Collective Violence and Group Solidarity: Evidence from A Feuding Society *

Abstract

Sociological explanations of group conflict usually presuppose that the various factors that breed hostility between collectivities also generate internal solidarity. Outside of the protest literature, studies of conflict therefore pay little attention to the collective-action problem facing groups in contention, and therefore overestimate the likelihood of group conflict: Intergroup struggle is implicitly regarded as a sufficient condition for group participation in violent conflict. Examination of nineteenth-century court documents from Corsica, a society known for its tradition of collectivist feuding, shows that violent incidents typically did not involve groups. The group character of violence—in the form of collaborative use of lethal force and inclusion of disputants’ kin—was conditional on collective contention having occurred before violence began. This and other empirical patterns support the view that collective violence occurs when group action fails to convince an adversary to back down. The failure to prevent escalation calls the group's solidarity into question, compelling members to demonstrate that they are able to overcome their collective-action problem.