On Psychic Determinism

Abstract

A confusion persists in the psychoanalytic literature regarding the concept of psychic determinism. Two authors are cited in whose works the concept is identified as foundational to psychoanalysis, in the one case as a “fundamental hypothesis” (Charles Brenner) and in the other as an “underlying presupposition” or assumption (Linda A.W. Brakel). Both claims are based on a conflation of the concept Freud had in mind with a philosophical doctrine going by the same name but meaning something quite different. The philosophical doctrine has no place in psychoanalysis at all, and Freud’s concept does not play a foundational role there. In a second section a restricted concept of psychic determinism is critically examined. A third section deals with the impact of that restricted concept on clinical theory and contemporary controversies about clinical practice. Finally, some possible reasons for this confusion are suggested.

Keywords

psychic determinism Brenner Brakel Freud

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