, Issue 2

https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X0505000203

Abstract

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

Browse journal

Current issue OnlineFirst All issues

Similar articles

Retricted access

The Merger Efficiency Defense: No Legal Basis and a Bad Idea

Retricted access

Against Per Se Illegality of Tying and Bundling in Digital Markets: Perspectives from the EU and India

Retricted access

Global Value Chains and International Competition

Retricted access

Excessive Data Collection as a Form of Anticompetitive Conduct: The German Facebook Case