Divine Commands and Moral Imperatives: A Proposal in Metaethical Theology

Abstract

Christians are generally committed to moral theism, moral realism, moral cognitivism, and moral rationalism. I argue that the acceptance of both moral theism and moral realism leads to a puzzle: Does God arbitrarily decide morality, or is morality independent of God? Neither horn of this dilemma is theologically or philosophically attractive. Furthermore, moral realism is dissatisfying because it is unparsimonious. I show that dispensing with moral realism solves this puzzle and erases this dissatisfaction. I recommend that Christians reject the position that there are moral facts. Together with moral realism, they ought to reject moral cognitivism, that is, they ought to reject the thesis that moral language is descriptive. Instead, I argue, they ought to adopt moral prescriptivism, the theory that the nature of moral language is imperative.