Revenge as Sanction and Solidarity Display: An Analysis of Vendettas in Nineteenth-Century Corsica

Abstract

Discussions of violence observe that dispute resolution in stateless societies often involves vengeance and collective responsibility for harm. These patterns are typically attributed to a distinctive cultural world-view emphasizing collectivism. Collective hostility is also a common theme in studies of stateless domains within industrial societies, where it is seen as a social pathology. Yet vengeance can also be understood as a purposeful sanction against collective aggression, rather than as a culturally prescribed response to aggression in general. Court records from Corsica are used to assess the rate at which murder was avenged, the determinants of revenge, and patterns in the kin relationships involved. Vengeance was rare and typically occurred when the original incident involved collaboration or violence against nondisputants. Vengeance rarely extended beyond the nuclear family. When it did, correspondingly distant kin of the original victim acted as avengers. Moreover, selection of vengeance targets was based on specific acts of solidarity, not on abstract collective responsibility. Accordingly, acts of revenge were calibrated to demonstrate that the aggrieved family's cohesiveness equalled that displayed by the offender's group. Viewed in this way, vendettas are highly strategic yet altruistic acts—calling into question the conventional notion that rational action is selfish.