Abstract
The term regression refers to the idea that a person can return to earlier phases of mental development and the primitive modes of functioning associated with them. A core concept in both conflict and deficit models of development, the idea has nonetheless come under increasing scrutiny from critics who argue that it misleads us into a genetic fallacy whereby we reduce the issues of adolescent and adult development to their childhood precursors. Inderbitzen and Levy (2000) suggest that we focus on transformations, or shifts, in mental organization, instead of on regressions. But discarding the concept of regression has theoretical implications: to adopt instead a focus on shifts in mental organization we must (1) consider our object of study to be the meaning-making person, not isolated instincts or needs; (2) understand conscious and unconscious mental life to be embedded in the here-and-now relational field; and (3) adopt a lifespan model of development. The aim here is to outline a theoretical framework in which we can more fully explore the possibility of discarding “regression” in favor of a focus on transformations in the developmental present.
Keywords
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
